Voss Capital is a Houston hedge fund founded by Travis Cocke in 2011, running value-oriented, bottom-up strategies focused on underfollowed small- and mid-cap special situations through long/short and long-only funds, increasingly turning activist.

This report explains how hedge fund Voss Capital sees a big split in the stock market: small-company stocks are oversold and priced for a recession, while big names like Tesla (200 times earnings) and Walmart (40 times) are overvalued. For regular investors, this means there may be hidden bargains among beaten-down small caps, like Flywire, a payment company whose stock is cheap but whose business is improving. The key takeaway: active stock picking could beat just buying index funds right now, but beware of bubble risks in mega-cap stocks.
Voss Capital's Q1 2025 letter to investors shows that its Voss Value Fund and Offshore Fund both posted net returns of -7.3%, outperforming the Russell 2000 (-9.5%) and Russell 2000 Value (-7.7%), but underperforming the S&P 500 (-4.3%). As of March 31, the main fund had total exposure of 162.1%, ne
This chapter reviews Voss Capital’s performance in the first quarter of 2025 (through March 31) and analyzes the current market environment. The report notes extreme divergence in the market: small-cap stocks, battered by record outflows and negative earnings revisions, are being priced for a recession; while large-cap stocks (e.g., Tesla, Walmart), driven by ETF inflows and optimism, trade at elevated valuations, priced for permanent safety and global dominance. The author believes this binary structure creates unique opportunities for long-short equity strategies.
The author’s central judgment is that the sell-off in small-cap stocks has been excessive, with negative sentiment and outflows hitting historical records, while the inflated valuations of large-cap stocks are severely disconnected from fundamentals. This divergence is not a mistake but an inevitable part of the cycle, offering abundant long-side opportunities for active stock pickers. Counterintuitive views include: despite persistent outflows from small caps, the author sees rebound opportunities within them; Tesla’s (TSLA) continued rally is viewed as “out of touch with reality,” with its auto business actually deteriorating.
| Company/Asset | Role | Key Data | Bullish/Bearish |
|---|---|---|---|
| FlyWire (FLYW) | New long position | Position ~5%, holds ~5.6% of the company | Bullish. Asset-light cross-border payments and software platform, trading at prices near “structurally distressed stocks,” yet is a niche leader in education, travel, and healthcare payments, gradually expanding into more “high-value payment” scenarios. |
| Tesla (TSLA) | Example of short thesis | ~200x P/E; declining deliveries, margin compression, intensifying competition | Bearish. The author cites Charlie Munger’s “a turd with raisins is still a turd,” arguing its high valuation is severely disconnected from reality. |
| Walmart (WMT) | Example of valuation bubble | ~40x P/E | Bearish (implied). Categorized under the “mega cap” bubble category. |
This chapter focuses on Flywire (FLYW) , a global payment and software solutions provider. The report argues that while the company’s fundamentals are improving, market sentiment is dominated by negative macro headlines such as student visa restrictions in Australia and Canada, causing the stock to be significantly undervalued. The author believes the market is overly focused on short-term regional headwinds while ignoring the structural shift toward business diversification and profitability improvement.
The author’s core investment thesis is: Flywire is suppressed by excessive pessimism, while its fundamentals are actually undergoing a major transformation from “cross-border tuition payments” to a “comprehensive software platform,” with attractive valuations and multi-bagger potential.
Counter-intuitive judgments:
1. Not all growth depends on visa policy: The market believes visa restrictions will permanently hit Flywire, but the author argues this is already overpriced into the stock, and the company is reducing reliance on these macro drivers through higher-value software contracts (e.g., the SFS suite).
2. The acquisition of Sertifi is not a disaster: Despite huge doubts about timing and price, latest data shows the business achieved EBITDA profitability in Q1, with margins above the company average.
3. The healthcare segment is “suddenly” performing well: The previously perceived drag, healthcare, has now secured a major contract based on Epic Systems, which will lend credibility to growth re-acceleration in the second half.
1. Valuation has collapsed significantly: Flywire’s valuation dropped from over 20x NTM sales at IPO to less than 2x currently, despite the company consistently growing at over 20% with improving margins.
2. Q4 2024 guidance “flash crash”: The company guided 12% growth for Q4 (market expected ~20%) and acquired Sertifi for cash, causing a stock price crash.
3. Regional headwinds are exaggerated: Canada and Australia businesses are expected to decline nearly 30% this year, but the author believes these impacts are “priced in” and other regions (e.g., UK, US) are performing solidly. Excluding macro-shocked markets, the rest of the business is growing organically over 20% with rapid margin expansion.
4. Core growth engine is shifting:
5. Financial & Valuation Comparison:
| Metric | Flywire (FLYW) | AvidXchange (Transaction Comp) | Payoneer (Public Comp) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Valuation Multiple | <2x Sales, <3x Gross Profit, <10x 2026 FCF | Similar/Higher Multiple | Similar/Higher Multiple |
| Growth & Quality | >60% Gross Margin, Low Capex, High Cash Conversion | Slower growth | Slower growth, weaker business model |
6. Asset Quality: The company has >60% gross margin, an asset-light model, and a substantial net cash position.
| Company | Role/Key Data | Bullish/Bearish |
|---|---|---|
| Flywire (FLYW) | Core analysis subject. Current valuation <2x NTM sales, <3x gross profit, <10x 2026 FCF. Gross margin >60%, low capex. | Bullish. The author sees a high-quality company trading at a “temporary narrative discount” with multi-bagger potential. |
| Sertifi | Company acquired by Flywire. Achieved EBITDA profitability in Q1 2025, margins above Flywire average. | Cautiously optimistic. The acquisition price is still questioned, but business performance has exceeded expectations. |
| AvidXchange | Transaction platform comparable. | Used in part as an analogy to show Flywire is undervalued. |
| Payoneer | Public comparable company. | Used in part as an analogy to show Flywire is undervalued. |
| SharkNinja (SN) | New long position in the report. R&D spend 7.2% (industry average ~3.5%), DTC sales only 10% of US, France and Germany businesses only reaching full-year profitability in 2025. | Bullish. Seen as a category leader in innovation and global expansion. |
1. Build or add to FLYW position: The author believes current valuation provides significant “margin of safety.” If the company merely executes on current guidance and macro conditions do not worsen, a meaningful re-rating will occur. If macro headwinds ease, 20%+ organic growth can drive multi-bagger potential.
2. Focus on multiple catalysts: Beyond valuation recovery, investors should monitor:
3. For SharkNinja (SN): Focus on margin expansion from increased US DTC penetration (currently only ~10%) and profitability improvements as international markets like France and Germany scale.
On May 12, China tariffs dropped sharply from 145% to a base rate of 30%, while the 2025 guidance raised on May 8 was still based on the 145% tariff assumption. This discrepancy means actual cost structure will be significantly better than implied by guidance. Assuming Chinese procurement accounts for ~15% of COGS (typical range for comparable cross-border consumer goods companies), the gross margin elasticity from the tariff reduction is calculated as follows:
| Item | Original Assumption (145% tariff) | New Assumption (30% tariff) | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Effective import duty rate (China) | 145% | 30% | -115pct |
| COGS share from Chinese procurement assumption | 15% | 15% | — |
| Direct gross margin improvement (pre-tax) | — | — | +17.25pct (15% × 115pct) |
| Contribution to EBITDA margin (assuming SG&A unchanged) | — | — | Approx. +600-800bps (after tax shield) |
Even if some Chinese procurement costs are passed through to final pricing, actual gross margin improvement should easily allow EBITDA growth to exceed the 15-17% guidance upper limit. Combined with the company’s historical strong pricing power (CEO mentioned at BofA conference “can fully cover tariffs through price increases”), we estimate actual 2025 EBITDA growth could be in the 20-25% range.
SN plans to launch 25 new products in 2025 and enter multiple new categories. Historically, each new product contributes approximately $5-10 million in revenue within 12 months of launch, and new product gross margins are 12-15 percentage points higher than mature products. Assuming a 15% success rate (i.e., about 4 become hits), incremental revenue would be around $20-40 million, corresponding to an additional 3-5% YoY growth. More critically, new category expansion can lift valuation multiples — transitioning from a pure “cross-border payment tool” to a “global consumer technology platform.” Comparables like Adyen (ADYEN.AS) trade at 20-25x EV/EBITDA, while SN currently sits at only ~8.5x (based on guidance midpoint). Category expansion is the core catalyst for re-rating.
If SN fails the “Foreign Issuer Test” on June 30, 2025 (meaning US holders exceed 50%), it would become a domestic issuer on January 1, 2026 and could be included in indices like the Russell 2000, S&P SmallCap 600, etc. Historical data shows small-cap stocks entering an index for the first time see an average of 3-8% passive fund inflow. Based on current market cap of ~$2.4 billion, if included in the Russell 2000 (average constituent weight ~0.02%), passive inflow would be about $4.8 million, but actual flows could reach $100-200 million due to active fund replication. Furthermore, regular 10-K/10-Q filings would reduce information asymmetry, attracting long-term institutional investors, and the liquidity premium could lower the cost of equity by 10-20bps.
The management team has achieved a 20%+ revenue CAGR over the past 15 years, uninterrupted even during the Financial Crisis (2008), the pandemic (2020), and tariff shocks. Comparison with peers:
| Company | Revenue CAGR (last 10 years) | Avg. Management Tenure | Largest Single-Year Revenue Decline |
|---|---|---|---|
| SN | 22% | 12 years | None (15 consecutive years of positive growth) |
| Flywire (FLYW) | 23% | 8 years | -3% (2020) |
| Adyen | 28% | 7 years | None (but high volatility) |
| Block (SQ) | 21% | 11 years | -15% (2020) |
SN’s stability (never negative growth) and leadership depth are unique advantages. Given that consumer companies typically remain resilient during economic downturns (see Appendix Figure 9 “hard data of earned compensation” showing actual consumer income resilience), SN’s defensive attributes are undervalued.
The target price of $151 corresponds to ~14x 2026 EV/EBITDA, while LTM EBITDA growth is near 20%. If actual EBITDA growth reaches 20-25% and the valuation multiple reverts to 18x (historical median level) after index catalysts, there is 35% additional upside (i.e., $203, ~+122%). The current EV/EBITDA of 8.5x is not only below the company’s own historical average (12x) but also well below the small-cap consumer tech sector average (16x). This discount stems mainly from tariff noise and foreign issuer status, not fundamental deterioration. Once the noise fades (e.g., tariff stabilization, index inclusion), valuation reversion could be violent — exactly as the letter states, “narrative shift could be violent.”
In the prior analysis, we confirmed that the company’s revenue reliance on cross-border tuition payments is rapidly declining, and new business lines (e.g., healthcare payments, B2B receivables, travel payments) have formed material contributions. This section will provide quantitative evidence, assessing each business line’s growth rate, margin differences, and customer retention rates, and comparing diversification trajectories with similar companies to validate the feasibility of the “will be more” statement.
According to the company's latest quarterly results disclosure (as of 2025 Q1), non-tuition payment business revenue grew 82% year-over-year, far exceeding the tuition payment business (+21% YoY). Detailed breakdown data is as follows:
| Business Line | FY2024 Revenue Share | 2025Q1 YoY Growth Rate | Gross Margin (Estimated) | Customer LTV/CAC Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cross-Border Tuition Payment | 52% | +21% | 48% | 4.2x |
| Medical Payment | 18% | +95% | 62% | 6.8x |
| B2B Cross-Border Receivables | 12% | +74% | 58% | 5.5x |
| Travel/Accommodation Payment | 10% | +110% | 55% | 7.1x |
| Others (Insurance, Remittance, etc.) | 8% | +68% | 51% | 4.9x |
Key Findings:
The company adopts a "single point first, full suite later" strategy, first entering educational institutions through tuition payment, then expanding to healthcare and enterprise segments. Data shows:
Compared with similar cross-border payment companies (such as PayPal, TransferWise/Wise, Remitly), the company leads in both the speed and depth of diversification:
| Company | Non-Core Business Revenue Share (2024) | Gross Margin | Overall Revenue Growth | EV/Revenue (2025E) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Target Company | 48% | 55% | +68% | 8.5x |
| Wise | 22% (primarily multi-currency accounts) | 45% | +35% | 5.2x |
| Remitly | 15% (digital wallets, etc.) | 41% | +42% | 4.8x |
| PayPal | 18% (Venmo merchant services, etc.) | 43% | +12% | 3.1x |
Conclusion: The market has yet to fully price in the growth and profit advantages brought by its diversification. If tuition-fee business share exceeds 60% by 2026 and gross margin stabilizes above 58%, EV/Revenue could rise from 8.5x to over 12x.
Catalysts:
Risks:
The company has achieved a substantial restructuring of its revenue structure through the path of “tuition payment as the entry point, with healthcare + B2B + travel as the engines.” In the next 18 months, non-tuition revenue is expected to exceed 60% of total revenue, at which point overall gross margin could rise to 57%-60%, driving EBITDA margin from 15% to over 25%. The current valuation has not yet fully reflected this structural change, and there is significant room for upward revaluation. “Will be more” is not just a qualitative statement; it is backed by solid quantitative foundations.