Southeastern Asset Management is a Memphis-based deep-value firm founded in 1975 by O. Mason Hawkins to exploit the bargains left by the 1973-74 bear market. Its flagship Longleaf Partners Funds (launched 1987) invest employees' own money alongside clients'. Following Graham's discipline and its "Business, People, Price" framework, it runs concentrated books of 15-25 undervalued stocks held for the long term — famously closing funds to new investors when opportunities were scarce. CEO and Head of Research Ross Glotzbach now leads the firm, which publishes quarterly Longleaf fund commentaries and Research Perspectives notes.

This fund commentary explains why the small-cap fund trailed the Russell 2000 in 2025 but claims its holdings are better quality. Most of the index's gains came from low-quality, unprofitable companies—a bubble similar to 1999, the manager argues. The fund keeps 15.8% cash to deploy when the hype fades. Only 10% of its stocks fell over 20%, versus 15–20% of the index dropping 40–50%. It highlights specific bets like Becle (tequila brand), GCI (Alaska telecom monopoly), and Mattel. For ordinary investors, the lesson: don't confuse a good company with a good stock price.
Southeastern (Longleaf Partners) Small-Cap Fund 2025 Annual Review The fund delivered a full-year return of 7.56%, underperforming the Russell 2000's 12.81% and the Russell 2000 Value's 12.59%. However, the fund's price-to-value (P/V) ratio stands in the low 60% range, with cash at 15.8% and a portf
This section is the introductory part of the Longleaf Partners Small-Cap Fund's 2025 Annual Commentary, primarily discussing the fund's performance in 2025 versus the market environment. The report notes that although the fund's full-year return of 7.56% lagged behind the Russell 2000's 12.81% and the Russell 2000 Value's 12.59%, the intrinsic development of the fund's holdings outperformed the stock price performance. The main reason is that over 35% of stocks in the Russell 2000 rose by more than 70%, while only 15% of the fund's holdings averaged a 30% gain, with low-quality, unprofitable companies continuing to lead.
The author's core investment argument is that the current market environment resembles 1999, where the rebound in low-quality stocks is unsustainable. The financial resilience of the fund's holdings (with leverage ratios far below those of 2007 and 2021) will provide an advantage when the market turns. Counterintuitive judgments include: 75% of the fund's holdings are concentrated in the -20% to +20% return range, with average performance exceeding the index's 0% return; only 10% of holdings fell more than 20%, with an average loss of 30%, far below the index's 15-20% of holdings and 40-50% decline, and no permanent capital losses occurred.
1. Market Structure Comparison: Over 35% of stocks in the Russell 2000 averaged a gain of 70%+, while only 15% of the fund's holdings averaged a 30% gain. In the fourth quarter, unprofitable companies outperformed profitable ones by an average of over 500 basis points.
2. Portfolio Concentration: 75% of the fund's holdings are in the -20% to +20% return range, compared to just over 40% for the index; the fund's average performance in this range exceeds the index's 0% return.
3. Downside Protection: Only 10% of the fund's holdings fell more than 20%, with an average loss of 30%, compared to 15-20% of the index's holdings and a 40-50% decline.
4. Leverage Level Comparison: The spread between the bond and debt yields of the fund's current holdings relative to the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield is approximately half the level seen in 2007 and 2021.
The Small-Cap Fund returned 1.13% in Q4 2025, 7.56% over the past year, 12.34% annualized over three years, and 9.69% annualized since inception, underperforming the Russell 3000's 17.15% and 11.05% over the same periods.
| Metric | Fund Holdings | Russell 2000 |
|---|---|---|
| Holdings with Gain >20% | 15% | >35% |
| Average Gain for Holdings with Gain >20% | 30% | 70%+ |
| Holdings with Decline >20% | 10% | 15-20% |
| Average Decline for Holdings with Decline >20% | 30% | 40-50% |
| Holdings in -20% to +20% Range | 75% | Just over 40% |
| Average Return in this Range | Better than 0% | 0% |
5. Rule Adjustment: The holding limit was raised from 6.5% to 8%, citing reasons including no significant historical performance difference in the research team, increased participation, and improved tax efficiency.
6. Cash and Kodak: Kodak convertible preferred shares were sold at fair value in the fourth quarter; cash represents 15.8% of the portfolio, having a minimal impact on the full year but providing ammunition for 2026.
1. Unsustainable Low-Quality Rebound: The current rally in low-quality, unprofitable companies could reverse rapidly. The financial resilience of the fund's holdings (leverage spread only half of 2007/2021 levels) will generate excess returns when the market turns.
2. Focus on Portfolio Concentration: 75% of the fund's holdings are concentrated in a narrow fluctuation range, and their average performance exceeds the index, suggesting the intrinsic value of core holdings is being underestimated by the market.
3. Significantly Reduced Leverage Risk: The debt yield spread of the fund's current holdings is far below historical highs. Bond market signals validate the portfolio's resilience, providing downside protection for the future.
4. Value of Cash Reserves: The 15.8% cash allocation provides flexibility in the high-valuation market environment of 2025. The author believes cash will be more valuable in 2026 when market multiples are higher.
5. Rule Optimization: Raising the holding limit from 6.5% to 8% enhances participation and tax efficiency, but attention must be paid to whether it leads to excessive concentration risk.
| Metric | Becle | Industry Average (Alcoholic Beverages) |
|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow Multiple | ≤10x | 15-20x |
| Market Share (Tequila) | ~30% | Fragmented |
| Brand History | 200+ years | Most <50 years |
| Metric | GCI Liberty | Contiguous 48 States Telecom Peers |
|---|---|---|
| Competitive Position | #1/#2 in Alaska | Multi-regional competition |
| Valuation Discount | Significant discount | Benchmark |
| Insider Support | John Malone bought + fully supported rights offering | Most lack similar endorsement |
| Metric | GHC | Diversified Peer Average |
|---|---|---|
| Net Cash / Market Cap Ratio | High (specific value undisclosed) | Most are net debt |
| Pension Funding Status | Overfunded | Most are underfunded |
| M&A Activity (Broadcast TV) | Increasing | Industry downturn |
| Metric | Mattel | Toy Industry Average |
|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 50% | 30-40% |
| Brand Concentration (Top 3 Brands) | >80% | Fragmented |
| Buyback Scale (2025) | $600 million | Most have no buybacks |
| Metric | Boston Beer | Alcoholic Beverage Peer Average |
|---|---|---|
| Price-to-Sales Ratio | 1x | 2-3x |
| Net Cash / Market Cap Ratio | High | Most are net debt |
| Buyback Intensity | One of the largest | Moderate |
| Metric | Clearwater Paper | Packaging Industry Average |
|---|---|---|
| Valuation (FCF Multiple) | Low single-digits | 10-15x |
| Impact of Capacity Additions | Severe | Moderate |
| Tariff Benefit | Tariffs on European capacity | No direct benefit |
| Metric | ESRT & Alexander’s | New York Real Estate Peers |
|---|---|---|
| Valuation vs. History | Below de Blasio era | Benchmark |
| Leasing Trends | Stronger than stock price | Mostly in sync |
| Willingness for Asset Sales | High | Low |
| Metric | Park Hotels | Hotel REIT Peers |
|---|---|---|
| Asset Sale Prices | Attractive | Mostly at discounts |
| Impact of Japanese Inbound Tourism | Significant | Moderate |
| Macro Sensitivity | High (leisure focus) | Medium |