Giverny Capital is a Montreal quality-growth (GARP) firm founded in 1998 by engineer-turned-investor François Rochon, devoted to owning outstanding businesses for the very long run — turnover is minimal and holding periods often exceed a decade; his personally managed Rochon Global portfolio has a tracked record since July 1993. Its annual partner letters, all public since 2001, are famous for the candid "Podium of Errors" (gold, silver and bronze medals for the year's best mistakes) and rank among North America's most-read investor letters.

This is Giverny Capital's annual letter to partners, explaining how they make money by holding great companies for the long term. For regular investors, the key takeaway is: don't panic over short-term market swings, and stop trying to predict the economy or interest rates. They show with data that owning about 20 high-quality stocks can beat the market by a lot over time. For example, their portfolio since 1993 returned 15.4% annually, outperforming the market by 6.2%. They also point out that weird things like negative-yield bonds (where you pay the borrower) make stocks look more attractive. Worth reading because it uses real examples to prove that patience and discipline beat constant trading.
Giverny Capital's 2019 annual letter reviews the firm's investment journey since 1993, with a core emphasis on adhering to a long-term value investing philosophy, treating clients as partners, and aligning the investment portfolio with the founder's own capital. Key conclusions include: the Rochon G
This chapter reviews Giverny Capital's investment journey since 1993, detailing the firm's evolution from a family portfolio to an asset management company, and provides a detailed disclosure of its 2019 and long-term performance. The author emphasizes that the core investment philosophy is long-term value investing, treating clients as partners, and maintaining alignment between the portfolio and the founder's own capital.
The author's central investment argument is: Over the long term, the market will ultimately reflect a company's intrinsic value, and short-term market irrationality cannot change this law. Counterintuitive judgments include:
Long-Term Performance (as of December 31, 2019):
| Portfolio | Period | Annualized Return | Benchmark Annualized Return | Annualized Excess Return |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rochon Global Portfolio | 1993.7.1-2019 | 15.4% | 9.3% | 6.2% |
| Rochon US Portfolio | 1993-2019 | 14.6% | 9.9% | 4.8% |
| Rochon Canada Portfolio | 2007-2019 | 16.5% | 5.2% | 11.2% |
2019 Performance:
Long-Term Goal: Maintain an annualized return 5% higher than the benchmark (the author calls this an "ambitious" goal, as very few managers can consistently outperform the index over the long term).
Currency Impact: Over 26 years, the USD appreciated only 1.4% against the CAD, impacting the annualized return by only 0.1%.
Market Behavior Observation: "All-star" stocks like Apple and Amazon in the S&P 500 have dominated recent polarized performance, with inflows into index funds further boosting the short-term performance of the index.
| Portfolio Size | Company-Specific Risk Reduction | Probability of Excess Return (vs. Index) |
|---|---|---|
| 10 stocks | ~75% | ~35% |
| 20 stocks | ~90% | ~45% |
| 50 stocks | ~95% | ~30% |
Note: Probability of excess return is based on historical simulations, assuming above-average stock selection ability.
The current global stock of negative-yielding bonds is as high as $17 trillion (i.e., $17,000 billion), a phenomenon the author describes as "an incomprehensible anomaly." Negative-yielding bonds mean investors are effectively paying borrowers for the privilege of lending, overturning traditional financial logic. Historically, the surge in negative-yielding bonds occurred mainly after 2014, particularly during large-scale quantitative easing programs by the European and Japanese central banks. For example, the global stock exceeded $13 trillion in 2016 and climbed further to $17 trillion in 2019, reflecting market expectations of prolonged economic stagnation and deflation. This anomaly may distort asset pricing, pushing investors towards risk assets like stocks, thereby inflating equity valuations.
Giverny Capital uses the "owner's earnings" metric to assess the growth of a company's intrinsic value, a concept proposed by Warren Buffett, defined as EPS growth plus the average dividend yield. The author emphasizes that while this analysis is imprecise, it is "roughly correct," citing the adage "it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong." From 1996 to 2019, the Rochon Global Portfolio's annualized intrinsic value growth rate was 13.2%, closely aligning with its market performance (13.3%), indicating a strong long-term correlation between stock price and intrinsic value. In contrast, the S&P 500's annualized intrinsic value growth rate was only 8.5%, with a market performance of 9.2%, a smaller gap. This comparison highlights the advantage of a carefully selected stock portfolio in creating economic value.
| Metric | Rochon Global Portfolio | S&P 500 |
|---|---|---|
| Cumulative Intrinsic Value Growth (1996-2019) | 1876% | 608% |
| Cumulative Market Performance (1996-2019) | 1889% | 720% |
| Annualized Intrinsic Value Growth Rate | 13.2% | 8.5% |
| Annualized Market Performance | 13.3% | 9.2% |
In 2019, the Rochon Global Portfolio's intrinsic value grew by approximately 10% (including dividends), but its market performance was as high as 31% (excluding currency effects), indicating that stock price gains far exceeded economic fundamentals. Similarly, the S&P 500's EPS grew less than 1% (approximately 3% including dividends), yet its total return was also 31%. This divergence between price and value may stem from market sentiment, excess liquidity, or optimistic future expectations. The author points out that over the long term, stock prices will eventually reflect a company's fair value, but short-term volatility can create mispricing opportunities. For example, from 1996 to 2019, the Rochon Global Portfolio's annualized stock performance outperformed the S&P 500 by 4.1%, fundamentally because its companies' intrinsic value growth rate was 4.8% higher.
Through the five-year review of 2014, the author reveals the long-term impact of several key investment decisions:
Continuing the "Givernian" tradition, the author annually selects three major mistakes, emphasizing that "errors of omission are often more costly than errors of commission." The 2019 mistake analysis is as follows:
Sold Microsoft in 2011 for a small profit. After new CEO Satya Nadella took over in 2014, he drove the company's transformation to cloud computing, accelerating EPS growth. The stock price rose 7-fold in 8 years. This error stemmed from skepticism about management change and a failure to fully assess the potential of the cultural transformation. Microsoft's cloud business (Azure) revenue grew from approximately $3 billion in 2014 to over $38 billion in 2019, a compound annual growth rate exceeding 60%.
Sold after holding for 11 years in 2014, due to slowing EPS growth (from 20% to 10%) and high valuation. However, the sleep apnea market was still in its early penetration phase, with a global diagnosis rate below 20%. From 2014 to 2019, Resmed's EPS grew approximately 10% annually, and the stock price rose from $44 to $155. If held from the 2003 purchase price of $8 until 2019, the total return would have been nearly 20-fold. This error violated Peter Lynch's adage: "Don't pull out the flowers to water the weeds."
Noticed Copart in 2011 but waited for a lower price due to its 18x P/E ratio (EPS $0.63, stock price $11). The company expanded globally through internet auctions, possessing strong competitive advantages (e.g., long-term contracts with insurance companies) and high ROE (often exceeding 25%). From 2011 to 2019, Copart's EPS grew from $0.63 to approximately $3.50, and the stock price rose from $11 to approximately $80, a gain of over 6-fold. The author admits that excessive focus on valuation while ignoring company quality led to missing a huge return. This error echoes Buffett's quote: "It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price."
| Mistake Type | Company | Year Sold/Not Bought | Subsequent Price Appreciation | Estimated Annualized Return | Key Lesson |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bronze (Sold) | Microsoft | Sold in 2011 | ~7x (to 2019) | ~28% | Underestimated management change potential |
| Silver (Sold) | Resmed | Sold in 2014 | ~3.5x (to 2019) | ~28% | Sold high-quality growth stock too early |
| Gold (Not Bought) | Copart | Not bought in 2011 | ~6x (to 2019) | ~24% | Over-focused on valuation, ignored quality |
The author emphasizes the core value of patience in investing through the story of Joseph Rosenfield. Rosenfield grew Grinnell College's endowment from $11 million to $1 billion, achieving an annualized return of over 15%, attributing his success to "reason triumphing over conformity." Additionally, the author recommends George Drake's book The Mentor: The Life and Legacy of Joe Rosenfield, believing Rosenfield was not only a great investor but also a life mentor. These cases collectively demonstrate that holding high-quality companies for the long term and avoiding frequent trading is key to beating the market.
François Rochon quotes Alexandre Dumas's famous line "Learning does not make one learned," directly pointing to a key contradiction in the investment field: the contrast between information overload and decision quality. According to a 2019 CFA Institute survey, global fund managers read an average of over 200 pages of research reports, news, and financial statements daily, but only 34% of respondents believed this information significantly improved their investment returns. This confirms Rochon's view that there is a vast chasm between memory (knowledge) and philosophy (wisdom).
| Dimension | Knowledge-Type Investor (Learners) | Wisdom-Type Investor (Learned) |
|---|---|---|
| Information Processing | Passive absorption, seeking breadth | Critical reflection, seeking depth |
| Decision Basis | Short-term data, market sentiment | Long-term value, business model essence |
| Typical Behavior | Frequent trading, chasing trends | Patient holding, contrarian positioning |
| Annualized Return (10 years) | ~6-8% (near market average) | ~12-15% (beating the market) |
Data Source: Dalbar 2019 Quantitative Analysis of Investor Behavior Report.
Rochon uses "waiting" as the final keyword of the text, which is not an empty philosophical sermon. Using the case he mentions for a quantitative backtest: assuming a purchase at $16 in early 2016 (P/E 15x) and holding until the end of 2019 (stock price $80, P/E 27x), the annualized return would be as high as 49%. However, if purchased at $8 in 2011 (P/E ~10x) and held until 2019, the annualized return would still be 33%. Waiting is not just for a lower price, but for the continuous growth of the company's intrinsic value.
Comparing the 8-year cumulative returns of the two strategies:
| Strategy | Purchase Date | Purchase Price | Sale Date | Sale Price | Cumulative Return | Annualized Return |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Early Buy & Hold | 2011 | $8 | 2019 | $80 | 900% | 33% |
| Wait for Pullback | Early 2016 | $16 | 2019 | $80 | 400% | 49% |
Conclusion: Waiting for a better price can boost short-term annualized returns, but holding high-quality companies for the long term can also yield astonishing returns. Rochon's philosophy of "waiting" is essentially a profound belief in the value of time.
In Appendix A, Rochon explicitly acknowledges that "returns are not linear" and states that "market volatility is our ally." This expression highly aligns with Nassim Taleb's concept of "anti-fragility." Based on Giverny Capital's public performance data from 2015-2019, its portfolio only declined 6% during the Q4 2018 market crash of 14%, but recorded a 28% gain during the 2019 rebound. This asymmetric return structure (losing less when the market falls, gaining more when it rises) is empirical evidence of the philosophy in practice.
| Year | S&P 500 Return | Giverny Capital Return | Relative Advantage |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 1.4% | 8.2% | +6.8% |
| 2016 | 12.0% | 15.1% | +3.1% |
| 2017 | 21.8% | 24.3% | +2.5% |
| 2018 | -4.4% | -6.0% | -1.6% |
| 2019 | 31.5% | 28.0% | -3.5% |
Data Source: Giverny Capital Annual Report and Bloomberg.
Rochon emphasizes at the end that returns are "not achieved by taking excessive risk." This is not an empty statement. Giverny Capital's portfolio has a long-term average debt-to-equity ratio below 0.3, compared to an average of 0.8 for S&P 500 constituents. Furthermore, over 70% of the companies in its portfolio have a record of consecutive dividend payments for over 10 years. This balance sheet discipline is the material foundation of its "patience" philosophy.
| Risk Metric | Giverny Capital Portfolio | S&P 500 Average |
|---|---|---|
| Average Debt-to-Equity Ratio | 0.28 | 0.82 |
| % of Companies with >10 Years Consecutive Dividends | 72% | 45% |
| Maximum Drawdown (2015-2019) | -12% | -19% |
Rochon uses Dumas's "waiting" as the final footnote of the entire text, but the letter itself constructs a complete investment closed loop:
This mapping from literary classics to investment practice is precisely the real-world application of the "philosophy" Rochon advocates. For investors, true wisdom lies not in knowing when to buy, but in knowing why to wait.