Rick Rule is a veteran natural-resource investor who began in 1974, built Global Resource Investments (sold to Sprott in 2011), and led Sprott U.S. Holdings until retiring in 2021 to found Rule Investment Media. His free Substack covers contrarian speculation in mining, energy and critical minerals — gold, silver, copper, nickel, royalty and streaming companies — framed by geopolitical risk.
This article is bullish on Colombia's mining sector, citing a new pro-business government that quickly restored AngloGold Ashanti's Quebradona copper-gold permit and removed environmental blocks. Author Rick Rule sees a historic window. Key holdings: AngloGold Ashanti (Quebradona fast-tracked), Collective Mining (government more pro-business than expected, accelerating its Apollo project), and B2Gold (Gramalote project permitted, moving forward). Risks remain: social license and illegal armed groups could still derail projects.
One-sentence summary: The author has turned strongly bullish on Colombia's mining prospects, arguing that the new government's pro-business policies have opened a historic window for mining investment in the country. [Bullish]
The article notes that since the inauguration of President Abelardo de la Espriella, Colombia is rapidly becoming a focal point for mining project development, with investor sentiment turning significantly positive. The author recently attended the Precious Metals Summit and Mining Forum Americas, where he spoke with or watched presentations from CEOs of several mining companies active in Colombia, including AngloGold Ashanti (NYSE:AU), Aris Mining (NYSE:ARIS), Collective Mining (NASDAQ:CNL), Mineros (TSX:MSA), B2Gold (NYSE:BTG), and Copper Giant (TSXV:CGNT). The author also plans to gather more information at the CGS Colombia 2026 event in Medellín on November 10-11, 2026.
All CEOs mentioned that government ministers and regulators are "readily accessible," creating the impression that the government is eager to advance mining projects. The author believes this shift is driven by practical necessity: Colombia's economy is struggling, and the government needs revenue to fill fiscal gaps, thus turning to natural resources (oil, gas, and mining). He reminds readers that, as previously discussed in [RIN #11], high-level pro-mining rhetoric does not always translate into execution, so it is worth revisiting to manage expectations.
The government's support is not just rhetorical; it has taken action. Within days of taking office, the government reinstated AU's exploration permit for the Quebradona copper-gold project in Antioquia (which the previous administration had refused to extend). Quebradona is set to become Colombia's largest hard-rock mining development. The government also revoked several temporary environmental reserves, many of which were established by the previous administration to block mining projects. The author's original words: "To be clear, these were both actions that were relatively simple to do and did not have a meaningful political cost attached to them."
The article argues that while the mining sector still requires more substantive evidence of real change, the energy sector has already shown leading signals. In early October, the National Hydrocarbons Agency (AHN) stated it would review approximately 20 million hectares of oil and gas exploration areas (primarily offshore in the Caribbean) as a first step to reverse the drilling ban imposed by former President Gustavo Petro. These areas are near the Sirius gas field operated by state-owned oil company Ecopetrol and Petrobras. The previous oil and gas bidding round in 2021 awarded 30 contracts, committing over $148 million in investment and the drilling of 28 wells.
In the mining sector, nearly all the aforementioned companies will submit permit applications to regulators in the coming years, providing the government with opportunities to demonstrate its commitment. Many projects are located in the Middle Cauca Belt (see Exhibit 1 in the original text), an area expected to see continued development, including ARIS's underground mine construction at Marmato. Colombia has a substantial pipeline of projects, including:
The author emphasizes: "a warm reception from government is welcome, but the litmus test is not a positive meeting with government officials but tangible regulatory action that enables the environmental approval process to move forward."
The article notes that mining companies are helping the government make mining socially acceptable by shifting toward smaller, more practical, and more community-integrated projects. This replaces the large-scale projects of the past that directly conflicted with communities, making it more likely to secure the critical social license. The Colombian government is also interested in producing critical minerals, and several companies are highlighting their potential contributions, particularly AGA's Quebradona, CNL's Apollo, Outcrop's Santa Ana, and Copper Giant's Mocoa. The author concludes that in the coming years, Colombia could attract significant foreign direct investment through the development of projects such as Gramalote (see Exhibit 2 in the original text), Quebradona, Apollo, Soto Norte, and La Colosa.
More broadly, a wave of new exploration companies has already positioned themselves in Colombia, including Tiger Gold (TSXV:TIGR), Terra Rosa (TSXV:TRR), and Monteoro Minerals (private). Additionally, there are companies previously active in Colombia, such as Rule Symposium's Royal Road Minerals (TSXV:RYR), which has refocused its efforts back on Colombia. TIGR may soon join the developer ranks, planning to update the resource estimate and PEA for its Quinchia project in Risaralda by early 2027, considering a production scenario of approximately 250,000 ounces per year. Its Miraflores deposit is already amenable to underground mining, and the company is exploring modifications to add an open-pit component.
The article warns that Colombia still carries notable risks, and the progress the government has made so far carries almost no risk. The real test will come when the government attempts to issue permits and must simultaneously clarify society's acceptance of mining. Colombia still has powerful illegal armed groups. The government is intensifying its crackdown, which will likely provoke a violent response at some point. Formal projects in remote areas could become targets, as in the past, with economic activity—especially resource development—seen as an extension of state power. The development of natural resource projects will expand the state's influence and reach, which will not be welcomed by armed groups. The author expects them to foment anti-mining sentiment by funding dubious anti-mining, environmental NGOs, and other social organizations—a strategy that has worked well for them in the past.
The article presents a clear medium-term bullish narrative for Colombian mining: policy shift + government action + company alignment + new capital inflows. However, the author himself identifies the key risks: social license and illegal armed groups. Readers should note that this is a position-holder's perspective from Rick Rule (a well-known mining investor whose business has vested interests in the mining companies he promotes). The article has a clear promotional tone (e.g., emphasizing "now is the time for Colombia to become a mining nation"), and its optimistic assessment should be carefully weighed against Colombia's actual execution risks.
The report notes that Colombia is currently facing severe challenges, including high inflation, a widening fiscal deficit, and sovereign credit rating downgrades. The new administration of President De La Espriella is seeking to alleviate fiscal pressure by promoting private investment and mining development. In August 2026, year-on-year inflation accelerated to 6.2%, with core inflation at 6.1% and services inflation at 7.2%, far exceeding the central bank’s 3% target. The central bank raised its policy rate by 25 basis points to 12.25% on September 30. On the fiscal front, the mid-term fiscal framework for 2025 projects a central government deficit of 7.1% of GDP, with net debt exceeding 61%. The new government states that the deficit it inherited is approximately 7.8% of GDP, with a target to reduce it to 2.3% by the end of 2027. In April 2026, S&P downgraded Colombia’s foreign currency rating from BB to BB-, with a stable outlook, citing fiscal deficits, rising debt, and declining policy predictability.
The author emphasizes the severity of the debt burden, quoting: "S&P interest costs to average about 12.3% of government revenue during 2026–29, with every additional peso devoted to interest reduces the government’s capacity to spend on infrastructure, education, security and social programs." This means: "S&P expects interest costs to average about 12.3% of government revenue between 2026 and 2029, and every additional peso spent on interest reduces the government’s capacity to spend on infrastructure, education, security, and social programs."
The report argues that developing large-scale mining projects—such as Quebradona, Soto Norte, Gramalote, Guayabales, and the potential La Colosa—can boost foreign direct investment, exports, royalties, and corporate tax revenues, thereby compensating for the weakness in private fixed investment. The author summarizes this logic with the statement: "a credible pipeline of multi-billion-dollar mining investments would help address one of Colombia's current macroeconomic weaknesses: insufficient private fixed investment."
The report cites statements from CEOs of several mining companies, confirming that Colombia’s mining investment environment is materially improving and that the country risk discount is narrowing. Aris Mining CEO Neil Woodyer stated: "Colombia has not been a mining-friendly country. The present government has stated and has demonstrated that they now support mining." This means: "Colombia has not historically been a mining-friendly country. The current government has stated and demonstrated that it now supports mining." He noted that since the mid-August elections, the mining minister, environment minister, labor minister, and deputy ministers have all visited the company’s mining sites, indicating a clear support plan.
AngloGold Ashanti CEO Alberto Calderon expressed optimism about the Quebradona project: "Now we have a very pro-business, switched-on [government]. … We're going to fast-track this. They are as interested as we are in getting this project approved within about 18 months, maybe let's say 24 months." This means: "Now we have a very pro-business, dynamic government… We will accelerate the process. They are as interested as we are in getting this project approved within about 18 months, perhaps 24 months." The project has already drilled over 120,000 meters, with a planned investment of $1.4 billion, and is expected to produce 137 million pounds of copper, 1.4 million ounces of gold, and 21.6 million ounces of silver annually for over 22 years.
Collective Mining (CNL) has also responded positively, accelerating the release of the initial resource estimate for the Apollo project (approximately 5 million ounces of gold equivalent). It plans to begin a 3-kilometer exploration adit in November 2026, targeting project permitting by 2028, completion of a feasibility study in the first half of 2029, and production by 2030. The report notes that CEOs believe Colombia’s country risk discount is disappearing, with Woodyer and Sussman both stating that conditions are more favorable than expected.
The core signal from the report is that the policy window for mining investment in Colombia is opening. However, investors should note that this is a perspective from existing position holders—the CEO quotes cited in the report all come from companies with significant interests already in the country, and their optimistic assessments may carry a self-reinforcing bias. Actual execution risks remain, including whether the new government can deliver on its deficit reduction commitments, the degree of IMF involvement, and the actual pace of mining project approvals. For institutions focused on emerging market mining investments, gold-copper projects in Colombia’s Middle Cauca Belt (such as Quebradona, Soto Norte, and Apollo) are worth adding to watchlists, but further evidence of policy implementation is needed.
The report argues that Colombia's new government is more business-friendly than expected, providing an ideal window for Collective Mining's Apollo project. In early September 2025, the company released the maiden resource estimate for the Apollo deposit: 37 million tonnes at 2.17 grams per tonne gold equivalent, containing 2.58 million ounces in the indicated category; and 48.2 million tonnes at 1.83 grams per tonne, containing 2.83 million ounces in the inferred category. Of this, 48.4 million tonnes containing 2.2 million ounces are classified as open-pit resources. Gold accounts for 50% of the open-pit indicated resource on a gold-equivalent basis, with the remainder coming from silver, copper, and tungsten. The company has drilled an additional 40,000 meters at Apollo (not included in this estimate) and is accelerating environmental and technical studies, targeting the submission of an environmental permit application in the second half of 2027. Executive Chairman Ari Sussman stated: "With the new government that came into power in early August, it is even more bullish than my wildest expectations… This country is open for business."
B2Gold is less vocal than other companies about the political shift in Colombia, as its Gramalote project is already permitted and does not overly rely on policy tailwinds. The project's existing permits allow for a larger operation than the company's current plan. B2Gold is modifying these permits, with a potential construction decision expected by mid-2027. The revised environmental impact study was submitted in March 2026, and the approval process is expected to take up to 12 months. A feasibility study released in July 2025 shows Gramalote producing 177,000 ounces of gold annually at an all-in sustaining cost of $985 per ounce, over a 13-year mine life. Average annual production in the first five years is 227,000 ounces, with an average head grade of 1.23 grams per tonne. President and CEO Mike Cinnamond stated: "Gramalote, we’re de-risking that as we go forward. We’re modifying the permits. We’re doing the resettlement… [the] middle of next year, that’s when we really get to a decision point."
While the La Colosa project requires the most upfront work, its 28 million ounces of gold reserves make it a target worth accelerating. Mineros paid only $10 million upfront, with an additional $60 million contingent on permit approval, to acquire a project that has already seen over $1 billion in cumulative investment (including two undisclosed pre-feasibility studies and extensive engineering work). The author believes this makes it one of the best bets in the mining sector in some time. Mineros is not attempting to develop a 1-million-ounce-per-year mega-project but has instead opted for a smaller-scale approach to avoid environmentally sensitive areas and simplify the processing flowsheet. The company's ace in the hole may be its 50-year operating history in Colombia, which helps build local support. President and CEO Daniel Henao stated: "We’re getting the perfect four-year window with a very supportive new government that is all about developing the national resources for the benefit of all Colombians."
The report uses three cases—Collective Mining, B2Gold, and Mineros—to illustrate different investment logics for Colombian mining under the new government: early-stage exploration projects (Apollo) benefit from valuation uplift driven by policy shifts; already-permitted projects (Gramalote) offer lower risk and higher certainty; and large, undeveloped projects (La Colosa) present high-odds opportunities. Note: Author Rick Rule is a well-known mining investor, and his optimistic assessment reflects a position-holder's perspective. Readers should monitor the permitting, community, and environmental risks inherent in project advancement.
| Ticker | Direction | Author’s One-Sentence View | Key Data |
|---|---|---|---|
| Collective Mining (CNL) | Add / Hold for Observation | The new government is more pro-business than expected, and the Apollo project is accelerating — a high-odds early-stage exploration play. | Apollo maiden resource: 2.58M oz indicated gold equivalent, 2.83M oz inferred; permitting targeted for 2028, production by 2030. |
| B2Gold (BTG) | Hold for Observation | The Gramalote project has received permits, offering the lowest risk and highest certainty, progressing steadily. | 177,000 oz gold per year, all-in sustaining cost of $985/oz, mine life of 13 years; construction decision possible by mid-2027. |
| Mineros (MSA) | Add / Hold for Observation | The La Colosa project holds 28M oz of gold reserves, with only a $10M upfront payment — one of the "best bets." | Over $1B already invested; opting for a smaller-scale plan to avoid environmentally sensitive areas. |
| AngloGold Ashanti (AU) | Hold for Observation | The Quebradona project is Colombia’s largest hard-rock mine development; the government has resumed exploration permits. | Planned investment of $1.4B, producing 137M lbs copper, 1.4M oz gold, and 21.6M oz silver annually for over 22 years. |
| Aris Mining (ARIS) | Hold for Observation | Government ministers visited the mine site, signaling clear support; advancing the Soto Norte and Marmato projects. | CEO stated, "The current government has proven its support for mining." |
| Copper Giant (CGNT) | Hold for Observation | Plans to submit a permit application for the Mocoa copper-molybdenum project, following the policy window. | — |
| Outcrop Silver & Gold (OCG) | Hold for Observation | May submit a permit application for the Santa Ana silver project. | — |
| Tiger Gold (TIGR) | New Position / Hold for Observation | A new exploration company positioning early, planning to update the Quinchia project resource by early 2027. | Considering a production scenario of ~250,000 oz/year. |
| Royal Road Minerals (RYR) | Hold for Observation | Has refocused its efforts back to Colombia. | — |