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SprottDeep research12 Jul 2023Source: sprott.com

Gold vs. Gold Stocks, An Unresolved Incongruity

Sprott is a Toronto-headquartered asset manager specializing in precious metals and critical materials (NYSE/TSX: SII), tracing its roots to Sprott Securities founded by Eric Sprott in 1981 and now led by CEO Whitney George. It runs physical gold, silver and uranium trusts, ETFs, active strategies and resource lending, with about $65bn in AUM. The Insights column carries monthly commentaries and white papers on uranium, gold, silver, copper and critical materials by Paul Wong, Jacob White and John Hathaway (ex-Tocqueville gold manager) — note the house's structurally bullish commodity stance, as it sells the corresponding trusts and ETFs.

Eric Sprott、Whitney George · 1981 · 加拿大多伦多Precious metals & critical materials

In plain words

This report explains why gold mining stocks have badly underperformed physical gold for years. The main reasons: poor management, excessive share dilution, and rising costs. Now gold miners are deeply undervalued. If gold breaks and stays above $2,000 an ounce, mining stocks could surge. For ordinary investors, this is a potential opportunity, but caution is needed—avoid companies that constantly issue new shares or have high debt. Worth reading for a clear, data-backed case that gold miners might be due for a comeback.

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Sprott research article points out that since the era of aggressive monetary policy began in 2000, gold has outperformed major asset classes. However, gold mining stocks have significantly lagged behind physical gold since gold prices peaked in August 2011. The core thesis is that the market's impli

~15 min full read · 15 sections
Deep Analysis

Theme and Background

This chapter focuses on the divergence in performance between gold and gold mining stocks since the era of aggressive monetary policy began in 2000. The report notes that while gold has outperformed major asset classes over the long term, gold mining stocks have significantly lagged physical gold since the gold price peaked in August 2011. The author attempts to dissect the multiple reasons behind this divergence and assess the market consensus implied by the current extremely low valuations of mining stocks.

Core Thesis

The author's core judgment is that the market's implied consensus is that the current gold price of approximately $2,000 per ounce is unsustainable, which has severely depressed the valuations of gold mining stocks. The author argues that the "perpetual option" and leverage effect offered by mining stocks (i.e., mining stocks rise more when gold prices increase) have been heavily discounted or even ignored by the market. The counterintuitive conclusion is that the gold price is only a few percentage points below its all-time high of around $2,075 from August 2020. A breakout could trigger a mean-reversion trade, generating excess returns for mining stocks.

Key Arguments and Data

1. Long-Term Performance Comparison: From 2000 to 2023, gold outperformed U.S. stocks, U.S. Treasuries, and the U.S. dollar. However, from 2011 to 2023, gold mining stocks (as measured by the VanEck Gold Miners ETF) significantly lagged physical gold.

2. Equity Dilution: The report argues that equity issuance is one of the primary reasons for the poor performance of mining stocks. Many companies have financed themselves through poor acquisitions and by neglecting per-share metrics (such as reserves per share, production per share, cash flow per share, and earnings per share), leading to dilution. However, most company websites or investor presentations do not display these per-share metrics, making it difficult for ordinary investors to assess management performance.

3. Capital Misallocation: The 2011 gold price peak triggered a surge in capital expenditure (CapEx) during 2012-2013, followed by a decline in gold prices that led to low returns on invested capital for the industry. From 2015 to 2021, mining companies drastically cut spending. Although CapEx began to recover in 2022, levels remain far below the peak of a decade ago, while global mine production has grown by approximately 20% compared to ten years prior. The author argues that this CapEx "drought" implies that existing production capacity possesses unrecognized scarcity value, and its replacement cost could be significantly higher than its book value.

Period Capital Expenditure (CapEx) Trend Global Mine Production Change
2012-2013 Peak (triggered by 2011 gold price)
2015-2021 Drastic cuts
2022 Began to recover, but still far below peak Approximately 20% higher than a decade ago

4. Return on Invested Capital (ROIC): Figure 4 shows that following the CapEx surge in 2012-2013, the ROIC of gold producers remained depressed for the subsequent five years.

5. Jurisdictional Risk: Resource nationalism is spreading in developing countries, leading to a higher risk premium for large new capital projects. Over the past decade, the map of favorable jurisdictions has shrunk significantly, with the rule of law deteriorating in many Latin American, Asian, and African countries. This results in valuation discounts for companies with production exposure in these regions, prompting a shift through M&A towards "politically safe" areas like North America and Australia.

6. Margin Erosion: The average all-in sustaining cost (AISC) for gold production was $1,100 per ounce in 2013 and is currently around $1,250 per ounce, an increase of 13.6%. AISC including growth capital rose from $1,484 per ounce to $1,612 per ounce. However, the author believes that the cost inflation trend may be peaking, and if the gold price stabilizes at current levels, the outlook for industry margin expansion could be excellent.

Metric 2013 Current (2022) Change
Average AISC (USD/oz) $1,100 $1,250 +13.6%
AISC including growth capital (USD/oz) $1,484 $1,612 +8.6%

7. Capital Cost Inflation and Extended Timelines: The timeline for building new mining and processing capacity has extended from six years a decade ago to over ten years, primarily due to increasingly stringent permitting requirements related to environmental and social factors. This results in capital being tied up for long periods without returns, increasing interest burdens and risks (supply chain disruptions, weather events, political changes). Single-asset or few-asset miners are particularly vulnerable and often face inevitable dilutive financing.

8. Competition from Gold ETFs: Since the launch of the SPDR Gold Shares (GLD) in 2004, the success of gold ETFs has "cannibalized" demand for gold mining stocks. In 2010, the total market capitalization of gold mining stocks was approximately $300 billion; by the end of 2022, it had fallen to around $260 billion. Meanwhile, gold ETFs had accumulated nearly $180 billion in assets by the end of 2022. Gold exposure has shifted from being exclusive to mining stocks to being shared with highly liquid gold substitutes.

Asset Class 2010 End of 2022
Total Market Cap of Gold Mining Stocks ~$300 billion ~$260 billion
Total Assets of Gold ETFs ~$180 billion

Companies/Assets Mentioned

  • SPDR Gold Shares (GLD): A gold ETF launched in 2004 whose success changed how investors gain gold exposure, shifting from mining stocks to physical gold substitutes.
  • VanEck Gold Miners ETF: Used to measure the performance of gold mining stocks, showing significant underperformance relative to physical gold from 2011 to 2023.
  • NYSE Arca Gold BUGS Index (HUI): An index used to calculate capital expenditure data for gold miners.
  • BMO Capital Markets: Source for AISC and ROIC data.

Investment Implications

  • Long Gold Mining Stocks: The author believes the current extremely low valuations of mining stocks, which imply an unsustainable gold price, are a mistake. If the gold price breaks through its all-time high (around $2,075), it could trigger a mean-reversion trade, allowing mining stocks to generate excess returns.
  • Focus on Scarcity Value of Capacity: Due to the long-term CapEx shortfall, the replacement cost of existing capacity may be far higher than its book value. Companies with existing production capacity may be undervalued.
  • Avoid High-Risk Jurisdictions: Resource nationalism and rule of law risks lead to valuation discounts. Investors should prioritize companies with production exposure in politically safe regions like North America and Australia.
  • Beware of Dilution Risk: Avoid investing in companies that frequently conduct equity financings and do not disclose per-share metrics, especially single-asset miners, as they face a higher risk of dilutive financing.
  • Focus on Margin Improvement Potential: If cost inflation peaks and the gold price stabilizes, the outlook for industry margin expansion is favorable, which could drive valuation recovery for mining stocks.

Theme and Background

This chapter examines the persistent valuation divergence between gold mining stocks and physical gold prices, as well as the potential for a mean-reversion trade. The author argues that the market lacks confidence in gold prices breaking through the psychological threshold of $2,000 per ounce, leading to systematic undervaluation of mining stocks—a situation that may soon reverse.

Core Views

  • Gold breaking $2,000 is the key catalyst for mean reversion in mining stocks. Once gold prices firmly hold above this level, mining stocks are set to deliver significant excess returns.
  • The current period is the final window for allocating to gold mining stocks, rather than waiting for the investment thesis to become obvious before acting.
  • Confusion between nominal and inflation-adjusted prices is the main obstacle to market misjudgment. At current levels, $2,000 gold is about 30% below the 2011 peak in inflation-adjusted terms and about 50% below the 1980 peak.
  • Gold mining stocks are undervalued on both a relative and absolute basis, with valuation multiples far below the S&P 500, yet stronger profitability and lower leverage.

Key Arguments and Data

1. Total market cap of gold mining stocks is extremely low, making potential capital inflows highly impactful

  • The total market cap of all developed-market precious metals mining stocks is approximately $260 billion, slightly higher than the market cap of Bank of America alone.
  • The top five precious metals mining companies have a combined market cap of about $150 billion, while all remaining companies total just $120 billion.
  • If pension funds such as CalPERS or Ontario Teachers allocated just 1% of their assets to precious metals mining stocks, it would trigger a dramatic scramble for shares.

2. Inflation-adjusted gold prices remain far from historical peaks

Time Point Nominal Gold Price Inflation-Adjusted Relative to Current Level
Current (2023) ~$2,000 Baseline
2011 Peak ~$1,900 Current is about 30% below peak
1980 Peak $800 Current is about 50% below peak

3. Replacement cost of existing mines is severely underestimated

  • Exploration costs have risen over 100% in the past decade.
  • Geopolitical and permitting hurdles for new mine construction have increased significantly.
  • The replacement cost of existing mine infrastructure may be 30%-100% higher than reflected in financial statements.

4. Systematic bias in valuation methodology

  • Mainstream sell-side analysts generally model using spot gold prices and artificially assume declining gold prices in future years.
  • Gold has appreciated at an average nominal rate of about 8% per year since 1971, but DCF models typically do not reflect this historical trend.
  • DCF analysis for gold mining usually does not calculate a terminal value, whereas other industries assume perpetual operations and include terminal value.
  • This negatively biased valuation framework not only misleads ordinary investors but also leads to underinvestment by mining company management.

5. Global gold production begins to plateau

  • Declining long-term exploration spending and extended lead times for new mine development imply limited future production growth, increasing the scarcity value of existing capacity.

Companies/Assets Involved

  • Gold mining stocks (overall): Bullish. The author believes the entire sector is systematically undervalued, and a mean-reversion trade is imminent.
  • Top five precious metals mining companies: Combined market cap of approximately $150 billion, representing core assets in the sector.
  • Bank of America: Used as a market cap comparison reference ($260 billion vs. $260 billion).
  • CalPERS / Ontario Teachers: Cited as examples of potential capital inflow catalysts.
  • NYSE Arca Gold Miners Index (GDM): Used for valuation comparison (source for Figure 7 data).

Investment Implications

  • Immediately increase allocation to gold mining stocks, rather than waiting for gold price confirmation before acting. Current valuations offer an excellent margin of safety.
  • Focus on inflation-adjusted gold prices, not nominal prices. At $2,000, gold remains historically low, with upside potential far outweighing downside risk.
  • Be wary of the misleading nature of mainstream DCF valuation methods, which systematically understate the true asset value and future cash flow potential of mining companies.
  • The scarcity value of existing mines is not priced into the market. As new mine supply remains constrained, the strategic value of already-producing mines will continue to rise.

Theme and Background

This chapter focuses on the fundamental reasons behind the prolonged undervaluation of gold mining stocks and the potential mean-reversion trading opportunities that may emerge in the future. The report argues that chronic underinvestment in the industry, coupled with an overreliance on discounted cash flow (DCF) models by management and analysts, has led to extreme discounts for small-cap gold mining stocks relative to large-cap peers. This structural issue may be corrected through a wave of mergers and acquisitions and a breakout in gold prices.

Core Views

  • Gold mining stocks are currently extremely cheap and overlooked by the market, making them ideal targets for contrarian investors. The report contends that the market's implicit consensus erroneously assumes the current gold price of approximately $2,000/oz is unsustainable, resulting in historically low valuations for mining stocks.
  • The DCF model is a "harmful tool" for capital allocation and valuation analysis. The report cites mining magnate Robert Friedland, who calls the DCF methodology "stupid" because it overvalues near-term cash flows while undervaluing long-term potential, leading management and investment banks to be short-sighted in M&A decisions.
  • Opportunities in small- and mid-cap gold mining stocks far outweigh those in large-cap stocks. The report argues that the dynamics of value creation through exploration and mine development are more pronounced in small-cap stocks, while large-cap stocks struggle to benefit from them.

Key Arguments and Data

1. Underinvestment and M&A Wave: The report notes that insufficient investment in future gold production will force large producers to acquire smaller ones at high premiums. It quotes Solomon, describing the mining M&A wave as a "Darwinian response to extinction."

2. Distortionary Effects of the DCF Model:

  • Overreliance on DCF models by management and investment banks leads to a very low willingness to acquire non-producing assets, creating a wide valuation gap between large-cap and small-cap stocks.
  • Gold mining companies in the exploration and development stages typically trade at "extreme discounts" relative to their producing peers.

3. Valuation Discount of Small-Cap vs. Large-Cap Stocks: The report cites BMO Capital Markets data (as of April 19, 2023), showing that the valuation of small-cap mining companies relative to large-cap peers is at historic lows (Figure 9). Small-cap companies typically have market capitalizations below $500 million and carry higher risk.

4. Mean-Reversion Potential:

  • If gold prices return to their inflation-adjusted 2011 levels, GDX (VanEck Gold Miners ETF) and GDXJ (VanEck Junior Gold Miners ETF) would rise by over 110% and 300%, respectively.
  • The report expects small- and mid-cap companies to outperform their large-cap counterparts.

5. Dollar Credit and Distorted Inflation Data:

  • Since Nixon abolished the gold standard in 1971, the dollar has consistently depreciated against gold. The report dismisses the notion that "a strong dollar is bad for gold" as laughable.
  • The CPI calculation methodology has been revised 25 times since 1983, with 21 of those revisions resulting in lower inflation readings. The correlation between TIPS (Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities) and gold prices, which stood at 90% from 2007 to 2021, has broken down (Figure 10), indicating market distrust of official inflation data.
  • U.S. government activity accounts for 27% of GDP, and public debt surged by over $1 trillion in a single month after the debt ceiling agreement (data from Meridian Macro Research), marking the "largest monthly increase in non-crisis times."

Companies/Assets Involved

Company/Asset Role Key Data Bullish/Bearish
Franco-Nevada Mining Corporation Mining financing company; founder Seymour Schulich once criticized the DCF model No specific data Bullish (implied)
Robert Friedland (Mining Magnate) Cited for criticizing the DCF methodology Calls DCF "stupid" Bullish (implied)
GDX (VanEck Gold Miners ETF) Large-cap gold mining stock index If mean reversion occurs, upside potential exceeds 110% Bullish
GDXJ (VanEck Junior Gold Miners ETF) Small-cap gold mining stock index If mean reversion occurs, upside potential exceeds 300% Strongly Bullish
Small/Mid-Cap Gold Mining Companies Exploration and development stage companies Valuation at historic lows relative to large-cap peers Strongly Bullish

Investment Implications

  • Go long on small- and mid-cap gold mining stocks: The report argues that the current discount of small-cap stocks relative to large-cap peers is historic, and a mean-reversion trade could yield excess returns of 50%-150% (relative to gold itself), with the most overlooked small-cap stocks offering the greatest potential.
  • Beware of dollar credit risk: The report expects gold prices to break through inflation-adjusted historical highs, reaching a nominal price of $2,500-$2,600/oz (approximately 30% above current levels), which would completely undermine the dollar's status as a safe-haven asset.
  • Avoid strategies overly reliant on the DCF model: The report suggests that the market's excessive focus on short-term cash flows is the root cause of mispricing. Investors should focus on undervalued small-cap companies with quality mine assets, rather than chasing short-term earnings in large-cap stocks.