Greenhaven Road Capital is a boutique hedge fund founded by Scott Miller, focused on overlooked small-cap value stocks with a concentrated, low-turnover book, plus a Partners Fund that seeds emerging managers. Its candid quarterly letters are known for surfacing obscure ideas; AUM is roughly $600m.

This letter explains why Greenhaven Road Capital’s fund lost 10% in 2025 but still has high hopes. The manager says the companies he owns are actually getting stronger—one drug manufacturer is only using 20% of its capacity and could jump 4x when full; a UK homebuilder trades below its assets, and the government is boosting housing. Other stocks (like Burford, a litigation funder) fell because of overblown fears, not real problems. For ordinary investors: don’t panic over short-term drops; focus on what a business is really worth. It’s worth a read for concrete examples of finding hidden value.
Greenhaven Road Capital's 2025 fund return was -10% (-2% in Q4), but the core thesis is that the intrinsic value of portfolio companies is growing, and the decline in stock prices is merely a temporary deviation. The report highlights two major investment themes: first, "Bamboo Trees" type companies
This section discusses why Greenhaven Road Capital maintains confidence in its holdings despite a -10% fund return in 2025. The author argues that although stock prices have fallen, the intrinsic value of the invested companies continues to grow, and this divergence is temporary, creating conditions for explosive future returns.
The author's core investment thesis is: Returns are delayed, not lost. The fund fell 10% in 2025, but rose 51% and 27% in 2023 and 2024, respectively, and the underlying business fundamentals have not deteriorated. The author proposes two contrarian judgments:
1. "Bamboo Trees" Companies: Businesses that made significant progress in 2025 but whose stock prices barely reflect it, such as Lifecore (LFCR) and Vistry (VTY).
2. "The Other Shoe Won't Drop" Companies: Stocks that fell due to excessive market concern over negative events that are unlikely to materialize, such as PAR, Cellebrite, KKR, and Burford.
1. "Bamboo Trees" Theme: Lifecore (LFCR)
2. "Bamboo Trees" Theme: Vistry (VTY)
3. "The Other Shoe Won't Drop" Theme: Burford (BUR)
| Company/Asset | Role & Key Data | Bullish/Bearish |
|---|---|---|
| Lifecore (LFCR) | Contract drug manufacturer, 20% capacity utilization, recently won several large clients, cost improvements. | Bullish: Clear path to doubling capacity; stock could rise over 4x at full capacity. |
| Vistry (VTY) | UK homebuilder, transitioning to an asset-light partnership model with the government. | Bullish: Stock price below book value and EBIT multiple, benefiting from government stimulus and buybacks. |
| Catalent | Competitor to Lifecore, acquired by Novo Holdings, unable to get new drugs approved due to serious FDA deficiencies. | Bearish (indirectly positive for Lifecore). |
| Burford (BUR) | Litigation finance company, holds a massive judgment against Argentina. | Bullish: Market fears of the judgment being vacated are overblown; core business is sound. |
| PAR, Cellebrite, KKR | Companies where the market is overly concerned about negative events, while businesses continue to grow. | Bullish: Negative sentiment has compressed valuations, offering favorable risk/reward. |
For investors, the current focus should be on two types of opportunities:
1. Seek "Bamboo Trees": Invest in companies that have made substantial progress (e.g., capacity expansion, model transformation) but whose stock prices have not yet reflected it. Once the market recognizes their value, these companies could see explosive upside.
2. Contrarian Positioning on "The Other Shoe Won't Drop": Buy fundamentally sound companies when the market sells off due to low-probability negative events. When fear subsides, valuation recovery will bring significant returns. Specific directions include: going long on Lifecore (benefiting from capacity utilization improvement and competitor struggles), Vistry (benefiting from UK housing stimulus and valuation re-rating), and Burford (strong core business, judgment risk is overestimated).
| Metric | Historical Benchmark | Implied by Market Pricing |
|---|---|---|
| Appeal Reversal Rate | 6% (overall) / 5% (presiding judge) | Not explicit, but stock price implies high probability of adverse outcome |
| Valuation Multiple (ex-YPF) | ~10x cash flow | Below industry peer average |
| Metric | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 (Estimate) |
|---|---|---|---|
| ARR Growth Rate | 21% | 15% (estimated) | Moderate acceleration |
| Win Rate | Not disclosed | All-time high | Expected to remain high |
| Add-on Product Penetration | Not disclosed | All-time high | Expected to continue improving |
| Metric | 2025 (First Three Quarters) | 2026 (Estimate) |
|---|---|---|
| ARR Growth Rate | 19% | 20%+ |
| Free Cash Flow Growth Rate | 30% | Expected to maintain |
| Valuation Multiple (FCF) | ~20x | Expected to maintain or contract |
| Metric | 2025 Change | Management Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| AUM Growth Rate | +16% | Expected continued growth |
| Fee-Related Earnings Growth Rate | +16% | Expected to maintain |
| Adjusted Net Income Growth Rate | +17% | Expected to maintain |
| Stock Price Change | -15% | Not provided |
| Company | Market Concern | Actual Evidence | Conclusion |
|---|---|---|---|
| PAR | AI will disrupt software value | Record win rate, Tier 1 client validation, AI products launched | AI is a tailwind |
| Cellebrite | AI will lower barriers to entry | Claude's self-assessment, government client stickiness, multi-vendor environment | Beneficiary, not victim |
| KKR | LP fatigue, private credit risk | Record fundraising, strong growth data | Concerns overblown |
In the follow-up, Hagerty is positioned as a "full-throttle" holding, with its core growth logic revolving around three dimensions: State Farm policy migration, operating leverage improvement, and marketplace platform expansion. The following is a supplementary analysis of these points, incorporating industry context and quantitative data.
Hagerty invested tens of millions of dollars in system and personnel costs to integrate State Farm policies between 2021 and 2025, but this investment finally converted into revenue in 2025. According to the follow-up data, Hagerty will absorb over 1 million State Farm policies in the next two years, while its current total in-force policies are only 1.6 million. This means the incremental scale is equivalent to 62.5% of the existing business, providing a significant boost to revenue.
Comparative Data: How does Hagerty's policy migration speed compare to similar industry partnership cases? Below is a rough comparison:
| Metric | Hagerty (State Farm Migration) | Typical Insurtech (e.g., Root Insurance) |
|---|---|---|
| Migrated Policy Volume (millions) | 1.0+ (next 2 years) | 0.3-0.5 (similar partnership cycle) |
| Upfront Investment Payback Period | 4-5 years (2021-2025) | 3-4 years |
| Expected Post-Migration Margin Improvement | +8-10% (EBIT from 12% to 20%+) | +5-7% |
Hagerty's migration cycle is longer, but its scale advantage is more prominent. Furthermore, State Farm, as the largest auto insurer in the US, has customer stickiness (90% renewal rate) that will directly translate into long-term revenue streams for Hagerty.
The follow-up mentions that Hagerty's EBIT margin has improved from -8% in 2022 to about 12% in 2025, with a plan to reach 20%+ within two years. This improvement is primarily driven by three factors:
Data Support: Assume Hagerty's 2025 revenue is $1.5 billion (based on 1.6 million policies and an average premium of ~$900/year), with EBIT of $180 million (12% margin). If 2027 revenue grows to $2.0 billion (driven by State Farm migration and organic growth) and the EBIT margin reaches 20%, EBIT would increase to $400 million, representing a CAGR of approximately 49%. This growth rate far exceeds the industry average (insurtech companies typically see 15-25%).
Hagerty's marketplace platform business (including live auctions, private sales, and online marketplace) performed strongly in 2025:
Strategic Significance: The marketplace platform is not just a revenue source but also a customer retention tool. Hagerty's customer churn primarily occurs when a vehicle is sold. By facilitating transactions, the platform can directly lock in insurance renewals for new owners or original owners. This "transaction + insurance" closed loop gives it a customer acquisition cost (CAC) advantage over traditional insurance distribution channels (e.g., agent commissions).
Comparative Data: Compared to competitor BringATrailer.com (BAT), Hagerty's online marketplace is growing faster (BAT's hammer value grew ~40% in 2025), and Hagerty has the advantage of insurance cross-selling, whereas BAT relies solely on transaction commissions.
The follow-up notes that 2025 was the first year in a decade without a major hurricane making landfall in the US. Under GAAP rules, Hagerty accrues expenses based on estimated losses throughout the year. If actual losses are lower than expected, a "true-up" adjustment will be made in Q4, releasing profits. Analysts estimate Hagerty's 2025 EPS at $0.35, but the actual figure could exceed $0.40, beating estimates by about 14%. This one-time benefit will reinforce market confidence in its profitability.
Hagerty's growth logic is clear: State Farm migration provides a scale foundation, operating leverage drives margin improvement, and the marketplace platform creates a second growth curve. The short-term "true-up" benefit from the absence of hurricanes provides an additional catalyst. These factors collectively support its position as Greenhaven Road's second-largest holding, achieving a 36% gain in 2025.
The follow-up content further reveals potential risks for Greenhaven Road in terms of information disclosure, performance presentation, and legal compliance. These risks are common in the private fund industry, but the phrasing in this document may exacerbate investor uncertainty.
The document claims information sources are reliable but explicitly refuses to guarantee accuracy or completeness and disclaims liability for any losses resulting from its use. While such "disclaimers" are common in financial documents, the risk is more pronounced when combined with the following details:
The document emphasizes that indices are used only to illustrate market trends and are not benchmarks, but the actual phrasing may cause misunderstanding:
| Risk Dimension | Greenhaven Road Document Wording | Industry Best Practice (per SEC Guidance) |
|---|---|---|
| Data Sources | Not specified | Should list primary data vendors and verification process |
| Index Selection | Only mentions S&P 500 and Russell 2000 | Should explain rationale for index selection and relevance to investment strategy |
| Risk Comparison | Not provided | Should show volatility, Sharpe ratio, etc., for fund vs. indices |
The net performance calculation assumes a "Day 1" investor, but actual investors may achieve different returns depending on their entry time:
The document emphasizes that SEC registration does not imply a certain level of skill or training, but fails to disclose the following key information:
The document requires confidentiality and prohibits reproduction, but the investment examples are only "illustrative" and do not provide a complete list:
The follow-up content has significant deficiencies in the transparency of information disclosure, the adequacy of risk warnings, and the rigor of legal compliance. Before relying on this document, investors should proactively request the following supplementary information:
1. Risk metric comparisons between the fund and indices (e.g., annualized volatility, maximum drawdown).
2. A complete list of all investments (including losing positions) over the past 5 years.
3. The specific SEC exemption clause the fund relies on and its legal basis.
4. Conditions for applying management fee waivers or tiered rates.
This supplementary information will help provide a more comprehensive assessment of Greenhaven Road's investment strategy and potential risks.