The Capital Cycle is the official podcast that Marathon Asset Management (the London firm founded in 1986) launched in 2024, hosted by financial historian Edward Chancellor, who interviews Marathon's investors about each Global Investment Review letter — applying the firm's long-term, contrarian "capital cycle" supply-side approach.
This report shows how Chinese companies are copying or beating global giants at a fraction of the cost—DeepSeek's AI model costs 90% less, and Chery's hybrid SUV sells for half the price of a Land Rover. For regular investors, this means stocks like Samsung and Micron, which rely on high profits from near-monopolies, might be riskier than they look. Chinese rival CXMT is rapidly expanding in low-end DRAM chips, threatening their pricing power. Worth a read because it warns that even hard-to-replicate advantages (like ASML's chip-making machines) can erode over time with enough capital and patience.
In January 2025, China's DeepSeek launched the R1 large model with a training cost of only approximately $6 million (rivals spent billions), with per-million input/output token pricing at $0.55/$2.19, causing Nvidia's market capitalization to evaporate nearly $600 billion in a single day. Similarly,
This chapter discusses how China’s low-cost capacity expansion challenges seemingly impenetrable technology moats. As seen in the cases of DeepSeek and Chery, China is replicating and even surpassing competitors’ products at extremely low costs and rapid speeds. The market may be underestimating the impact of this trend on the profit pools of global oligopolies.
The author argues that the current pricing power and valuation premiums enjoyed by the DRAM triumvirate (Samsung, SK Hynix, Micron) and ASML rest on a fragile assumption — that no new entrant can challenge their position at low cost. CXMT’s capacity expansion in China is proving this premise invalid. The counterintuitive point is that the market views AI-driven HBM demand as a structural tailwind, but this may instead become a trigger for disruption in the low-end market, as the giants voluntarily cede low-end share to focus on high-end capacity.
| Item | DRAM Trio (Samsung/SK Hynix/Micron) | CXMT (China) |
|---|---|---|
| Current DRAM share | ~95% (oligopoly) | Expected to reach 15% this year |
| Capacity direction | Shift to high-end HBM, actively reducing low-end | Focus on low-end, rapid capacity expansion |
| Operating margin | >60% | Loss-making/low profit (subsidy-driven) |
| Core risk | Rapid loss of low-end share, pricing power collapse | Unable to enter HBM profit pool in near term |
| Valuation | Part of trillion-dollar market cap | Unlisted |
1. Avoid low-end DRAM oligopolies: Investors should reassess the valuation safety of Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron. CXMT’s capacity expansion could cause low-end DRAM prices to plummet, thereby compressing the overall profit margins of the three giants. Even if AI-driven HBM demand is real, the erosion of low-end business may still severely drag down profits and market cap.
2. Focus on Chinese "survivors": Investment should target Chinese manufacturers that have survived China’s brutal capital cycles and possess global cost advantages (e.g., Sany), rather than global oligopolies relying on moat assumptions. Sany’s globalization, electrification, and low valuation (<2x price-to-sales) provide downside protection.
3. Beware of overpriced scarce assets: Seemingly irreplicable technological barriers like ASML are also facing challenges. Capital and patience can buy time, ultimately breaking through the boundaries of "genius and physics." Investors currently paying high premiums for these assets may face valuation restructuring risk.