Robotti & Company is a New York deep-value boutique founded by Bob Robotti in 1983, specializing in left-for-dead cyclical industries — energy services, building products, shipping — with multi-year holding periods and occasional activist letters. It manages about $650m; Bob is regarded as one of the most steadfast Graham-tradition cyclical value hunters.

This letter explains why Robotti's fund lagged the market in mid-2013. The Fed kept interest rates very low (from 4% down to about 2%), which pushed stock prices above what companies were actually worth. But the manager sticks to old-school value investing—buying stocks that could double in 3-5 years and are currently cheap. He gives an example: his biggest holding, Subsea 7 (an underwater pipeline company), dropped 11% in one day after a project write-down. But its orders and profits were actually improving, so he thinks the market overreacted. For regular investors, the takeaway is: don't panic over short-term losses. If a company's business is getting better while its stock falls, that might be a buying opportunity.
Robotti’s Q2 2013 investment report shows that its Value Equity Composite posted a return of -2.73% in the second quarter, underperforming the benchmark (Russell 2500 Value Index) which returned 1.54%; year-to-date return stands at 1.62%, significantly lagging the benchmark’s 15.10%. The report’s co
This chapter serves as the introduction to Robotti's Q2 2013 investment report, primarily addressing the fund's short-term underperformance in a low-interest-rate macro environment and elaborating on its 30-year commitment to a deep value investment philosophy. The report notes that since the market low in 2009 (S&P 500 at 677), the overall market has risen over 138%, yet Robotti's value portfolio significantly underperformed its benchmark in both Q2 2013 and year-to-date.
The author's core investment argument is: Short-term underperformance results from the Fed's sustained low-interest-rate policy (dropping from 4.00% in June 2008 to 1.98%), causing market valuations to detach from fundamentals. However, historically, such environments self-correct quickly, creating opportunities for fundamental investors. The author insists on seeking securities with the potential to double over the next 3-5 years and possessing a margin of safety, viewing volatility as an acceptable cost—citing Buffett's quote, "I would rather have a lumpy 15% return than a smooth 12%."
Counterintuitive judgments:
1. Performance Comparison:
2. Macro Environment:
3. Subsea 7 Case Study:
| Company | Role | Key Data | View |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subsea 7 (OB:SUBC) | Largest portfolio holding | Stock price $17.73 (start of year $24.60); Orders $10B+; EBITDA margin 16.5% | Bullish: Market overreaction, fundamentals improving, favorable deepwater market growth trends |
| Technip, Saipem | Competitors | Form the three major competitors with SUBC | No explicit rating, but SUBC seen as best positioned |
| Amazon (AMZN) | Cites CEO Bezos | 1997 shareholder letter | Used as an analogy for consistency in investment philosophy |
Robotti Value Equity Composite returned -2.73% in Q2 2013 (benchmark 1.54%), and 1.62% year-to-date, significantly underperforming the benchmark's 15.10%, but achieved a 20-year compound annual growth rate of 13.04%, outperforming the benchmark's 8.59%
Robotti added Pico Holdings (NASDAQ:PICO) in Q2 2013, with an investment logic typical of deep value and catalyst-driven approaches:
Robotti continued to add to UMH Properties (NYSE:UMH), with logic complementing Pico:
Robotti reduced its position in Builders FirstSource (NASDAQ:BLDR) but retained a "very substantial position":
| Holding | Investment Theme | Catalyst | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pico Holdings | Contrarian Assets + Tax Arbitrage | Realization of water rights value, Canola plant commissioning | Long asset realization cycle, water rights policy risk |
| UMH Properties | Housing Recovery + Economic Substitute | Community expansion, rising unit occupancy rates | Interest rate impact on REIT valuations, fluctuating manufactured home demand |
| Builders FirstSource | Industry Cycle + Value Reversion | Rising new home starts, increasing market share | Building material price volatility, intensifying competition |
Robotti reaffirms its "long-term buy-and-hold" strategy in the letter, with extremely low quarterly turnover (typically adding only 2-5 new positions annually). Its actions reflect three core principles:
Robotti's Q2 2013 letter demonstrates the flexibility of value investing in practice: buying contrarian during market panic (Pico's real estate), partially taking profits after significant gains (BLDR), while continuously adding to positions directly benefiting from macro trends (UMH). This strategy of "long-term core holdings plus flexible peripheral adjustments" allows it to balance risk and return during the housing recovery cycle.