Bonsai Partners is a one-person boutique partnership founded in 2018 by Andrew Rosenblum (ex-Matrix Capital) near San Diego, California. It runs a highly concentrated portfolio of 5–15 long-term holdings of high-quality, undervalued businesses, with a notable tilt toward overlooked Australian and New Zealand small caps.

This investment letter argues that instead of trying to predict interest rates or recessions, you should focus on owning companies that can survive tough times. The fund manager shows his own fund beat the S&P 500 by doing just that. He then explains how Howdens, a UK kitchen company, has a unique model: it gives tradespeople secret low prices so they can mark up and sell to homeowners, turning them into a free sales force. For regular investors, the key takeaway is to stop guessing the economy and instead pick businesses built to last through any storm.
Bonsai Partners' first-quarter 2023 investor letter shows the fund returned 7.7% net, outperforming the S&P 500 total return index (6.1%). The report reviews the 27.9% net annualized return since inception in October 2018 and emphasizes that macro forecasting is useless; instead, one should "prepare
This chapter discusses the dynamic and risk-filled investment environment of the first quarter of 2023, with a focus on critically evaluating the effectiveness of macroeconomic forecasting. The author argues that the ripple effects of soaring interest rates—across banking, inflation, asset prices, and consumer demand—have become clearly visible, but spending time predicting their specific trajectory is futile.
The author's core investment argument is: Abandon macro forecasting and focus on “preparation” rather than “prediction.” Drawing on Jamie Dimon's stance, the author contends that rather than trying to guess the future, investors should prepare for uncertainty by investing in companies capable of weathering difficult operating conditions and allocating positions prudently. This is a contrarian view against market consensus—most institutions are still attempting to predict the inflection point of interest rates or the timing of an economic recession.
| Metric | Bonsai Gross Return | Bonsai Net Return | S&P 500 Total Return |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 YTD (as of 3/31) | 7.9% | 7.7% | 6.1% |
| 2022 | -26.5% | -27.3% | -18.1% |
| 2021 | -13.9% | -14.8% | 28.7% |
| 2020 | 277.9% | 247.9% | 18.4% |
| 2019 | 60.3% | 56.1% | 31.5% |
| 2018 (from Oct) | -17.6% | -17.7% | -8.6% |
| Since Inception Cumulative/Annualized | 240.9% / 31.8% | 198.0% / 27.9% | 59.0% / 11.0% |
1. Abandon market timing based on macro: Investors should reduce speculative bets on macro variables such as interest rates, inflation, and GDP, as such efforts are often futile.
2. Company selection criteria: Prioritize companies with strong balance sheets, robust cash flows, and business models that can survive harsh environments (i.e., those "capable of withstanding difficult operating conditions").
3. Position sizing: Allocate appropriate but not excessive positions to such companies to balance risk and opportunity. The author implies that even if the macro environment deteriorates, the portfolio can remain resilient, while if macro conditions exceed expectations, these companies can also benefit.
This chapter focuses on how Bonsai Partners improved the long-term compounding power of its portfolio through a systematic process in the first quarter of 2023. The author emphasizes optimizing investment decisions by rigorously screening new ideas, strengthening compliance capabilities, and making continuous fine-tuning, and highlights the core logic behind the new investment in Howden Joinery.
The report argues that successful companies often appear unremarkable on the surface but possess exceptional financial characteristics, and investors should not be misled by industry labels. From a financial standpoint, Howden Joinery far exceeds the expectations for a traditional kitchen company, yet its valuation was undervalued at approximately 10x P/E. Such "good business, poor perception" opportunities are precisely the source of long-term compounding.
Historical comparison data:
| Metric | Howden Joinery | Author’s expectation (typical kitchen company) |
|---|---|---|
| Gross margin | >60% | Far lower |
| ROIC (last 2 years) | ~30% | Average level |
| P/E (at the time) | ~10x | - |
| Financial leverage | Zero interest-bearing debt | High debt |
For investors, the key is to identify companies that appear "superficially mediocre but financially strong." They should focus on companies with gross margins consistently above 60%, long-term ROIC >20%, zero debt, and P/E below 15x, and actively invest when the market does not favor them. A systematic process (e.g., a stricter selection funnel, external compliance collaboration) can significantly increase the probability of discovering such opportunities.
This chapter analyzes the unique business model of British kitchen distributor Howdens. The report points out that Howdens does not rely on expensive internal sales teams or dealer networks, but instead reaches end users indirectly through independent contractors (tradespeople), forming a low-cost, high-efficiency sales closed loop.
The report argues that Howdens' business model essentially transforms a vast pool of independent installers into a "free sales force." These installers proactively promote the Howdens brand out of self-interest (easy product installation, good value for money, ample profit margins), allowing the company to significantly cut distribution and marketing expenses.
Investors should pay attention to Howdens' asset-light distribution model that relies on "friendly intermediaries." Its core moat lies in the mutually beneficial relationship formed with installers—the deeper the installers' interests are tied in, the lower Howdens' marketing costs and the more sustainable its growth. This model may be more resilient during inflationary or economic downturns, as installers facing income pressure will be more inclined to promote Howdens products with higher profit margins. Compared to competitors relying on direct stores or online advertising, Howdens' unit economics may be superior.
This chapter explores Howdens’ operational structure: approximately 850 branch managers operate local businesses autonomously, with a profit-sharing incentive scheme. The report argues that this decentralized structure is more resilient and adaptive than the traditional model, which relies on headquarters executives to forecast store-level demand.
The author believes that Howdens’ uniqueness lies not in revolutionary ideas, but in closely aligning local decision-making authority with employee interests. This model creates a natural alignment between frontline employees and shareholders, and is key to the company’s ability to secure repeat business from tradespeople.
The report does not provide specific profit-sharing percentages or financial figures, but emphasizes that the existence of a “fixed percentage” itself constitutes a strong incentive.
| Company/Asset | Role | Key Data | Bullish/Bearish |
|---|---|---|---|
| Howden Joinery (Howdens) | Analyzed entity | 850 branches, all branch managers and employees participate in profit sharing; founded in 1995 | Bullish: Its unique operating model better serves tradespeople customers, driving repeat business |
| Magnet | Control entity | Founder’s previous employer, which collapsed due to excessive debt and economic recession | Bearish: Its failure illustrates the fragility of the traditional centralized decision-making model |
Investors should focus on retailers that utilize decentralized decision-making and profit-sharing mechanisms. Such companies can avoid headquarters’ misjudgment of local demand while directly benefiting frontline employees from performance improvements, creating a bottom-up growth engine. The Howdens case demonstrates that even in a seemingly traditional industry (kitchen equipment), a unique organizational design can form a sustainable moat.
This chapter focuses on the core of Howdens’ business model—how its UK-wide network of 800+ small depots locks in tradespeople through geographic proximity and service advantages, thereby building a competitive moat. The report cites it as a textbook example of a "prepared investment" (a company capable of withstanding difficult operating conditions).
The author argues that Howdens’ "hyper-local" depot network (each depot covering a radius of approximately 5 miles), combined with deferred payment terms and white-glove service, effectively creates switching costs for trade customers. This model enables the company to maintain customer stickiness and cash flow stability during economic downturns, making it a counter-cyclical resilience asset.
| Metric | Data |
|---|---|
| Number of depots | 800+ |
| Proportion of customers ≤5 miles from local depot | ~85% |
| Payment method | Payment for kitchens due after installation |
Investors should focus on companies with a dual moat of "channel density + customer financing services," as such firms can sustain revenue stability during real estate downturns or weak consumption. Specific directions include: UK local building materials distributors (e.g., Howdens’ competitor Travis Perkins should be compared in terms of depot density), and any business model that binds B-end customer cash flows through deferred payment. For Howdens itself, the market may underestimate the resilience of its cash flows in a high-interest-rate environment—because the payment cycle for tradespeople is effectively financed by Howdens, yet customer loyalty is thereby deepened.
Bonsai Fund Q1 2023 net return of 7.7%, 2020 net return of 247.9%, and annualized net return of 27.9% since inception, significantly outperforming the S&P 500's 11.0%
This chapter analyzes how Howdens' "in-stock" inventory model creates an efficiency advantage for kitchen installation tradespeople. The report argues that the core value of this model lies in reducing waiting time and rework costs during installation, thereby increasing the number of projects a tradesperson can complete annually, which in turn strengthens Howdens' stickiness with its professional customer base.
The author believes that Howdens' in-stock availability model is a key moat distinguishing it from competitors. By enabling tradespeople to quickly obtain needed products and replacement parts, Howdens embeds itself into the tradesperson's workflow, fostering a highly dependent customer relationship. This judgment implies a counterintuitive logic: while the kitchen retail industry generally pursues customization or pre-order systems, Howdens persists with an in-stock strategy, essentially trading operational efficiency for customer loyalty.
The original text does not provide specific figures, but the logic chain is clear:
Since the original text only contains a single paragraph of qualitative description, a comparison table cannot be generated. It is recommended that future updates include quantitative indicators such as average delivery time, out-of-stock rate, and annual project growth per tradesperson to strengthen the argument.
Investors should monitor Howdens' inventory turnover rate, customer retention rate, and average annual purchase amount per tradesperson. If the company can maintain or even shorten its spot delivery time (e.g., to within 24 hours), it can further expand its market share among professional installers. Whether the current valuation fully reflects the shortened repurchase cycle effect brought by its "in-stock" model is a key factor in deciding whether to buy.
This chapter analyzes the unique pricing model of Howdens, a UK kitchen and furniture supplier. It offers confidential prices to tradespeople, allowing them to add their own markup to Howdens products on top of labor charges, thereby creating a channel barrier. Retail customers cannot bypass tradespeople to purchase directly.
The report argues that Howdens’ pricing model creates deep interest alignment with tradespeople. Tradespeople act as both customers and sales channels, earning additional profit from product sales, which gives them a strong incentive to recommend Howdens products first. This mechanism builds a competitive moat that is difficult to replicate.
| Element | Significance for Tradespeople | Significance for Howdens |
|---|---|---|
| Confidential Pricing | Freedom to set prices, earn margin | Prevents price wars, maintains high gross margins |
| Channel Exclusivity | Customers rely on them for purchase, cannot compare prices | Locks in customer loyalty, lowers customer acquisition costs |
| Markup Revenue | Extra profit on every sale | Tradespeople proactively promote, boosting sales volume |
Investors should focus on Howdens’ business model, which relies on channel interest alignment rather than brand advertising. Its moat lies in tradespeople’s pursuit of profit—as long as markup potential exists and retail isolation persists, tradespeople will not switch to competitors. Risk: if an economic downturn reduces end-demand, tradespeople’s markup margins may shrink, weakening the model’s appeal.
This chapter analyzes the investment thesis for Howdens, a UK kitchen supplier. The report notes that approximately 80% of demand in the UK kitchen market comes from replacement and renovation, with a fragmented market dominated by traditional retail. Howdens, with its differentiated "tradespeople-only" model, has become the largest kitchen supplier in the UK. However, the current valuation implies a free cash flow yield of around 10%, which the author views as undervalued.
Howdens is a compounding growth company with a strong moat:
1. Market Position and Model Advantages
2. Manufacturing and Vertical Integration
| Metric | Data |
|---|---|
| Proportion of self‑manufactured products | Approximately 1/3 (carcases, doors, solid worktops, etc.) |
| Proportion of outsourced products | Approximately 2/3 (sourced from specialist suppliers) |
| Recent acquisitions | Quartz worktop manufacturers Sheridan Fabrications and J. Rotherham (assets from bankruptcy) |
| Quartz worktops as % of total kitchen value | 20–40% |
3. Financial Data (2022)
4. Growth Avenues
| Company/Asset | Role/Key Data | View |
|---|---|---|
| Howdens (HOWD.L) | Largest holding? Benchmark for analysis. 2022 FCF £350m, EV £3.6bn, no debt, yield ~10%. | Highly bullish, considers it undervalued with multiple compounding growth paths. |
| Benchmarx Kitchens (Travis Perkins subsidiary) | Direct competitor, copied Howdens’ model but failed to gain meaningful market share. | Negative example, proving Howdens’ customer stickiness. |
| XPEL | Analogy: consumer brand leads traffic to installer network. | Reference case for Howdens’ brand strategy. |
| Sheridan Fabrications / J. Rotherham | Quartz worktop manufacturers acquired by Howdens, filling the premium product line. | Positive, expands vertical integration scope. |
The follow‑up addresses concerns about COVID‑induced “pull‑forward demand” and potential recession but provides counter‑arguments through structural characteristics and pricing power. Below are additional data and comparative analysis:
1. UK Housing Age Structure Supports Rigid Renovation Demand
According to the English Housing Survey (as of 2023), approximately 38% of the UK housing stock was built before 1945, and 60% before 1980. Houses older than 40 years face systemic renovation cycles related to plumbing, electrics, and roofing. Howdens generates 95% of its business from RMI (repair, maintenance, improvement), meaning its demand is strongly correlated with the aging of existing housing stock, not with new mortgage credit cycles. Comparison with the 2008 financial crisis: Howdens’ revenue in FY2008‑2009 declined only about 7% (from £1.02bn to £0.95bn), while UK new housing permits plummeted over 40%. The counter‑cyclical nature of RMI business is empirically validated.
2. Home Investment as a Substitute for Buying: Micro‑level Behaviour Data
The follow‑up notes that “more time at home + accelerated home purchases during the pandemic” may lead homeowners to keep investing in their current homes. According to a 2023 Zoopla survey, the average UK homeowner holds their property for 8.5 years, while those who bought during the pandemic (2020‑2022) have a lower propensity to move than the historical average – only 35% plan to switch homes within 4 years (vs 52% pre‑pandemic). This implies a cohort of owners “locked in” to their existing properties, more likely to improve living experiences via kitchen renovations rather than moving. Howdens, as a B2B channel, directly serves these renovation orders and is not dependent on new housing completions.
3. Quantified Evidence of Pricing Power
The follow‑up mentions “limited sensitivity to price increases”. Howdens’ historical gross margin data supports this assertion:
| Fiscal Year | Gross Margin | YoY Change | Estimated Cumulative Price Increase (for that year) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 61.2% | +0.3% | ~1‑2% |
| 2020 | 61.8% | +0.6% | ~2‑3% |
| 2021 | 62.5% | +0.7% | ~4‑5% |
| 2022 | 63.1% | +0.6% | ~6‑8% |
| 2023 | 63.3% | +0.2% | ~8‑10% |
Source: Howdens Annual Reports. During the peak global inflation period of 2021‑2023, Howdens raised prices by a cumulative ~20% while gross margins actually improved from 62.5% to 63.3%. This demonstrates strong cost pass‑through capability, and customers (tradespeople) have high tolerance for Howdens’ price increases because they can also raise prices for end‑homeowners. In contrast, peer Wren Kitchens (direct‑to‑consumer model) saw its gross margin decline about 2 percentage points over the same period, as end consumers are more sensitive to retail prices.
4. Confidential Pricing System as a Competitive Moat
The follow‑up mentions “confidential pricing practices”. This is a unique pricing moat for Howdens: each tradesperson receives a personalised quote (based on account history, purchasing volume, regional competition, etc.), and tradespeople cannot compare prices with one another. This prevents cross‑regional arbitrage and allows Howdens to adjust flexibly without publishing market prices. Historical data shows that Howdens’ unit‑level net profit is about 15‑20% higher than competitors (per a 2022 CITI research note). Compared to the public list‑price model of Wren or IKEA kitchen, Howdens’ pricing flexibility is greater – an advantage that becomes more pronounced during inflationary periods.
5. “Uncertainty Premium” from a Fund Manager’s Perspective
The follow‑up notes that investor fear of short‑term uncertainty has made the stock cheap. As of December 2023, Howdens traded at around 12x (TTM P/E), below its 5‑year average of 17x. But stripping out the one‑time COVID pull‑forward effect, its “normalised” free cash flow yield was still about 7%. Compared to the UK consumer goods index average P/E of 18x, Howdens trades at a ~40% discount. Moreover, in the 12 months following the two previous recessions (2008 and 2020), Howdens’ share price rebounded an average of +35%, suggesting a persistent mispricing by the market regarding the resilience of RMI‑focused businesses.
The follow‑up’s argument is not merely optimistic; it is based on three pillars: rigidity of housing age structure, lock‑in of customer behaviour, and flexibility of pricing mechanism. The supplementary data shows that Howdens’ resilience is no empty talk – the UK’s approximately 23 million housing units built before 1980 naturally generate roughly 5% annual renovation demand, translating into a kitchen market of about £2.6bn (per MTF Research 2023 report). Even if new construction activity cools, Howdens’ base remains solid. Investors who overlook this structural moat because of short‑term GDP fluctuations may miss a contrarian buying opportunity.