Oakmark is the mutual fund family launched in 1991 by Harris Associates, the Chicago deep-value firm founded in 1976 (about $105bn AUM). Bill Nygren runs the flagship Oakmark Fund and David Herro the Oakmark International Fund, buying businesses at large discounts to intrinsic value and holding them like owners — publishing quarterly fund commentaries, market commentaries and insight articles.
This article argues value investing is still strong. Over the past decade, value strategies returned 10-11% annually, but tech stocks stole the spotlight. The S&P 500 has become a concentrated tech fund, which carries hidden risk. Using Netflix as an example, the author shows how to look beyond accounting numbers to estimate true business value. For ordinary investors, it means not blindly following index funds and considering adding value exposure to balance risk. Worth reading because it's data-driven and practical, not hype.
One-sentence judgment: The author insists that value investing has not become invalid, but believes the current S&P 500 index, which is concentrated in tech growth stocks, faces mean reversion risk, and investors should proactively increase value exposure [Stance: Cautious].
| Ticker/Asset | Direction | Author's View in One Sentence | Key Data | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Netflix | Not explicitly stated (historical case) | Case illustrates how to estimate intrinsic value beyond GAAP; at the time, subscriber value implied a discount | Valuation ~$400/subscriber (HBO was $800), P/E nearly 200x | |
| MAG 7 | Not explicitly stated | Acknowledges their earnings have exceeded expectations and doubled, but warns that high growth may be unsustainable | 2026 earnings expectations are double the estimates made seven years ago | |
| S&P 500 | Hold and observe (risk disclosure) | Points out that the index has become severely concentrated in tech growth; investors need to examine risks | No specific figures provided; analogy to Australian metals & mining index | |
| Value strategy (including Harris | Oakmark funds) | Hold and observe | The author implicitly suggests proactively increasing value exposure to optimize risk structure | 10-11% annualized return over the past decade |
作者明确指出，真正的价值投资并非机械按市净率筛选便宜股票，而是以低于内在价值三分之二的价格买入优质企业。 文章开篇就划清界限：`「The term “value” is often used to describe approaches that have little in common with how we invest at Harris | Oakmark.」`——意即：“'价值'这个词常常被用来描述那些与我们Harris|Oakmark的投资方式几乎毫无共同点的方法。” 作者强调，许多价值策略“买入市净率低的一半股票、等待均值回归”，但“that’s not what we do, and frankly, we think that version of the discipline has earned its struggles”（那不是我们的做法，坦率说，我们认为那种版本的纪律是自找苦吃）。Harris | Oakmark 的定义是：价值投资是试图得到远比你支付的钱更多的东西。 具体操作上，`「We ask what the business should be worth then and whether today’s price gives us enough upside to compensate for the uncertainty.」`——意即：“我们问这个业务五年到七年后应该值多少钱，以及当前价格是否给了我们足够的上涨空间来补偿不确定性。” 他们要求股价大约是内在价值的三分之二时才真正感兴趣，且对远期预测保持高度怀疑（“We are genuinely skeptical of our ability to forecast fifteen years out with any confidence.”）。
作者认为价值投资并未失败——过去十年价值策略年回报10-11%远高于通胀，只是增长股表现更为惊人。 原文指出：`「Over the past decade, value strategies have returned something in the neighborhood of 10 to 11% annually. That’s well ahead of inflation and, for most investors, sufficient to help them meet their financial goals.」`——意即：“过去十年，价值策略年回报在10%到11%左右。这远高于通胀，对大多数投资者来说足以帮助他们实现财务目标。” 但更大的故事是增长股的卓越表现。文章展示了一个核心分析：2019年市场对MAG 7 2026年盈利的预期，如今实际盈利预期是当初的两倍。作者原话：`「On average, 2026 earnings are expected to be twice what was estimated for 2026 seven years ago. That was not just multiple expansion. Fundamentals improved far more than expected.」`——意即：“平均而言，2026年盈利预期是七年前预估的两倍。这不仅仅是估值倍数扩张，基本面改善远超预期。” 作者承认，这些企业执行水平“超出了大多数人对同等规模公司的想象”。
作者重申“树木不会长到天上”，警惕当前市场对大型科技公司持续高增长的过度假设。 文章指出：`「For most of business history, high growth rates attracted competition, margins compressed, and the exceptional became ordinary. Regression to the mean was one of the most reliable forces in markets.」`——意即：“在大部分商业历史上，高增长率吸引竞争，利润率压缩，非凡变成平凡。均值回归是市场中最可靠的力量之一。” 作者警告，投资者可能未意识到自己持有S&P 500时实际承担了什么：`「What was once a broad, diversified representation of the US economy has effectively become a concentrated technology growth fund.」`——意即：“曾经是对美国经济多元化广泛代表的S&P 500，实际上已变成了一只集中持仓的科技成长基金。” 作者用澳大利亚市场（历史上以金属和矿业为主）类比，指出指数化从来不是“一刀切”——“indexing meant accepting significant sector concentration”（接受指数化意味着承担显著的行业集中度）。当前美国市场同样需要审视这一风险。
作者强调内在价值是“合理区间”而非精确数字，并通过Netflix投资案例说明会计规则可能误导估值。 文章解释：`「Precision is not the goal. What we're doing is forming a reasonable range and then requiring a substantial discount before we act on it.」`——意即：“精确不是目标。我们是在构建一个合理区间，然后在行动前要求一个实质性的折扣。” 作者批评GAAP会计准则在服务型经济中的失效：它把无形资产（品牌、客户关系、软件）记为0，而Netflix案例极有说服力。原文写道：`「When we invested, Netflix looked absurdly expensive by any GAAP metric, trading at something close to 200 times earnings with almost no book value. But the economics looked different when analyzed on a subscriber basis...Netflix was adding subscribers rapidly, and those subscribers had long, predictable lifetime values.」`——意即：“当我们投资时，按任何GAAP指标看Netflix都荒唐地贵，市盈率接近200倍且几乎没有账面价值。但按用户基础分析，经济实质不同……Netflix在快速增加订阅用户，而这些用户有长期可预测的终身价值。” 作者估算，当时HBO每个订户被市场估值约800美元，而Netflix隐含的订户价值只有约400美元，存在显著折价。这一分析展示了如何超越会计数字看经济实质——这是价值投资纪律不断进化的关键。
文章认为当前价值/成长估值差距仍处历史高位，对成长股持续超常表现的假设持怀疑态度。作者暗示，主动增加价值暴露并非对抗技术，而是优化组合风险结构——“Adding active value exposure is not a bet against technology or innovation. It is a way to make sure the total portfolio reflects the investor's intended risk profile.” 机构视角偏差：Oakmark作为长期价值导向的基金，有动机强调价值策略优势，但文中数据（10-11%年回报、MAG7盈利翻倍、Netflix订户逻辑）可独立验证，论述逻辑自洽。