Cobas Asset Management is a Madrid deep-value firm founded in late 2016 by Francisco García Paramés, Europe's standard-bearer of value investing after 25+ years running Bestinver and author of "Investing for the Long Term". Cobas applies a strict Graham/Buffett value framework overlaid with Austrian business-cycle theory, concentrating in unloved energy, shipping and other cyclicals, with AUM above €3.4bn. Its investor letters are fully archived from Q1 2017, moving to a semi-annual cadence in 2022.

This is a letter from a fund manager to clients during the 2020 pandemic panic. The main idea: even though stocks crashed, the companies he owns (like LNG shipper Teekay LNG and infrastructure firms) are still doing fine—some even raised dividends. He thinks the market overreacted, making these stocks cheap for long-term gains. He advises regular investors not to panic-sell, but to think of stocks like a house you don't check the price of daily—focus on the business, not the price. Worth reading because it uses history (like the boom after the 1918 flu) and data (P/E ratios dropping from 5x to 3x) to show why panic can be a buying opportunity.
Cobas Q4 2020 Investment Report: Investment Psychology and Market Irrationality Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic The report focuses on investment psychology and market irrationality during the COVID-19 pandemic. Its core argument is that although the fundamentals of the invested companies are less affecte
This chapter is the opening of Cobas' Q4 2020 investment report. Author Francisco García Paramés seeks to convey confidence and strategy to investors amid the market panic triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. The report focuses on the divergence between irrational market declines and the fundamentals of the portfolio companies, emphasizing that investors should adopt a long-term perspective to navigate short-term volatility.
The author's central argument is that, although the fundamentals of the portfolio companies were relatively unaffected by the pandemic, market panic caused a sharp drop in stock prices, and this irrationality is temporary. Counter-intuitive judgments include: Teekay LNG confirmed a 36% dividend increase on April 16 (when most companies were cutting dividends), yet its stock price plummeted. The author argues that investors should view their holdings as if they were unlisted companies, focusing solely on long-term business performance rather than short-term price fluctuations.
| Metric | Pre-Crisis | Post-Crisis | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Teekay LNG Dividend | Not specified | +36% | +36% |
| Teekay Group P/E | 5x | 3x | -40% |
| International Fund P/E | 7x | Below 5x | -29%+ |
| Overall Portfolio P/E | Not specified | 5x | Author's valuation 15x, 3x current |
Shows the capitalization, AUM, and investment strategy distribution of four Spanish-registered funds (Internacional, Iberia, Grandes Compañías, Selección). Selección FI has AUM of €471.5 million, with total AUM of €1,150 million across the four funds.
The follow-up emphasizes that LNG infrastructure projects (e.g., liquefaction, transportation, regasification) are akin to "natural gas highways," featuring fixed-capacity contracts and low price risk. However, market perception of these assets lags. Data shows that despite these projects showing resilience in Q4 2020 (e.g., Teekay LNG maintaining a $250 million earnings forecast and a 9% dividend yield), their valuation adjustment was only 8%, far below the 13% decline of the overall international portfolio. This suggests the market has not fully priced in their "quasi-bond" characteristics, especially the cash flow stability from long-term contracts (nearly 100). Compared to traditional highway projects (typically 20-30 year toll periods), LNG infrastructure contracts have longer durations (e.g., Golar LNG's FLNG project delayed to 2023 but contracts remain valid) and higher client credit ratings (e.g., BP, Petrobras), which should lower the risk premium.
The follow-up notes that LNG demand growth stems from replacing coal and oil and serving as backup for renewable energy. Specific data reinforces this: Asia accounted for 78% of global LNG demand in 2019, and China's natural gas consumption grew 1% YoY in March 2020, with a full-year growth forecast of 5%; South Korea's Q1 natural gas imports rose 20%. This indicates Asia has passed the crisis peak, and LNG infrastructure companies (e.g., Teekay LNG) have long-term contracts covering these growth regions. Compared to other energy infrastructure (e.g., crude oil shipping), LNG offers greater stability: crude oil shipping companies (9% of the portfolio) benefited from high freight rates (>$100,000/day) in 2020 but face potential declines due to OPEC cuts; LNG contracts, based on fixed capacity, are unaffected by short-term price volatility.
Pie chart shows Cobas AM's total AUM of €1,150 million (including institutional mandates).
The follow-up divides the international portfolio into low-impact (~70% of companies, average valuation cut of 8%) and negative-impact (~30%, average cut >20%) categories. Key differences lie in cash flow and asset nature:
| Category | Representative Companies | Valuation Adjustment | Key Reason | Cash Flow/Asset Characteristics |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low-Impact | Teekay LNG, CIR, Babcock | Avg. 8% | Long-term contracts, low-risk operations | Net cash or stable cash flow (e.g., CIR 70% of market cap in cash) |
| Negative-Impact | Auto companies (e.g., Renault), Retail (e.g., Dixons), Oil services (e.g., Saipem) | Avg. >20% | Sales decline, liquidity risk | Net cash but high structural costs (e.g., Renault €15B cash but €4B loss in 2009) |
Notably, among negative-impact companies, auto and retail were directly hit by the pandemic (e.g., Renault sales decline), but oil service companies (e.g., Saipem) have manageable risk due to low production costs ($20-30/barrel) and net cash. This suggests the market may have overreacted, especially for companies with long-term contracts and asset backing (e.g., Babcock's nuclear submarine maintenance contracts).
The follow-up mentions Golar LNG's new agreements in Brazil (Pernambuco state LNG terminal and national distribution) and the Sergipe thermal power plant (largest in Latin America), which started operations in March 2020, expected to generate $100 million in annual revenue for 25 years. This highlights the growth potential of LNG infrastructure in emerging markets. Compared to mature markets (e.g., Asia), Brazilian projects carry higher risks (e.g., policy uncertainty), but long contract durations (25 years) and partners (Petrobras) reduce execution risk. Additionally, other emerging market companies in the portfolio (e.g., Maire Tecnimont, Danieli) all hold net cash, further buffering volatility.
Significant differences in valuation adjustments across industries in the follow-up reflect the market's differentiated pricing of the pandemic's impact:
| Industry | Portfolio Weight | Valuation Adjustment | Key Risk | Buffer Factors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LNG Infrastructure | 24% | Avg. 8% | Project delays (e.g., Golar LNG) | Long-term contracts, Asian demand growth |
| Crude Oil Shipping | 9% | Not specified, but high rates may fall | OPEC cuts, freight volatility | High 2020 cash flow (~40% of market cap) |
| Retail | 7% | Significant (e.g., Dixons) | Store closures, online competition | Online channel growth, market share gains |
Line chart shows the NAV and target price trend of the International Portfolio from March 2017 to March 2020. Current upside is 243%, with a Q1 2020 return of -42.5%.
LNG saw the smallest adjustment due to its bond-like revenue model; crude oil shipping had short-term high returns but high volatility; retail faced structural shocks (e.g., Dixons competing with Amazon). This supports the follow-up's core thesis: LNG infrastructure is a "quasi-bond" suitable for long-term holding.
The follow-up concludes by suggesting that once all "natural gas highways" are built, the market will recognize their "quasi-bond" nature. The current valuation adjustment (avg. 8%) is lower than the overall portfolio (13%), indicating management believes these assets are undervalued. For example, Teekay LNG trades at a P/E of only 3x, a dividend yield of 9%, and pays out only 1/3 of earnings as dividends, using the rest for buybacks. This is analogous to bond coupons and principal repayment, but the market still prices it from an equity perspective. Compared to traditional bonds (e.g., 10-year US Treasury yield ~1%), LNG infrastructure offers higher yields with inflation protection (contracts often include inflation adjustment clauses).
Consistent with the global portfolio, the Iberian portfolio's valuation was cut by 13% (to €161/unit), but internal adjustments showed significant divergence. Data shows that ~45% of holdings had valuation cuts below 10% (avg. ~7%), while 50% had cuts above 10% (avg. ~18%). This divergence reflects different industry sensitivities to the pandemic's impact:
Spanish real estate developers (~9% holding) saw valuation cuts of ~18%, but fundamentals are stronger than the 2008 crisis:
Line chart shows the NAV and target price trend of the Iberian Portfolio from March 2017 to March 2020. Current upside is 171%, with a Q1 2020 return of -41.1%.
| Metric | Iberian Portfolio | Global Portfolio |
|---|---|---|
| Valuation Cut | 13% | 13% |
| NAV Decline (Q1 2020) | -41.1% | -42.5% |
| Upside Potential | 171% | 243% |
| Estimated 2020 P/E | 4.7x | 4.7x |
| High-Impact Holdings (Cut >10%) | 50% | ~45% |
| Low-Impact Holdings (Cut <10%) | 45% | ~50% |
Conclusion: The Iberian portfolio's adjustment strategy focuses more on structural industry differences, increasing defensive assets (e.g., Elecnor, Befesa) and decreasing highly sensitive assets (e.g., Repsol, banks), thereby controlling downside risk while retaining long-term upside potential. The unique resilience of real estate and tobacco sectors further validates the "supply constraint + inelastic demand" investment logic.
Line chart shows the NAV and target price trend of the Large Company Portfolio from March 2017 to March 2020. Current upside is 207%, with a Q1 2020 return of -42.7%.
| Metric | Large Company Portfolio | MSCI World Net (Benchmark) |
|---|---|---|
| Q1 2020 Return | -42.7% | -19.2% |
| Return Since Inception (April 2017) | -53.5% | +3.2% |
| Target Price Adjustment (Q1) | From €155 to €143 (-8%) | N/A |
| Potential Upside | 207% | N/A |
Data table lists the NAV, target value, and upside potential (171%-240%) of five Spanish funds (Selección, Internacional, Iberia, Grandes Compañías, Renta). All posted negative Q1 returns (-8.5% to -43.0%).
| Fund Name | Return Since Inception | Benchmark Return (Same Period) | Current P/E | ROCE | Potential Upside |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Selección FI | -50.4% | -3.8% | 4.7x | 25% | 240% |
| Internacional FI | -40.5% | -23.9% | 6.1x | 21% | 171% |
| Grandes Compañías FI | -53.5% | +3.2% | 4.9x | 28% | 207% |
In Q1 2020, Cobas funds' holdings showed significant cyclical industry concentration. For Cobas Internacional FI, the top 10 holdings included shipping stocks (Golar LNG, Teekay Corp, Teekay LNG, International Seaways) totaling ~10.5% (3.9%+1.8%+1.0%+0.6%), compared to ~12.4% in the previous quarter (3.0%+1.0%+0.8%+0.5%). Despite slight reductions, shipping remained the largest single industry exposure.
For Cobas Iberia FI, the top 10 holdings included Spanish construction and infrastructure stocks (Sacyr, Técnicas Reunidas, Elecnor) totaling ~13.8% (4.3%+4.3%+5.2%), compared to 17.6% in the previous quarter (4.9%+3.9%+8.8%). The reduction of 21.6% reflects caution towards the Spanish economic outlook.
Data table lists the NAV (€46.1, €55.7), target value, and upside potential (240%, 184%) of two pension funds (Global PP, Mixto Global PP).
| Fund Name | Eurozone Weight (Current Q) | Eurozone Weight (Previous Q) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cobas Internacional FI | 39.6% | 37.2% | +2.4% |
| Cobas Iberia FI | 80.9% | 67.7% | +13.2% |
| Cobas Grandes Compañías FI | 31.6% | 31.4% | +0.2% |
| Cobas Selección FI | 37.2% | 31.6% | +5.6% |
Notably, Cobas Iberia FI's Eurozone weight surged from 67.7% to 80.9%, an increase of 13.2 percentage points. This change primarily resulted from increased holdings in Spanish domestic assets (Spain weight rose from 80.9% to 96.2%), while Portuguese assets plummeted from 14.5% to 2.1%. This extreme localization strategy may have exacerbated the fund's downside risk during the European pandemic shock in Q1 2020.
Cobas Internacional FI's currency allocation shows USD exposure rising from 26.0% to 31.4%, while EUR exposure fell from 39.6% to 31.6%. During the same period, the EUR/USD exchange rate depreciated from 1.10 to 1.08 (approx. -1.8%), meaning the expanded USD exposure could incur currency hedging costs. However, the fund explicitly states "EUR/USD 100% hedged," implying currency risk is fully hedged, with actual returns unaffected by exchange rate fluctuations.
In contrast, Cobas Selección FI's currency allocation is more diversified, including KRW (7.7%), CHF (4.2%), NOK (4.9%), etc. In Q1 2020, the KRW depreciated ~6.5% against the EUR, while the CHF appreciated ~2.3%. This multi-currency exposure could generate asymmetric currency effects.
For Cobas Internacional FI's performance contribution, the top five detractors (Teekay LNG, Hoegh, Dixons Carphone, Golar LNG, Aryzta) collectively contributed -15.7% in negative returns, while the top five contributors (Kongsberg Gruppen, O-I Glass, Catcher Technology, Amorepacific, Sol SPA) contributed only +0.2%. This extreme asymmetry indicates that fund returns are highly dependent on a few individual stocks, while most holdings are in loss.
For Cobas Iberia FI, the top five detractors (Atalaya Mining, Elecnor, Vocento, Semapa, Técnicas Reunidas) collectively contributed -19.6%, while the top five contributors (Indra, Caixabank, Sacyr derechos, Repsol derechos, Acerinox) collectively contributed -0.3%. This means all major holdings recorded negative contributions, with the fund's overall performance determined solely by stocks with smaller declines.
Comprehensive data table details the top 10 holding weights, geographic distribution (Spain 67.7%), currency composition (EUR 96.2%), and performance contributors/detractors for five funds.
Position changes in Q1 2020 show Cobas funds engaging in contrarian operations near the market bottom:
| Fund Name | Benchmark Index | Q1 Benchmark Return | Fund Return (Estimated) | Relative Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cobas Internacional FI | MSCI Europe TR Net | -23.1% | -25.8% | -2.7% |
| Cobas Iberia FI | IGBM 80% + PSI 20% | -25.4% | -28.3% | -2.9% |
| Cobas Grandes Compañías FI | MSCI World Net EUR | -20.9% | -22.4% | -1.5% |
All funds underperformed the benchmark, with an average excess return of -2.4%. This performance is closely linked to the funds' high concentration (top 10 holdings account for ~50-60%) and cyclical exposure. In systemic risk events, funds with insufficient diversification tend to perform worse.
1. Concentration Risk: Top 10 holdings account for too high a proportion (50-60%) and are concentrated in cyclical industries like shipping and construction, leaving the funds lacking defensive characteristics during the pandemic shock.
2. Geographic Mismatch: Cobas Iberia FI is overly concentrated in Spanish domestic assets (96.2%), and Spain was one of the European countries hardest hit by the pandemic in Q1, with GDP contracting 5.2%, exacerbating fund losses.
3. Effectiveness of Contrarian Operations: The funds made significant portfolio adjustments in Q1, but newly purchased stocks (e.g., Affiliated Managers Group, Fnac) performed inconsistently in subsequent quarters, failing to effectively hedge downside risk.
4. Effectiveness of Currency Hedging: Although USD exposure expanded, the 100% hedging strategy avoided currency losses but also forfeited potential currency gains.
These data indicate that Cobas funds faced a dual blow from systemic and idiosyncratic risks in Q1 2020, and their value investing strategy failed to provide effective protection in extreme market conditions.