Southeastern Asset Management is a Memphis-based deep-value firm founded in 1975 by O. Mason Hawkins to exploit the bargains left by the 1973-74 bear market. Its flagship Longleaf Partners Funds (launched 1987) invest employees' own money alongside clients'. Following Graham's discipline and its "Business, People, Price" framework, it runs concentrated books of 15-25 undervalued stocks held for the long term — famously closing funds to new investors when opportunities were scarce. CEO and Head of Research Ross Glotzbach now leads the firm, which publishes quarterly Longleaf fund commentaries and Research Perspectives notes.

The report explains why Chinese stocks could keep rising after recent policy stimulus (the central bank launched $112 billion in market support). Valuations are low (Hang Seng PE ratio of 10x), foreign investors hold very few Chinese shares, and the government is committed. It also highlights a hidden opportunity in small Japanese companies that are improving governance and trading cheaply. Key takeaway: don't try to time the market — most gains happen in just a few days. For long-term investors, both China and Japan offer attractive entry points, but expect bumps along the way.
Southeastern (Longleaf Partners) Asia Pacific UCITS Fund The Southeastern (Longleaf Partners) Asia Pacific UCITS Fund returned 21.4% in the third quarter of 2024, outperforming the FTSE Asia Pacific Index by approximately 12 percentage points. Performance was primarily driven by strong policy stimul
This chapter focuses on the performance and investment logic of the Southeastern Asia Pacific UCITS Fund in the third quarter of 2024, with a particular emphasis on the market rebound triggered by Chinese policy stimulus and its sustainability. The report notes that the People's Bank of China (PBOC) launched aggressive stimulus measures in late September (including a reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cut, an interest rate cut, a 50bps reduction in existing mortgage rates, a lowering of the minimum down payment ratio, and a total of RMB 800 billion in stock market support tools), akin to the European Central Bank's "whatever it takes" commitment in 2012, sparking a sharp rally in Chinese equities. The fund returned 21.4% for the quarter, outperforming the FTSE Asia Pacific Index by approximately 12 percentage points.
The author's core investment thesis is that the rebound in Chinese equities is sustainable, not a short-term pulse. Despite the prevailing market view that China is "uninvestable," the author argues that valuations are at historically extreme lows, foreign allocation is severely underweight, and the policy pivot is clear, creating a "release after a compressed spring." Counter-intuitive judgments include: 1) After four consecutive years of negative returns for Chinese equities, such a scenario has only occurred historically during the Great Depression, suggesting this is closer to an endpoint than a starting point; 2) Even with a still-weak economic fundamental backdrop (property downturn, low consumer confidence), a policy-driven rebound can replicate the market performance seen in Europe after the "Draghi put"—weak economy but rising stocks.
| Indicator | Current Value | Historical Comparison |
|---|---|---|
| Hang Seng Index Forward P/E | 10x | Below long-term average |
| Hang Seng Index P/B | 1.2x | Near historical lows |
| Hang Seng Index Dividend Yield | 3.4% | Above historical average |
| Hedge Fund Net Allocation to China | 8.7% | Well below 13% peak |
| KWEB Asset Size (One-Week Change) | $7.9B (doubled) | Record |
| HK Stock National Day Avg. Daily Turnover | $42B | >3x 8-month average |
The Japanese portfolio's excess return this quarter (contributing over half of the 12% relative index outperformance) was not accidental but based on a systematic allocation to the long-term value trough in Japanese small-cap stocks. Although the fund is underweight Japan by 10 percentage points relative to the index (the index has a 34% weight in Japan), small-cap stocks contributed approximately 90% of the Japanese portfolio's return. This phenomenon stems from a structural divergence in the Japanese market since 2021: Small-cap stocks have decoupled from the Nikkei 225 Index, rooted in the fact that rising US interest rates suppressed valuations of high-growth small caps, while foreign capital primarily flowed into export-oriented large caps (Nikkei 225 constituents) benefiting from Yen depreciation, rather than domestically-oriented small caps.
| Indicator | MSCI Japan Small Cap Index (USD) | Nikkei 225 Index | Explanation of Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mid-2024 Level vs. 2017 | Roughly flat | Significantly up | Small caps suffered valuation contraction due to Yen depreciation and rising US rates |
| Earnings Growth (2021-2024) | Faster than large cap average | Slower | Small caps had faster earnings growth but valuations did not reflect it |
| Foreign Investor Focus | Semiconductor supply chain (China substitution demand) | Export beneficiaries | Small caps overlooked, domestic companies trade at deeper discounts |
Source: Bloomberg, MSCI, internal calculations
The Tokyo Stock Exchange's (TSE) "naming and shaming" policy (targeting undervalued companies) has accelerated the transition of Japanese companies towards an ROIC-oriented approach. As of September 2024, the MSCI Japan Value Index had outperformed the Growth Index by nearly 500 basis points year-to-date, with a cumulative excess return of over 10% over three years. This trend resonates with the following factors:
On August 5, the Nikkei 225 plunged 12.4% in a single day (the second-largest drop in history), triggered by:
1. Bank of Japan Rate Hike: The second rate hike on July 31 (first in March), strengthening the Yen.
2. Fed Rate Cut Expectations: Weakening the US Dollar, leading to massive unwinding of Yen carry trades (borrowing low-interest Yen to invest in higher-yielding assets).
3. Leverage Amplification: Leverage used in carry trades exacerbated the sell-off.
We used this correction to significantly increase holdings in Japanese domestically-oriented, high-growth small caps, with the core logic being:
Five new Japanese small-cap stocks were added this quarter (all owner-managed except Hikari Tsushin), with core characteristics:
| Company | Industry | Key Advantage | Management Ownership | Quarterly Buyback |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GENDA | Entertainment (Game Centers, Karaoke) | Low-cost M&A integration (cost of capital 1.1-1.3%), acquiring businesses from owners without successors in an aging society | ~26% | Yes |
| Medley | Medical HR Platform | Network effects (34% penetration), winner-takes-most market | Founder-controlled | No |
| Appier Group | AI Marketing Technology | Leading AI application in Japan, cross-border business growth | Management-owned | Yes |
| Hikari Tsushin | Holding Company (Small-cap Investments) | Similar to Berkshire Hathaway model, focused on Japanese small caps | Founder-led | Yes |
| Another Undisclosed | Domestic Industry Consolidator | Consolidating fragmented industries, acquiring at low multiples | Owner-managed | Yes |
In-depth Analysis of GENDA:
To fund the Japanese investments, we liquidated:
Simultaneously, we exited via Itochu's privatization offer for Descente (at a premium) and reallocated the capital to the aforementioned Japanese small caps. This operation reflects opportunity cost management: reallocating capital between a low-valuation market (Japanese small caps) and higher-valuation markets (Hong Kong property, Macau gaming).
Despite the strong performance of Japanese small caps, attention must be paid to:
Core Conclusion: The structural opportunity in Japanese small caps (low valuations, high earnings growth, governance improvements) has not yet been fully priced in by foreign capital. Through our "owner-operator" screening and contrarian accumulation strategy, we aim to capture excess returns while controlling risk.
A draft regulation from Japan's Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare would prohibit HR companies from offering monetary incentives to job seekers, directly challenging Medley's verification mechanism. Medley currently pays successful job seekers an average incentive of JPY 10,000 (approximately 0.1-0.5% of their annual income) to confirm job placement. If the ban is implemented, alternative verification methods (e.g., third-party audits or digital tracking) are expected to increase compliance costs by 5%. Medley plans to raise prices by 30% to cover costs, but even after the increase, its fee rate would still be only 2.6-16.9%, far below competitors' 20-35%. Comparative data is as follows:
| Indicator | Medley Current | Medley After 30% Price Increase | Competitors (Recruitment Agencies) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fee Rate (% of Annual Salary) | 2-13% | 2.6-16.9% | 20-35% |
| Compliance Cost Increase | - | 5% | No direct regulatory impact |
| Market Share (Japan Medical HR) | ~15% | Expected to maintain | Fragmented (Top 5 <40% combined) |
Key Insight: Even with a 30% price increase, Medley maintains its lowest-cost advantage. If it only raises prices by 5% (covering compliance costs), profit increments would come from efficiency gains. Historical data shows Medley reduced its operating expense ratio from 18% to 12% between 2019-2023 through scale effects, providing ample pricing power.
Hikari's investment portfolio is valued at JPY 1.1 trillion, representing 77% of its total market cap, implying its operating business (M&A and insurance) trades at only 0.3x P/B. Management's target share price is JPY 50,000-60,000, implying 78-114% upside from the current price (~JPY 28,000). The buyback plan (JPY 10 billion, 1.13% of shares outstanding) is the 7th such operation since 2018, with historical buybacks followed by an average 23% share price appreciation over the next 12 months. Comparing its investment returns and operating growth:
| Indicator | Hikari Tsushin | Japanese Market Average |
|---|---|---|
| Portfolio IRR (7-Year) | 18% | 8-10% (TOPIX) |
| Operating Profit CAGR (10-Year) | 12% | 3-5% (Japanese Small/Mid Caps) |
| Price-to-Book Ratio | 0.8x | 1.2x (TOPIX) |
Risk Note: 70% of investments are concentrated in Japanese small caps, posing higher liquidity risk; however, management has achieved 15% annualized EPS growth through buybacks and M&A synergies (e.g., the 2023 acquisition of an insurtech company).
Appier is in the early stages of its North American expansion (revenue share <10%), but customer acquisition costs (CAC) have fallen to 60% of their level 12 months ago, benefiting from 12 years of proprietary data accumulation. Its AI model gains an advantage under privacy regulations (e.g., GDPR, CCPA): customer retention rates improved to 92% in H1 2024, compared to an industry average of 75-80%. Management announced a JPY 1 billion buyback (0.8% of shares outstanding), based on expectations of improved profitability in H2. Key financial indicators:
| Indicator | 2023 | 2024 (Estimate) | Industry Comparison (AI Marketing Companies) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow (JPY Millions) | -150 | +200 | Median: -50 (2023) |
| Gross Margin | 68% | 72% | 55-65% |
| North America Revenue Growth (YoY) | +40% | +60% | +25% (Industry Average) |
Catalyst: If North American revenue reaches 20% of total by 2025, it could push overall gross margins above 75% and free cash flow margin from 5% to 12%.
Among the top five contributors in Q3, consumer (SharkNinja, Jollibee) and technology (Appier) each accounted for two positions, demonstrating the portfolio's cross-cycle allocation. SharkNinja's inventory cycle (8.6 weeks) is below its historical average (10-12 weeks), with restocking potential of over 20%. Alibaba's contribution was primarily sentiment-driven (China policy stimulus), but operationally, its market share remained stable at 35-38% (in line with industry growth). Comparing quarterly and annual performance:
| Holding | 3Q24 Contribution (%) | 2024 YTD Contribution (%) | Driver |
|---|---|---|---|
| SharkNinja | +2.86 | +5.29 | North American restocking + International expansion |
| Alibaba | +2.20 | - | Policy sentiment + HK dual listing |
| GENDA | +2.14 | - | Japanese entertainment consumption recovery |
| Appier | +1.57 | - | AI marketing demand + Buyback |
Risk Hedge: Among the bottom contributors, Macau gaming stocks (Melco, Sands China) were dragged down by weak Chinese consumption, but valuations have fallen to historical lows (EV/EBITDA 6-8x), providing a margin of safety.
| Company | Southbound Stake (Current) | Southbound Stake (Potential) | Total Shareholder Yield (TTM) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alibaba | 2.67% | 10% | 8.0% |
| Tencent | 8.5% | 10% | 3.5% |
| Meituan | 4.2% | 6% | 1.2% |
The portfolio adjustments this quarter reflect a positive positioning towards Southbound capital inflows (Alibaba), M&A integration (GENDA), a profit-oriented transformation (Jollibee), and AI operating leverage (Appier). Key observation points include: whether Alibaba's Southbound stake can break through 5%, the pace of per-store revenue improvement at GENDA's NEN locations, Jollibee's ROIC improvement trajectory, and whether Appier's operating margin can continue to expand.