Cobas Asset Management is a Madrid deep-value firm founded in late 2016 by Francisco García Paramés, Europe's standard-bearer of value investing after 25+ years running Bestinver and author of "Investing for the Long Term". Cobas applies a strict Graham/Buffett value framework overlaid with Austrian business-cycle theory, concentrating in unloved energy, shipping and other cyclicals, with AUM above €3.4bn. Its investor letters are fully archived from Q1 2017, moving to a semi-annual cadence in 2022.
This report covers how Spanish asset manager Cobas handled its portfolio in the first half of 2026. It sold energy stocks that had risen a lot (like Saipem) and bought less popular, cheaper companies such as sportswear retailer JD Sports and dialysis-equipment maker Fresenius. It also reviews the full story of its investment in Israeli drugmaker Teva: an initial loss over legal risks, then a re-entry at a low price, and finally a three-fold gain after five years. For everyday investors, the key takeaway is to buy good companies when they are cheap, sell when they are no longer cheap, and admit mistakes when wrong. It is worth reading because it shows discipline based on value, not market predictions.
The author believes: the logic of value investing is being confirmed point by point, and the portfolio sits in a deep-value zone of "cheaper as it rises" — stance: [Optimistic].
The International Portfolio rose 15.8% in the first half, outperforming its benchmark by 5.3 percentage points; the Iberian Portfolio rose 6.5%, lagging its benchmark by 8.2 percentage points. The author did not provide attribution by segment; the narrative thread is that "investment theses were validated and are gradually being reflected in share prices."
Performance comparison:
| Portfolio | 1H 2026 Return | Benchmark Return | Excess Return |
|---|---|---|---|
| International Portfolio | +15.8% | +10.5% (BBG Europe Developed Markets) | +5.3 percentage points |
| Iberian Portfolio | +6.5% | +14.7% | -8.2 percentage points |
Portfolio valuation:
| Portfolio | Upside | Valuation |
|---|---|---|
| International Portfolio | Over 100% | 7x P/E |
| Iberian Portfolio | 85% | 9x P/E |
The energy sector weight has fallen from a peak of 46% in early 2022 to roughly 30% by end-2025, and further to about 24% by the end of the first half, setting the stage for the subsequent reduction narrative.
Energy services was the segment with the most concentrated reductions: Saipem and Weatherford were fully sold (each roughly 2% and 1% of the portfolio, having risen about 75% and 40%, respectively); the TGS position was cut from about 3% to roughly 1%; the weight of oil and gas exploration and production companies fell by less than 1%, as the author believes their prices still do not reflect value.
The author explains this substantial reduction as "thesis validation → disciplined selling," a self-referential argument from the holder's perspective; energy still accounts for 24%, so this is not a full retreat.
During the period, new positions were established in family-controlled holding companies Exor and Bolloré, global dialysis leader Fresenius Medical Care, and athletic apparel retailer JD Sports; the author stresses that JD Sports is a family-controlled, debt-free company bought at 5x earnings.
The author did not disclose the specific position sizes for these new holdings, only saying that some were "old acquaintances" and others were "tracked for a long time before first purchase."
The first Teva investment failed because legal risks exceeded expectations: a 1% position was bought at the end of 2017 and sold in spring 2019 at approximately cost. The author treats it as a case of "intellectual honesty" in decision-making.
Teva is an Israeli pharmaceutical company and a global leader in complex generics, biosimilars, and innovative central nervous system drugs. Around 2016 it was hit by multiple setbacks: poor management, debt ballooned by aggressive acquisitions, patent expiry for the multiple sclerosis blockbuster Copaxone, intensifying generic competition, and legal uncertainty from opioid crisis and price-fixing settlements in the United States. The share price fell from above USD 55 in 2016 to around USD 15 by mid-2017.
The author established a small 1% position at the end of 2017, but the potential impact of legal risks was larger than initially expected, so he sold in spring 2019 at close to the purchase price. The author cites this exit as an illustration of methodology: the exact words are "the risks and opportunities can prove greater than initially anticipated, and in such cases intellectual honesty is essential," meaning "risk and opportunity can prove greater than initially anticipated, and in such cases intellectual honesty is crucial"—after exiting, he reassessed from the outside to reduce bias and gain broader perspective.
The full arc of the second Teva position: established at USD 11 in early 2021, added to when it fell to USD 7 in 2022, gradually reduced after the share price broke above USD 35 in 2026, and fully exited from the International Portfolio in July.
Based on the content of the sequel, the following analysis expands on three additional dimensions—rotation mechanics, portfolio restructuring efficiency, and valuation discipline—with supporting data.
The most important incremental information in this commentary lies in the specific execution data for portfolio rotation, which reveals the practical logic behind Cobas AM's "sell" decisions — not simply profit-taking, but rebalancing driven by upward revisions to target values.
| Portfolio | H1 Returns | Companies Fully Liquidated | Total Liquidated Weight | New Positions Initiated | Total Weight of New Positions | Target Price Upgrade Magnitude |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| International | +15.8% | 7 | ~8% | 17 | ~23% | +20% |
| Iberian | +6.5% | 6 | ~6% | 6 | ~12% | +9% |
| Large Cap | +17.9% | 13 | ~18% | 13 | ~25% | +21% |
A key pattern emerges from the table above: the weight of new positions (23%/12%/25%) is significantly higher than the weight of liquidated positions (8%/6%/18%) in all three portfolios. This means the rotation is not merely position swapping but net accumulation — trimming names whose high returns have already been realized and concentrating capital into new opportunities with larger expectation gaps. This directly explains why the portfolios' overall invested ratio remains at a high 98%–99%.
Take Enquest (return >100%) and Saipem (return >70%) as examples: after these two positions had completed their valuation recovery, the remaining upside was no longer attractive, so Cobas AM chose to trim them even though fundamentals had not deteriorated. This behavior differs from the "hold-until-target-price" inertia typical of most value funds; it more closely resembles dynamic rebalancing — shifting capital from positions whose potential has been released to positions whose potential remains suppressed.
The original text uses the shift in a certain company's analyst recommendations from 2016 to 2022 (from 80% Buy to 6% Buy) to illustrate the magnitude of the reversal in market sentiment. This case can be interpreted from a broader perspective:
This transition from a "crowded trade" to being "out of favor" is precisely the expectation gap formation process that value investors focus on most. Notably, the company did not experience a fundamental collapse during this period (inferred from the outcome that Cobas AM continued to hold it and ultimately profited), indicating that market pricing was driven more by narrative polarization than by fundamentals.
The original text specifically points out that "in such large-cap companies with broad analyst coverage, negative views reinforce one another." This observation carries behavioral finance implications:
| Portfolio | Portfolio P/E (2026E) | Benchmark P/E | Discount | Portfolio ROCE | Benchmark ROCE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| International | 7.1x | 18.0x | -60.6% | 27% | Not disclosed |
| Iberian | 9.1x | 18.0x | -49.4% | ~35% | Not disclosed |
| Large Cap | 7.5x | 25.0x | -70.0% | 25% | Not disclosed |
The data reveal two characteristics:
Notably, there is a correlation between the first-half performance of the three portfolios and their target price increases:
This phenomenon—where prices rise but target prices are raised even faster—shows that the rotation strategy not only locks in gains, but also improves the overall portfolio quality by purchasing more undervalued assets, preventing the portfolio's potential return from shrinking in tandem with price increases.
Notable new positions in this period include: JD Sport (International), Exor (International & Large Cap), Cirsa (Iberian), Vidrala (Iberian), and Fresenius Medical Care (Large Cap).
Common characteristics shared by these companies:
| Characteristic | Description |
|---|---|
| Diversified industries but extreme valuations | Consumer discretionary (JD Sport), holding conglomerate (Exor), gaming (Cirsa), packaging (Vidrala), medical devices (Fresenius) — low correlation with one another, yet all sit at cyclical troughs in their respective industries |
| "Event-driven" or "structural mispricing" attributes | Exor, as a holding company, has long traded at a conglomerate discount; Fresenius Medical Care is suppressed by policy concerns over the dialysis industry |
| Upper-mid-tier ROCE | The portfolio's overall ROCE is 25%-35%, reflecting that the new positions do not sacrifice quality in exchange for undervaluation |
This construction of cross-industry diversification plus concentration in extreme valuations is precisely designed to address the point the report raises about "the market will test us many times" — concentrated holdings in a single industry or a single thesis would be difficult to hold through swings of this magnitude.
The most important takeaway of this section is that Cobas AM's rotation is not market timing, but the institutionalization of "target value reassessment" within the investment process.
It is precisely this mechanism of "not forecasting the market, only responding to valuation spreads" that enabled the portfolio to reallocate around 20% of its capital within six months while still maintaining 99% exposure—executing discipline without wasting capital.
The fund list disclosed this time further enriches Cobas AM's product line. Besides the traditional FI (Spanish investment funds) and Luxembourg SICAV vehicles, pension products such as PPES (Plan de Pensiones de Empleo Simplificado) and PPE (Plan de Pensiones de Empleo) also appeared. Notably, these pension products are not independently designed but directly replicate the holding logic of the flagship funds: for example, the metrics of `Global PP` and `Cobas Empleo 100 PPE` (such as an 8.0% return, 28% upside, and 7.4x PER) are highly similar to those of `Iberia FI`, while `Mixto Global PP` corresponds to the blended strategy. This indicates that Cobas is extending the same value investing framework through different legal entities into the retirement savings channel, in order to obtain a longer-term and more stable capital pool.
| Product Type | Representative Fund | Inception Date | AUM (€ millions) | Upside | PER |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FI (Domestic) | Iberia FI Class C | 03/03/2017 | 12.6 | 160.9%* | 8.9x |
| FI (Global Large Cap) | Grandes Compañías FI Class A | 05/02/2024 | 6.5 | 113.2%* | 7.4x |
| Pension (Global) | Global PP | 18/07/2017 | 241.0 | 86.9%* | 7.4x |
| Pension (Blended) | Mixto Global PP | 23/06/2021 | 3.6 | 118.4%* | 7.4x |
*Note: "Upside" in the table is from the original report (TARGET VALUE/POTENTIAL). Some funds have multiple share classes; representative share classes are selected here.
Cobas sets up four share classes, A/B/C/D, for each FI to meet the needs of different distribution channels or investor types. Taking `Grandes Compañías FI` as an example, the valuation metrics (PER, ROCE) of the four share classes are exactly the same (8.4%, 7.4x, 25%, etc.), but AUM and inception dates differ markedly: Class A was launched in 2024 with AUM of only €6.5 million; Class D was launched in 2021 with AUM of €177.5 million. This shows that earlier share classes have accumulated more scale, while newer share classes are still in the fundraising period. Similarly, `Iberia FI`'s Class C and Class D differ in AUM (€12.6 vs €32.9) and certain ratios, but their fundamental metrics converge. This structure allows investors with different fee sensitivity to enter while maintaining consistency in portfolio management.
For international markets, Cobas offers four Luxembourg SICAVs. As of June 30, 2026, their performance and valuation metrics are as follows:
| Fund | Inception Date | AUM | Upside | PER | ROCE | Annualized Return Since Inception |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| International EUR | 01/06/2017 | €173.9 | 27% | 7.2x | 114% | 15.0% |
| Selection EUR | 18/04/2008 | €342.1 | 28% | 7.5x | 111% | 14.0% |
| Large Cap EUR | 14/10/2019 | €46.8 | 25% | 7.5x | 114% | 16.9% |
| International USD | 06/06/2017 | $1.07* | 27% | 7.2x | 114% | 15.8% |
| Selection USD | 18/04/2008 | $33.4* | 28% | 7.5x | 111% | 14.8% |
*USD share class AUM is in US dollars; NAV figures (e.g., International USD at $231.96) were listed in the original report.
This set of data reveals several key points:
From the disclosed Top 10 data (the original table has some ordering inconsistencies), the companies with the highest exposure frequency can be extracted: CK Hutchison Holdings (Cheung Kong Hutchison), Bw Offshore, Bayer AG, JD Sports, Fresenius, Golar LNG, Exor, Grifols, Bolloré, Wizz Air Holdings. These companies can be roughly classified into four categories:
Notably, the overlap among the top ten holdings of different funds is extremely high. For example, both `Iberia FI` and `Grandes Compañías FI` are heavily weighted in CK Hutchison, Bw Offshore, Bayer, etc. This indicates that Cobas actually uses a globally unified "bottom-up" stock selection universe; geographic affiliation is only a secondary label for the investment universe, not the dominant factor in investment decisions.
The original report provides several sets of geographic allocation data, which can be summarized into the following three typical portfolios:
| Region | Portfolio A (Europe-Tilted) | Portfolio B (Balanced) | Portfolio C (Global) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eurozone | 43.0% | 34.0% | 43.6% |
| Rest of Europe | 26.5% | 30.7% | 20.1% |
| USA | 12.9% | 15.0% | 15.2% |
| Asia | 14.5% | 16.1% | 19.3% |
| Other | 3.1% | 3.6% | 1.8% |
The comparison shows:
The Notes restated in the report read more like a detailed valuation manual. They specify that: the target price is based on internal estimates of the company's future normalized profitability, commonly using multiple-based valuation or discounted cash flow; the discount rate is usually between 6% and 12% (with very rare exceptions); the PER is calculated as market capitalization divided by internally estimated normalized cash flow; and the ROCE is normalized operating profit after tax divided by capital employed excluding goodwill. This bottom-up "normalization" framework, on the one hand, explains why the portfolios contain a large number of cyclical stocks (e.g., shipping, energy), because their current earnings may be at cyclical troughs and their normalized earnings are underestimated; on the other hand, it reminds investors that these metrics are based on management's subjective judgment and need to be cross-checked against public information.
In terms of risk, VaR is calculated using 2.32 sigma (i.e., the maximum expected monthly loss at a 99% confidence level). This figure is not given as a specific percentage in the text, but the methodology allows investors to understand the benchmark for measuring tail risk.
From this batch of data, one can see that Cobas AM maintained extremely low portfolio valuations (PER of 7-8x), high ROCE (>110%), and firm conviction in companies' normalized earnings during the first half of 2026. The expansion of the product line (pension funds, Luxembourg SICAVs) did not dilute the investment philosophy; instead, it allowed the same value framework to reach a broader group of investors. The next point worth watching is whether these heavily held oil and gas services and cyclical consumer stocks can sustain their "normalized earnings" assumptions during an economic downturn—this will be the core validation point of the next semi-annual report.
The previous section discussed position adjustments from a single-fund perspective, but the real value-add of this report is that it simultaneously discloses the industry allocations of multiple portfolios. Arranging these data horizontally makes it clear which industries are common choices across the Cobas AM platform, rather than preferences of individual fund managers.
| Industry | Portfolio A | Portfolio B | Portfolio C | Portfolio D |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil & Gas Exploration & Production | 15.8% | 6.3% | 11.1% | 13.1% |
| Oil & Gas Storage & Transportation | 9.2% | 10.0% | 7.8% | 6.8% |
| Energy Equipment & Services | — | 5.1% | 10.1% | — |
| Retailing | 11.6% | 5.7% | 7.6% | 11.7% |
| Industrial Conglomerates | 9.7% | 8.4% | — | 8.7% |
| Automobiles & Components | 7.9% | 6.2% | — | 7.4% |
| Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology | 4.9% | 11.3% | 10.8% | 6.6% |
| Total Energy Chain | 25.0% | 21.4% | 29.0% | 19.9% |
The weighted share of the energy chain (exploration & production + storage & transportation + equipment & services) exceeds 19% in all four portfolios, with the highest approaching 30%. This confirms that oil and gas is not a tactical allocation of a single fund, but a core belief at the entire investment platform level. More notably, the top three industry weights generally reach 30-37% across portfolios, indicating that industry concentration is a deliberately maintained characteristic of this firm, not a byproduct of diversification.
Another set of extreme data in the report shows that a single industry weight in one portfolio is as high as 65.4%, with all other industries below 15%. Regardless of whether this figure corresponds to a specialized strategy or a temporary concentrated allocation, it again confirms that Cobas's upper limit for industry concentration far exceeds the prudence standards of traditional asset managers.
The performance attribution section reveals two important pieces of information: first, return sources are highly concentrated in the energy chain; second, the energy sector is not monolithic internally.
Across the contributor lists of multiple portfolios, Kosmos, Golar, TGS, Saipem, and Enquest appear repeatedly. Kosmos's highest contribution reached 2.2%, Golar also 2.2%, Saipem up to 2.1%, and TGS up to 1.9%. What these companies have in common is that they all occupy specific links in the oil and gas value chain: Kosmos is a West African upstream explorer, Golar is an LNG carrier operator, TGS is a seismic data acquisition company, and Saipem is an energy engineering contractor. This means the portfolio's earnings engine is not simply "oil price beta," but rather a selection of sub-sector structural opportunities in energy infrastructure, LNG trade, deep-sea exploration, and the like.
However, energy stocks also appear on the detractor list: Borr Drilling (-1.2% to -0.1%), BW Energy, Panoro, and Seacrest Petroleo. These companies are concentrated in drilling services and small-to-mid-cap exploration and production. A pattern repeatedly validated by the data can thus be discerned: Cobas's excess returns in the energy sector come from selecting operators and contractors that "own scarce assets," while purely cyclical service providers and equipment lessors become sources of negative contribution.
| Industry Category | Main Contributors | Main Detractors | Directional Consistency |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oil & gas value chain | Kosmos, Golar, TGS, Saipem, Enquest | Borr Drilling, BW Energy, Panoro, Seacrest | Highly divergent |
| Conglomerates | CK Hutchison, LG Electronics | CK Asset Holdings, Wharf Holdings | Divergent |
| Automobiles | — | Renault, Porsche | Consistently negative |
| Pharmaceuticals & healthcare | Viatris, Bayer | Grifols, Almirall | Divergent |
| Consumer services | Meliá | Elior Group, Douglas | Divergent |
The divergence in the pharmaceutical sector is equally striking. Viatris and Bayer enter the top five contributors in some portfolios, while Grifols and Almirall become notable detractors in others. This divergence is highly correlated with company-specific fundamental events, rather than an industry-wide trend.
Aggregating the detractor lists across multiple portfolios, the most frequently appearing names reveal several common regional and sectoral problems.
Renault and Porsche appear in at least three detractor lists, with magnitudes ranging from -0.1% to -1.2%. European traditional automakers face both valuation re-rating in the EV transition and share squeezes from Chinese competitors. The long-term negative contribution of this industry in Cobas's portfolios may not simply be a timing issue, but rather the balance-sheet pain that the industrial system of the old energy era must inevitably suffer in the transition to new energy.
Grifols also appears across multiple portfolios, affecting both Spain-related funds and global portfolios. As a blood products company, its drag stems more from corporate governance and financial structure issues than from a failure of sector logic—indicating that although Cobas excels at selecting industries, company-level governance risks can still cut through sector judgments.
Real estate-related companies occupy a prominent position among the detractors in Asian portfolios: CK Asset Holdings, Robinson Land, SM Prime, and Wharf Holdings. This echoes the high weights of Retailing and Consumer in Asian allocations—Cobas's Asian portfolios rely more heavily than its European portfolios on value release in the real estate and consumer chains, and both chains have been under pressure in the macro environment of the past two years.
In addition, the frequent appearance of Elior Group (food services), Douglas (beauty retail), Ibstock (building materials), and China Education Group (education) shows that industries with "relatively stable cash flows," such as consumer services and education, have experienced even larger valuation contractions during the rate-rising cycle than cyclical industries.
Alongside the holding data, this report devotes considerable space to Cobas AM's resource commitments outside investing. This content cannot be dismissed as mere branding; it is actually part of the company's business model.
The financial education program has formed a product matrix covering multiple age groups: the Brainvestor workshops and mentorship program for adult investors, the Value School Summer Summit for young adults, and Smart Young Invest for teenagers aged 12-16. The format has also expanded from one-way lectures to games, project-based learning, and in-person workshops. This depth of educational investment is uncommon among asset managers of comparable size.
Also noteworthy is the shift in recommended reading. The Manual of Ideas is a typical investment methodology book, but The Sociology of Revolutions—a sociology book about the roots of social revolutions—has been added to the recommendation list, suggesting that the company is not thinking solely about investment technique, but rather placing market volatility within a broader socio-historical framework. Pitirim Sorokin's work, written in exile after the Russian Revolution, discusses how order collapses and how society reconstructs itself. Reading this book alongside the fund portfolio reveals an implicit worldview: violent fluctuations in asset prices, reversals of political cycles, and restructuring of social structures are all normal variables that long-term investors must confront.
The progress of the GSIF fund series reflects another logic: extending value investing methods into the impact investing space. GSIF Spain added the PARIS/64 transaction—a leather goods manufacturer located in Illueca, Aragon—which fits the classic value investing framework perfectly: a traditional industry, time-honored craftsmanship, a region under the pressure of industrial relocation, and a brand with international expansion potential. GSIF Africa, meanwhile, entered the health sector for the first time, investing in a Kenyan emergency medical services company.
What these two investments have in common is that both seek opportunities in areas of "market failure." The traditional handicraft industry in Spain's Aragon region faces hollowing out, and the supply of emergency medical services in rural Kenya is severely inadequate. Cobas's approach, however, is not charitable donation but equity investment plus operational support—GSIF Spain continues to provide operational support to its portfolio companies, and GSIF Africa has added two investment directors, Theany Bazet and José María Acín.
This report presents concentration at two levels. On the explicit level, the portfolios are heavily weighted in the oil and gas value chain in terms of industry allocation, rely on a small number of energy names such as Kosmos, Golar, and TGS for return sources, and have significant exposure to the real estate and automotive chains in Europe and Asia. On the implicit level, the company devotes substantial resources to financial education, social impact investing, interdisciplinary knowledge dissemination, and organizational capacity building.
The former is a market-oriented investment portfolio; the latter is a time-oriented organizational asset. For an asset management company positioned as a long-term value investor, the degree of implicit overweighting may matter more than explicit industry weights in determining its position in the next cycle.
This section focuses on the operating data of the Open Value Foundation (OVF) and its affiliated initiative FdF Impacto in the first half of 2026, showing a clear inflection point from the "seed stage" to the "portfolio management stage." Unlike earlier reports that emphasized project narratives, this sequel provides quantitative evidence of capital allocation, revealing the actual operating form of the blended finance model.
In the first half of the year, FdF Impacto reached 47 participating foundations, nearly €490,000 in assets under management, and more than €465,000 invested in 12 social enterprises, marking that the initiative has passed the "proof-of-concept" phase and entered the institutional replication stage. Notably, the gap between assets under management and invested capital is only about €25,000, indicating extremely high capital utilization—almost all funds have entered the allocation process rather than sitting idle in accounts. This "invest as received" rhythm reflects that FdF Impacto's due diligence and investment processes have become highly standardized.
Compared with its initial state five years ago, when perhaps only a handful of foundations launched it, 47 participants mean the network now has cross-institutional coordination capacity—each foundation contributes an average of about €10,400 in managed funds. This "small shares, large coalition" model effectively reduces the risk exposure of any single funder.
Two sets of seemingly overlapping data appear in this sequel, and the hierarchy needs to be distinguished: FdF Impacto, as a dedicated fund under OVF, has its 12 social enterprise investments as part of OVF's overall portfolio, while OVF's active social enterprise portfolio has reached 28. This means that OVF has roughly 16 social enterprise investments outside the FdF Impacto channel, possibly from Open Value Foundation's direct strategic philanthropy or early-stage projects, constituting a two-track parallel structure.
| Investing Entity | Active Social Enterprises | 2026H1 Investment Amount | 2026H1 Charitable Grants |
|---|---|---|---|
| FdF Impacto | 12 | >€465,000 | — |
| OVF (Overall) | 28 | €315,000 | €294,430 |
Notably, OVF's overall new formal investments in the first half (€315,000) were lower than FdF Impacto's cumulative investments (€465,000), indicating that FdF Impacto's existing investments cover a large number of early-stage projects, while OVF's incremental investments in this period are more concentrated on specific themes such as Proyecto Arraigo, DIOMCOP, Posibilita SBIC, and B de Bocata, reflecting a strategy convergence from "broad seeding" to "focused nurturing."
In the first half of the year, OVF invested €315,000 in social enterprises while allocating €294,430 as grants to businesses and entities. The investment/grant ratio is approximately 1.07:1, nearly balanced. This ratio is extremely rare in the impact investing field—many funds are either predominantly grant-based or predominantly investment-based—while OVF's "half and half" validates its two-engine structure:
This structure allows OVF to accommodate both commercially sustainable and donor-dependent social enterprises within the same portfolio. The Ugandan agricultural company case is a typical example of the rural development theme—through seeds, fertilizer, training, and market linkages, it generates income while improving the livelihoods of smallholder farmers.
Proyecto Arraigo appears both in the formal investment list (as part of €315,000) and in the description of grant uses ("housing, integration of migrants, rural development," etc.), implying that the organization may have received a combination of investment and grant funding from OVF. This practice of using different capital instruments for the same project is the most refined form of blended finance—equity/debt investment supports core business expansion, while grants subsidize impact assessment, capacity building, or low-margin segments. If subsequent financial reports disclose the specific capital structure of this project, the actual effect of this "one project, two instruments" approach can be better assessed.
By participating in the activities of Philea (the European Foundation Centre network) and Impact Europe (the European impact investing network), OVF is no longer merely a "recipient" but is actively embedding itself in the policy discourse and standard-setting of European impact investing. The deeper value of this shift is that OVF's blended finance model no longer needs to justify itself; instead, it pushes its model toward the mainstream through industry alliances. Combined with the fifth-anniversary milestone, OVF is well positioned to become a technical template for joint investment by small European foundations—leveraging less than €500,000 to mobilize 47 institutions to act together. This leverage ratio has disruptive reference value for traditional philanthropy.
OVF's portfolio already has 28 active social enterprises, but the report does not mention exit or re-investment strategies. Given that funds typically have a life cycle of 5-7 years, FdF Impacto at its fifth anniversary is entering its first exit window. The next key indicators to watch are: how many of the 28 enterprises achieve financial self-sustainability, how many need second-round financing, and how many are eliminated by the market. This will be the litmus test for whether OVF's blended finance model can generate real social returns, rather than remaining merely at the level of "capital deployment."
| Name | Direction | Author's Stance | Key Data |
|---|---|---|---|
| Teva | Full exit | Fully exited by July 2026, ending a five-year, threefold run | Initiated at USD 11 in 2021 → broke USD 35 in 2026; added at USD 7 during the period to above 3% |
| Saipem | Full exit | Tracked for 15 years before initiating; took profits once the thesis played out | Bought at an average of EUR 2, sold near EUR 4, approximately +75% |
| Weatherford | Full exit | Margin of safety narrowed after the rally; sold alongside Saipem | Approximately +40% |
| TGS | Reduced | Position reduced after sharp rally | Approximately +50%; position cut from 3% to about 1% |
| Enquest | Reduced | Remaining upside no longer attractive after returns exceeded 100% | Return >100% |
| Oil & gas E&P company (undisclosed) | Reduced | Price still does not reflect value; remains bullish | Weight cut by less than 1%; amid a backdrop of elevated geopolitical risk and high commodity prices |
| JD Sports | New position | Family-controlled, debt-free athletic apparel leader bought at 5x P/E | Traded at 22x P/E in 2022 |
| Exor | New position | "Old acquaintance" family-controlled company, bought after long-term tracking | Position not disclosed |
| Bolloré | New position | Family-controlled company bought after long-term tracking | Position not disclosed |
| Fresenius Medical Care | New position | Global leader in the dialysis industry | Position not disclosed |
| Cirsa | New position | New gaming addition to the Iberian portfolio | Position not disclosed |
| Vidrala | New position | New packaging addition to the Iberian portfolio | Position not disclosed |
| Kosmos | Hold (Watch) | One of the earnings engines of the energy chain; West African upstream explorer | Peak contribution 2.2% |
| Golar | Hold (Watch) | LNG carrier operator; standout contribution to returns | Peak contribution 2.2% |
| CK Hutchison | Hold (Watch) | Top-10 holding and contributor across multiple portfolios | Asian weight reached as high as 19.3% |
| Bayer | Hold (Watch) | Entered the top-five contributors in some portfolios | — |
| Viatris | Hold (Watch) | Pharma sector contributor | — |
| Wizz Air | Hold (Watch) | Top-10 holding (aviation) | — |
| Bw Offshore | Hold (Watch) | Top-10 holding (energy shipping) | — |
| G-III Apparel | Hold (Watch) | Top-10 holding (apparel) | — |
| LG Electronics | Hold (Watch) | Conglomerate contributor | — |
| Meliá | Hold (Watch) | Consumer services contributor | — |
| Grifols | Hold (Watch) | Governance risk a drag, cutting through the sector judgment | Significant drag across multiple portfolios |
| Borr Drilling | Hold (Watch) | Drilling services provider; negative contributor | -1.2% to -0.1% |
| BW Energy | Hold (Watch) | Detractor | — |
| Panoro | Hold (Watch) | Detractor | — |
| Seacrest Petroleo | Hold (Watch) | Detractor | — |
| Renault | Hold (Watch) | European OEM; persistent negative contributor, under pressure from the EV transition | On at least three detractor lists, -0.1% to -1.2% |
| Porsche | Hold (Watch) | Same as above | — |
| CK Asset Holdings | Hold (Watch) | Asian property-chain drag | — |
| Wharf Holdings | Hold (Watch) | Asian property-chain drag | — |
| Robinson Land | Hold (Watch) | Asian property-chain drag | — |
| SM Prime | Hold (Watch) | Asian property-chain drag | — |
| Elior Group | Hold (Watch) | Food services; valuation contracted over the rate cycle | — |
| Douglas | Hold (Watch) | Beauty retail drag | — |
| Ibstock | Hold (Watch) | Building materials drag | — |
| China Education Group | Hold (Watch) | Education drag | — |
| Almirall | Hold (Watch) | Pharma sector drag | — |
| Fresenius | Hold (Watch) | Appears among top-10 holdings | — |
| Maire Tecnimont | Not specified | Reference holding demonstrating depth of insight into Saipem | — |
| Técnicas Reunidas | Not specified | Same as above | — |
| Subsea 7 | Not specified | Same as above | — |
| Novo Nordisk | Not specified | Reference for assessing Kåre Schultz's track record | — |
| Lundbeck | Not specified | Reference for assessing Kåre Schultz's track record | — |
| Biogen | Not specified | Reference for assessing Richard Francis's track record | — |
| Sandoz | Not specified | Reference for assessing Richard Francis's track record | — |