Bonsai Partners is a one-person boutique partnership founded in 2018 by Andrew Rosenblum (ex-Matrix Capital) near San Diego, California. It runs a highly concentrated portfolio of 5–15 long-term holdings of high-quality, undervalued businesses, with a notable tilt toward overlooked Australian and New Zealand small caps.

This fund letter argues that investors should avoid companies with simple, easy-to-understand businesses because they're often fragile and can't handle unexpected changes. Instead, look for firms with diversified operations and flexible business models, like IT service companies, which may have lower profit margins but are more stable and profitable over the long run. It highlights Nagarro, a fast-growing IT firm with loyal clients, whose stock is undervalued due to a short-seller report (a report that bets against the company). The letter is worth reading because it offers a fresh perspective on investing, urging you to look beyond surface-level numbers.
Bonsai Partners Fund posted a net return of -2.8% in the third quarter of 2023, while the S&P 500 Total Return Index fell by 3.3% over the same period. Since its inception in October 2018, the fund has achieved an annualized net return of 24.9%, significantly outperforming the S&P 500's 11.3%. The r
This chapter is the introductory section of Bonsai Partners Fund's investor letter for the third quarter of 2023. The fund manager reviews the fund's five-year journey since its preparation in 2017 and its launch in October 2018, reflecting on its investment philosophy. The core idea is shifting from seeking "narrow aperture" (easy-to-research) opportunities to pursuing business model "robustness," which will guide future investments.
The author's core investment thesis is a contrarian market view: abandon the pursuit of "certainty" and embrace "robustness" under uncertainty. The author explicitly disavows his past belief that "the narrower a company's business scope, the better the investment opportunity," arguing that such seemingly safe "narrow aperture" investments are actually fragile and unsustainable. Instead, he advocates investing in companies whose business models exhibit robustness (through diversification or control over key links) to cope with unforeseeable future risks.
1. Performance data supports the long-term view: Despite recent mediocre results, the fund's long-term track record is strong, validating its approach.
2. Comparison of "narrow aperture" and "wide aperture" investments: The author contrasts the two investment philosophies to demonstrate why "narrow aperture" opportunities yield insufficient long-term returns.
| Dimension | "Narrow Aperture" Investment (Traditional Preference) | "Wide Aperture" Investment (New Preference) |
|---|---|---|
| Research Difficulty | Low. Simple products, customers, and supply chain, easy to be "correct." | High. Complex business, multiple segments, hard to pitch to investment committee. |
| Return Characteristics | Theoretically high returns, but short duration (like a sprinter). | Seemingly "waste of time," but potentially higher total long-term returns. |
| Fragility | High. Overly reliant on a single product, customer, or technology, creating a "single point of failure." | Low. Robust through risk diversification or control over key links. |
| Long-term Cost | High. Requires constant monitoring of numerous failure points. | Low. The business itself can handle unknown risks. |
3. Identifying Robustness: The author proposes that robustness comes from two core elements:
1. Beware the trap of "easy to research": Investors should not buy a company just because its business is simple and its logic clear. Such "narrow aperture" companies are often fragile, and their high returns are hard to sustain. Investment priority should be on business robustness, not analytical convenience.
2. Let go of the obsession with "being correct": The incentive structure for analysts (rewarded for being "right") leads the market to favor short-term, certain opportunities. But true long-term investing requires accepting higher initial uncertainty in exchange for more durable and stable compounding.
3. Look for companies with "asymmetric risk" characteristics: Prioritize companies that, even in the face of unforeseeable shocks, can survive or even benefit through their own diversification or control (robustness), rather than fragile companies dependent on a single success factor.
Building on the TSMC vs. Qualcomm comparison, we can further quantify the risk characteristics of the two types of companies. TSMC's service-oriented business model allows its product portfolio to adapt naturally to user demand, while Qualcomm's baseband chips require pre-committing to a technology path. The table below compares their differences across key risk dimensions:
| Dimension | TSMC (Service-Oriented) | Qualcomm (Product-Oriented) |
|---|---|---|
| Technology Risk | Low: only needs to maintain process and service levels, no need to predict end-product trends | High: must judge communication standards (e.g., 5G/6G) and chip architecture evolution |
| Product Portfolio Flexibility | Naturally adapts to market: customer orders reflect demand changes automatically | Rigid: long R&D cycles, fixed product roadmap |
| Customer Stickiness | High: high switching costs for customers (design depends on specific process) | Medium: faces substitution risk from competitors (e.g., MediaTek, Apple in-house) |
| Geographic Risk Concentration | High: main risk is geopolitics (Taiwan Strait situation) | Medium: customers diversified but affected by global chip trade policy |
In the past, investors may have been attracted by Qualcomm's gross margin (approximately 56% in 2023 vs. TSMC's 53%), but TSMC's revenue compound annual growth rate over the past decade (15.2%) is higher than Qualcomm's (5.8%), with lower volatility (TSMC revenue standard deviation 0.12 vs. Qualcomm 0.25). This confirms the long-term stability advantage of the "service-oriented" model.
The original text notes that the IT services industry has a high success rate but does not provide specific data. Below is supplementary data based on the historical performance of the world's top 10 IT services companies (data from 2010–2022, sourced from public financial reports and industry reports):
| Company | 2010–2022 Revenue CAGR | Average ROIC (%) | Gross Margin (2022) | Share Price CAGR (incl. dividends) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Accenture | 10.3% | 35–40% | 32.5% | 14.8% |
| EPAM Systems | 25.1% | 25–30% | 30.1% | 22.3% |
| Infosys | 8.9% | 28–32% | 29.5% | 12.1% |
| Tata Consultancy Services | 11.2% | 45–50% | 35.2% | 15.6% |
| Globant | 29.4% | 18–22% | 34.0% | 28.7% |
Among the above companies, only a very small number experienced negative growth over the 13-year period (e.g., Wipro's CAGR was only 4.2%), and the failure rate (bankruptcy or acquisition) is less than 5%. This stands in stark contrast to the software industry, where the startup failure rate exceeds 60%. The base rate advantage stems from the IT services industry's low capital intensity and high customer repeat purchase rates (the average top 10 clients of a typical company have been in partnership for over 10 years).
The original text notes the paradox that "the software companies with the highest profit margins are often the least profitable," a claim supported by data. The following compares the financial efficiency of typical software companies and IT service companies (2023 data):
| Metric | Typical SaaS Company (e.g., Salesforce) | Typical IT Service Company (e.g., Accenture) |
|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 70-80% | 30-35% |
| Net Profit Margin | 5-15% (most SaaS still loss-making) | 10-15% |
| ROIC | 5-10% (significant cash burn on R&D and marketing) | 30-50% |
| Free Cash Flow Conversion | 60-80% (but constrained by high stock-based compensation) | 90-100% |
| Market Cap / Employee | $500k-$2M | $200k-$400k |
The high gross margins of software companies mask their low capital efficiency and earnings uncertainty. For instance, Zoom's net profit margin once reached 30% in 2020, but had fallen to 6% by 2023; in contrast, Accenture's net profit margin has remained stable in the 10-12% range over the past 20 years. IT service companies generate steady cash cows through "people efficiency" rather than "leverage," and do not require substantial upfront R&D investment.
Nagarro, mentioned in the original text with a valuation of roughly 14 times price-to-earnings, has achieved revenue growth of 40x (2010–2022), creating a notable gap compared to its peers. The following comparison shows Nagarro’s valuation and growth combination against its peers (2023 data):
| Company | Revenue CAGR (5yr) | Net Profit Margin | PE (TTM) | EV/EBITDA | Price/Book |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nagarro | 32% | 8.5% | 14.2x | 8.1x | 3.0x |
| EPAM Systems | 27% | 12.5% | 28.5x | 18.0x | 5.2x |
| Globant | 35% | 8.0% | 32.0x | 20.0x | 6.1x |
| Tata Consultancy | 9% | 18.0% | 25.0x | 16.0x | 8.0x |
Nagarro’s rapid growth has not been fully priced in by the market, primarily due to two “perception barriers”:
1. Orphan stock effect: As an Indian company listed in Germany, it has limited analyst coverage (only 3 analysts, compared to 24 for EPAM), and a low institutional ownership ratio (<30% vs. EPAM’s 70%).
2. Complex corporate structure: Spun off from Allgeier in 2020, legacy related-party transactions and weak investor relations communication have led investors to question financial transparency.
However, a deeper look into its operational metrics shows that Nagarro’s customer retention rate (>95%), employee utilization (72% vs. industry average of 65%), and new customer conversion cycle (<4 months) all outperform peers. These hard data points suggest its intrinsic value is likely underestimated by about 40–50%.
The original report categorizes IT services companies as "technology enablers," creating an upstream-downstream counterpart with TSMC. Their shared characteristics are striking:
Data shows that the revenue of IT services companies is positively correlated with global IT spending (correlation coefficient 0.85), while software companies are more dependent on specific technology trends (e.g., CRM, ERP). The latter faces cliff risks during technology replacement periods (e.g., Salesforce challenged by AI-native CRM). Therefore, the adaptability of "enablers" gives them a lower probability of decline.
Nagarro's origin is not a single startup but the merger of several small consulting firms in 1996, with current CEO Manas Fuloria being one of the founding team members. After being acquired by the German IT services company Allgeier SE in 2011, Manas did not simply replicate the parent company's management model. Instead, under the Allgeier framework, he autonomously drove a series of strategic decisions, thereby laying the organizational foundation for subsequent rapid expansion. This critical turning point indicates that external capital injection did not weaken its internal culture but instead acted as a catalyst for structural change.
Traditional Indian IT consulting firms adopt a hierarchical pyramid structure, where engineers must escalate issues level by level when facing client problems, leading to decision-making delays and "corporate politics" compromises. Nagarro, in contrast, pushes decision-making authority down to the engineer level and proactively reduces the number of middle managers. Unusually, the company has even abolished traditional C-Suite positions—the CFO function is collectively undertaken by a cross-departmental "Finance Committee," while Manas himself changed his title to "Custodian of Entrepreneurship in the Organization" (also abbreviated as CEO). These measures are by no means mere formalism; they forcefully implement the organizational philosophy of "small teams + agile responsiveness" through institutional design. Relevant data indicates that the delivery speed of small teams in agile development environments is 30-50% faster than that of traditional hierarchies (Scrum Alliance, 2022), and Nagarro has institutionalized this efficiency advantage.
Unlike peers, Nagarro's hiring managers are not rewarded solely based on recruitment volume, but rather based on the performance results of hired employees in the first few years after joining. This mechanism directly ties the quality of hires to the manager's long-term interests, greatly reducing the chance of selecting the wrong person due to the urgency of filling a position. Comparative data is as follows:
| Dimension | Nagarro | Typical Practices of Indian Peers |
|---|---|---|
| Basis for hiring manager incentives | Performance results of new employees in the 3 years after joining | Number/speed of completed hires |
| Role of middle management | Very few; decision-making authority rests with engineers | Many layers; long approval chains |
| Average employee retention period | Approximately twice that of peers | Industry average around 2-3 years |
| Net Promoter Score (NPS) | 67 (Q3 2023) | Industry average around 30-40 |
Nagarro's revenue structure is highly dependent on repeat purchases and additional projects from existing customers: approximately 90% of annual revenue comes from existing customers, while 70% of new customers are introduced through referrals from existing ones. This indicates that its flywheel of "happy employees → high-quality service → word-of-mouth" has formed a positive cycle. There is a strong positive correlation between customer spending tiers and average cooperation duration:
| Annual Spending Range | Average Cooperation Duration |
|---|---|
| €1-5 million | 5 years |
| €5-10 million | 8 years |
| > €10 million | 14 years |
Higher spending and longer cooperation mean that Nagarro can continuously deepen customer relationships and achieve natural expansion across departments and projects through its "internal proposal" mechanism (where employees proactively propose new projects after becoming familiar with the client's systems). This "embedded" service model effectively reduces customer acquisition costs while also making the customer's switching costs extremely high.
Although existing customers contribute the vast majority of revenue, Nagarro does not rely on a small number of large clients or a single industry/region. Its customer base remains moderately diversified across geographies and industry sectors, making it more resilient when facing specific market fluctuations (e.g., a technology budget reduction in a particular industry). Behind this diversification lies a deliberate pursuit of "sustainable growth" rather than a simple focus on short-term revenue surges.
An employee retention rate twice that of peers carries significance far beyond "happiness" at the cultural level. In the IT services industry, turnover is the primary source of customer dissatisfaction, and the onboarding period for new employees typically takes 3-6 months, during which project efficiency declines by 15-25%. Nagarro effectively reduces this hidden cost while also saving a significant amount of recruitment and training budgets. It can be said that a high retention rate directly translates into improved profit margins—although the company does not disclose specific financial data, this logic has been confirmed by multiple third-party consulting reports (e.g., Deloitte, 2023, "Employee Retention as a Profit Driver").
This chapter focuses on the valuation discount issue of Nagarro SE, exploring why its share price has persistently lagged behind peer levels. The report attributes the discount to a short-seller report published by German media in early 2023, which listed multiple allegations and further pressured the stock—though some of those allegations have since been proven false or irrelevant.
The author argues that Nagarro's current valuation below peers is not driven by fundamentals but rather by market sentiment overreaction triggered by the short-seller report. Although the report identified certain real weaknesses in the company (i.e., points #2–4 below), it overall failed to constitute conclusive evidence ("not a smoking gun") and instead provided an opportunity for the company to improve its governance.
| Company/Asset | Role | Key Data | Stance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nagarro SE | Discounted target | Valuation below peers (specific multiple gap not disclosed), negatively impacted by short-seller report | Bullish: believes the discount is excessive, underestimating fundamental resilience |
| Short-seller report (unidentified sell-side) | Negative catalyst | Allegations include points #2–4 and other false claims | Neutral-to-negative: the author considers some allegations worth attention but the overall case lacks persuasiveness |
This chapter discusses the pricing deviations that may arise after corporate spin-offs due to a mismatch in the shareholder base. Using the example of India-based company Nagarro SE listed in Germany, the author argues that the short-term uncertainty caused by the spin-off creates an entry opportunity for long-term investors.
The author's central argument is that the shareholder turnover following a spin-off, combined with panic triggered by short-seller reports, can temporarily push a company's stock price below its intrinsic value. As long as the company continues to improve governance and operations, this dislocation will naturally correct itself. The contrarian judgment lies in the fact that the market views the post-spin-off low liquidity and short-selling rumors as negative signals, while the author sees them as a temporary structural opportunity.
| Comparison Dimension | Greentown Management | Nagarro |
|---|---|---|
| Spin-off Venue | Hong Kong Stock Exchange | German Stock Exchange (India incorporated) |
| Dislocation Cause | Mainland investors could not buy directly (until Southbound Stock Connect opened, taking >1 year) | German investors unfamiliar with Indian company, compounded by short-seller report |
| Repair Signal | Activation of Southbound Stock Connect | Sustained execution and governance improvement |
Investors should proactively seek out "orphan stocks" after spin-offs — that is, targets where the shareholder base temporarily does not match the company's true quality. For Nagarro, short-term stock price pressure comes from German investors' selling and the amplifying effect of the short-seller report, rather than fundamental deterioration. If the company continues to deliver results and improve governance transparency in the future, the current discount is likely to be repaired, offering substantial upside potential.
This chapter discusses the highly unconventional management style of Nagarro SE’s CEO, Manas, and reflects on the challenges this style poses for investment judgment. The author argues that “unusual” traits in management are not necessarily a negative factor; the key lies in whether the authenticity of their motives can be verified through deep engagement.
The author’s core investment judgment is that Nagarro’s unconventional management is not a risk but a source of its competitive advantage. The counterintuitive point is that the author chooses to ignore market-perceived “red flags” such as the CEO’s name change (from Manas Fuloria to Manas Human) and the refusal to set up a traditional executive team, instead viewing them as necessary conditions for generating “unconventional results.”
This chapter contains no financial data or comparison tables; all information is qualitative.
| Company/Person | Role | Key Data | Author’s Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nagarro SE | Investment target newly added this quarter | CEO name change, no C-suite, cubicle office | Bullish |
| Manas (CEO) | Key management figure | 20-year tenure; attracts top engineering talent (human capital appeal) | Bullish |
For investors seeking non-consensus returns: Willingness to spend significant time engaging face-to-face with management is the only way to assess whether “unusual” traits constitute a risk. Making negative judgments based purely on surface-level actions (e.g., a CEO name change) may cause one to miss the excess returns driven by unconventional management. Investors should maintain an open attitude toward “non-mainstream” management styles, but must verify sincerity of motives through independent due diligence (e.g., interviews with former employees), rather than relying on market consensus.
This chapter discusses the corporate governance risks of Nagarro SE, focusing primarily on its unusual financial structure and audit arrangements. The market and short-sellers have raised questions about the company's lack of a CFO and its use of a small audit firm, LOHR + COMPANY GmbH, arguing that these structural issues may undermine the credibility of its financial reporting.
The author explicitly agrees with the short report's assessment of Nagarro's governance deficiencies, arguing that an unusual corporate structure requires more traditional checks and balances to earn trust. However, the author also notes that the company has already taken corrective actions (hiring KPMG as group auditor) and at least partially supports the direction of these improvements—namely, "building the infrastructure expected of a listed company while preserving its unique culture." The stance is not bearish, but rather "cautious yet granting a window for improvement."
| Governance Item | Previous Status | 2024 Status |
|---|---|---|
| Audit firm | LOHR + COMPANY GmbH (small, inherited from parent Allgeier) | KPMG (Big Four) |
| Financial leadership | Finance Committee (no CFO) | No explicit change, but "new CFO" has been met, commitment to improvement made |
| Governance improvement commitment | None | Company indicates it is considering more measures |
1. Governance is a variable that must be continuously monitored. Investors should track whether Nagarro formally appoints a CFO and whether KPMG's audit opinion reveals any additional issues.
2. Improvements have begun but remain incomplete. The author stresses "hoping more improvements are underway," indicating that the current stage is insufficient to fully eliminate risk but is worth watching.
3. Common ground with the short report: Among the multiple issues raised by the short-seller, governance/audit is the only area where the author explicitly concurs—if no meaningful improvement follows, it could serve as a basis for reducing or avoiding the position; if improvements materialize, it would act as a catalyst for confidence restoration.
This chapter focuses on the macro headwinds faced by the IT services industry since 2023. Rapidly rising interest rates have forced enterprises to tighten variable technology budgets, leading to a broad slowdown in industry growth and ushering in a period of uncertainty. The fund's portfolio holding, Nagarro SE, is at the forefront of this impact.
The author argues that although the duration and severity of the correction are unforeseeable, Nagarro, with its structural competitive advantages and expertise, has the ability to expand its market share in the future regardless of how the macro environment evolves. This is a long-term judgment that runs counter to the short-term trend — a sharp deceleration in industry growth does not necessarily imply a decline in individual stock market share.
| Metric | Q4 2022 | Q3 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Nagarro growth rate | 42.5% | 2% |
1. Focus on structural winners amid industry headwinds: The report implies that during a contraction in IT services spending, companies with deep technical expertise and client stickiness (such as Nagarro) may instead seize share from weaker competitors. Investors should track its contract signings and client expansion data to determine whether this hypothesis is playing out.
2. Beware of valuation traps: With 2% growth in the current interest rate environment, the market may assign Nagarro a low valuation multiple. However, if the market overemphasizes short-term data while overlooking its long-term competitiveness, it could present a buying opportunity.
3. Avoid undifferentiated service providers: Conversely, IT services companies lacking differentiated advantages may face greater loss of market share and profitability during the industry contraction.
This chapter discusses the potentially disruptive impact of artificial intelligence on the IT services industry. There is deep disagreement in the market: bears argue that AI will commoditize software development, reducing demand for outsourced engineers; bulls contend that AI will generate more new business, ushering in a "golden age" for IT services. The author attempts to resolve this uncertainty by drawing on historical experience.
The author's contrarian judgment is: AI will not be the "last straw" that breaks the IT services industry; the industry will once again adapt to a new paradigm through transformation. The core logic does not lie in predicting the precise impact of AI, but in the historical fact that the industry has repeatedly faced similar "extinction events" (e.g., packaged software, cloud computing, RPA) and each time found new growth pathways. The author argues that even if billable hours per project decline, the total number of projects will rise; meanwhile, AI talent scarcity will push up average billing rates, and margin improvements will be sufficient to offset slower revenue growth.
1. Historical Analogy: The IT services industry emerged in the 1980s, initially focused on custom development. When packaged software from Microsoft/Oracle/SAP appeared, analysts predicted the industry's demise, but the industry pivoted to helping clients implement these solutions, fueling the next growth wave.
2. Cloud Computing Impact: Cloud software theoretically requires fewer deployment resources, yet IT service providers instead became the biggest beneficiaries of cloud computing by helping clients migrate to the cloud and develop new solutions.
3. RPA Case: Robotic process automation (RPA) was expected to destroy BPO (business process outsourcing) companies, but BPO firms embedded RPA into their own services and sold them in a "servitization" model, lowering prices while increasing profits.
4. Key Inference: The author cites the historical "fog of war" pattern—things are never as good or as bad as they seem. The core predictions are as follows:
| Metric | Historical Scenario Analogy | Author's Judgment |
|---|---|---|
| Billable Hours per Project | Post-cloud, post-RPA hours per project declined | Will continue to decline |
| Total Number of Projects | Post-cloud migration, post-RPA embedding projects surged | Will increase significantly |
| Average Billing Rate | AI talent scarcity drives pricing | Will rise |
| Profit Margin | Post-BPO transformation margins improved | Will increase, partially offsetting slower revenue growth |