Robotti & Company is a New York deep-value boutique founded by Bob Robotti in 1983, specializing in left-for-dead cyclical industries — energy services, building products, shipping — with multi-year holding periods and occasional activist letters. It manages about $650m; Bob is regarded as one of the most steadfast Graham-tradition cyclical value hunters.
This letter explains why market swings in early 2019 actually support value investing. The S&P 500 had its worst December since 1931, then its best January in 30 years—proving emotions, not fundamentals, drive short-term moves. For ordinary investors, the key takeaway: don't sell just because a stock recovers to your purchase price. If the company's business is improving and its stock is still cheap, holding on could pay off. The letter also notes that industries like housing and offshore drilling are recovering, and insider-owned companies are buying back shares—a strong sign of undervaluation. Worth reading because it uses historical cycles to show why value investing may be poised for a comeback.
Robotti's Q1 2019 letter to clients discusses the core tenets of value investing amid market volatility: despite short-term market turbulence (the S&P 500 experienced its worst December since 1931, followed by its best January rebound in over 30 years), inefficient markets present opportunities for
This chapter opens Robotti's Q1 2019 letter to clients, discussing how core value investing convictions are maintained amid extreme market volatility. The backdrop is the S&P 500 experiencing its worst December since 1931, followed by its best January rally in over 30 years, reflecting a dramatic reversal in market sentiment.
The author's central investment argument is that current market volatility precisely proves markets are not efficient, and inefficiency is a friend to value investors. Despite double-digit portfolio returns in Q1, holdings remain deeply undervalued with continuously improving fundamentals. The counterintuitive judgment is: investors should not sell after breaking even but should instead use downturns to enhance profitability, as style cycles and industry cycles are at inflection points with ample upside ahead.
This chapter does not name specific companies but references the following characteristics: