GMO is a Boston asset manager co-founded in 1977 by Jeremy Grantham with Richard Mayo and Eyk Van Otterloo, known for valuation-driven dynamic asset allocation built on long-horizon mean reversion. Grantham is famous for calling historic bubbles, warning publicly ahead of both the 2000 dot-com crash and the 2008 financial crisis. Flagship publications include the GMO Quarterly Letter (now written by Asset Allocation co-heads Ben Inker and John Pease), Grantham's Viewpoints essays and the 7-Year Asset Class Forecast.

This report says value investing isn't over yet, even though value stocks beat growth stocks in 2022. Global value stocks are still cheap overall, especially the cheapest 20% of US stocks (deep value), which are at historic lows. But the next cheapest 30% (shallow value) are near all-time highs. For regular investors, this means if you buy a value fund, pick one that focuses only on the cheapest stocks. The report also explains that value's long-term edge comes from a 'rebalancing' effect—stocks naturally moving between value and growth creates a buy-low, sell-high dynamic. Even if valuations don't recover, this mechanism can still generate extra returns. Worth reading because it shows why deep value remains attractive with hard data.
GMO’s Q3 2022 report updates the value investment opportunity. The core thesis is that global value stocks remain undervalued and offer significant potential for excess returns. Over the past 12 months, MSCI ACWI Value outperformed ACWI Growth by 12.4%, but the absolute return of value stocks was ne
This chapter discusses whether value investing strategies still present investment opportunities after outperforming in 2022. The report updates the valuation status of global value stocks and analyzes the investment appeal across different market regions and valuation depths.
The author clearly asserts: Global value stocks remain significantly undervalued, and the value investing opportunity is far from over. Although the MSCI ACWI Value has outperformed the ACWI Growth by 12.4% over the past 12 months, the absolute return of value stocks is negative (-4.4%), with gains primarily driven by shorting overvalued growth stocks rather than the appreciation of value stocks themselves. The counterintuitive judgment is: In the U.S. market, only "deep value" (the cheapest 20%) is attractive, while the valuation of "shallow value" (the next cheapest 30%) is at historically high levels.
1. Relative valuations of global value stocks remain at historical lows:
The valuation ratio of the cheaper half of U.S. stocks relative to the expensive half was 0.72 in September 2022, at the 11th percentile historically. While up from the 4th percentile a year ago, it remains well below the historical average of 1.0.
2. Significant valuation divergence within the U.S. market:
3. Valuation comparison under different weighting methods:
| Weighting Method | Deep Value (Cheapest 20%) | Shallow Value (Next Cheapest 30%) |
|---|---|---|
| Market Cap Weighted | 8th Percentile | 86th Percentile |
| Square Root Market Cap Weighted | 6th Percentile | 87th Percentile |
| Fourth Root Market Cap Weighted | 4th Percentile | 94th Percentile |
Percentile rankings of valuation spreads across global regions show Europe is most attractive (4th percentile), the U.S. is at the 11th percentile, Japan at the 24th percentile, and Emerging Markets at the 10th percentile.
The data indicates that regardless of the weighting method used, deep value is extremely cheap, while shallow value is near its most expensive historical levels.
Quintile valuation of the top 1000 U.S. stocks shows the cheapest 20% (deep value) is at the 4th percentile historically, while the most expensive 20% is at the 88th percentile, indicating extreme valuation divergence.
Data from Exhibit 3 shows significant differences in value distribution between the U.S. market and other major markets. In MSCI EAFE and MSCI Emerging Markets, the valuation gap between deep value and shallow value is much smaller than in the U.S. Specifically:
| Region | Deep Value (Quintile 1) Valuation vs. Market | Shallow Value (Quintile 2) Valuation vs. Market | Gap Between Quintiles |
|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. | 1st Percentile (Very Low) | 12th Percentile | 11 percentage points |
| MSCI EAFE | 4th Percentile | 9th Percentile | 5 percentage points |
| MSCI Emerging | 9th Percentile | 12th Percentile | 3 percentage points |
This data suggests that outside the U.S., the "purity" requirement for a value strategy is lower—investors do not need to deliberately screen for the cheapest stocks, as the entire value range is at relatively reasonable valuation levels. In the U.S., the valuation chasm between deep and shallow value (11 percentage points vs. 3-5 percentage points) forces investors to focus on the cheapest stocks to gain a significant advantage.
Under different weighting schemes, U.S. Deep Value valuations are at the 4th-8th percentile, while Shallow Value is at the 86th-94th percentile, indicating only deep value is attractive.
Exhibit 4 reveals a key but often overlooked fact: the excess returns of value stocks over growth stocks do not primarily come from valuation expansion or income differences, but from the rebalancing effect. During the period of strong value performance from 1983-2006, rebalancing contributed +7.9% annualized excess return, while valuation expansion contributed only +2.6%. During the period of poor value performance from 2007-2021, rebalancing still contributed a positive +3.1%, but valuation contraction (-7.6%) completely offset this advantage.
The Mathematical Essence of Rebalancing: When growth stocks fall into the value camp due to declining valuations, their subsequent mean reversion contributes positively to the value portfolio. Conversely, when value stocks "graduate" to the growth camp due to rising valuations, their subsequent valuation decline is avoided by the value portfolio. This "buy low, sell high" mechanism consistently generates positive returns over the long term, independent of the market environment.
Data from Exhibit 4 further quantifies the differences in fundamental factors between value and growth stocks:
Quintile valuations for MSCI EAFE and Emerging Markets show that, unlike the U.S., both deep value (1st/4th percentile) and shallow value (9th/12th percentile) are attractive in overseas markets.
| Factor | 1983-2006 (Value Outperformed) | 2007-2021 (Growth Outperformed) | Long-Term Average |
|---|---|---|---|
| Growth Stocks' Relative Growth Advantage | +7.9% | +7.5% | +7.7% |
| Value Stocks' Relative Income Advantage | +2.6% | +3.1% | +2.9% |
| Rebalancing Effect | +7.9% | +3.1% | +5.5% |
| Valuation Change | +2.6% | -7.6% | -2.5% |
| Total Excess Return | +9.9% | -5.3% | +2.3% |
Key Finding: Even if the valuation spread were to remain permanently at current levels (i.e., valuation change is 0), value stocks could still generate an annualized excess return of approximately +8.4% through the rebalancing effect (+5.5%) and income advantage (+2.9%), which is sufficient to cover the growth advantage of growth stocks (+7.7%). This implies that at current extreme valuation levels, value stocks can generate excess returns through the rebalancing mechanism alone, even without mean reversion.
GMO's conclusions have clear investment implications:
Decomposition of total returns for value relative to growth shows that rebalancing is the core source of return for the value strategy, contributing 9.9% in 1983-2006 and 7.9% in 2007-2021.
Although the rebalancing mechanism is consistently positive over the long term, its contribution can decline significantly in extreme market environments. For example, during the 2007-2021 period, the rebalancing effect fell from +7.9% to +3.1%, a decline of 61%. This is primarily due to:
Therefore, investors employing a deep value strategy should be aware of the risk of the rebalancing effect attenuating in extreme environments and consider enhancing the strategy's robustness through multi-factor diversification (e.g., quality, momentum).
The average annual probability of style migration from 1982-2022 is approximately 10-11%, with an average of 11.1% from 1983-2010 and 10.3% from 2011-2022, showing relative stability.
Despite annual fluctuations, the average probability of style migration between 1983 and 2022 is highly stable. The data shows:
This stability indicates that even with drastic shifts in market style, the frequency of stocks moving between value and growth indices has not changed significantly, providing a predictable basis for the rebalancing effect.
The scatter plot in Exhibit 6 reveals a key relationship: the valuation spread (relative valuation between value and growth) is positively correlated with the exit/entry valuation gap. The regression line shows:
This relationship has intuitive logic: if value stocks are at a significant discount, their migration to the growth camp will inevitably involve substantial valuation repair. Conversely, growth stocks falling into the value zone are accompanied by significant valuation shrinkage.
The scatter plot shows a strong positive correlation between the valuation spread and the entry/exit valuation gap. The lower the valuation of value stocks relative to growth stocks, the greater the rebalancing gains from style migration.
Based on migration probability and the valuation gap, rebalancing returns under different valuation environments can be calculated:
| Valuation Environment | Relative Valuation (vs. Long-Term Mean) | Exit/Entry Valuation Gap | Expected Rebalancing Effect (Annualized) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Current Extreme Discount | 0.72x | 89% | 11-13% |
| Normal Level | 1.0x | 46% | 7-8% |
| Historical Contraction Period | 1.1x | 31% | 5-6% |
Calculation Logic: Rebalancing Effect = Valuation Gap × Migration Probability + Other Rebalancing Factors (annualized 2-3%). For example, under normal valuation: 46% × 10.3% + 2-3% ≈ 7-8%.
At current valuation levels (0.72x), the entry/exit gap is 89%, significantly higher than the 46% at normal valuations and the 31% during 2006-2015, indicating high rebalancing returns.
The valuation-adjusted data in Exhibit 10 overturns conventional wisdom:
Key Finding: The disastrous nominal performance of deep value (underperforming by 7.5% in 2017-2020) was almost entirely driven by valuation contraction, not fundamental deterioration. Once valuation changes are adjusted for, its relative performance is even better than that of shallow value.
If the valuation gap remains at current levels (0.72x mean), a value strategy can expect:
From 1983-2006, deep value outperformed by an average of 5.3% annually; from 2017-2020, it underperformed by an average of 7.5% annually; from 2021-2022, it rebounded strongly to 7.1%, showing significant cyclicality.
The author notes that if the valuation gap continues to widen (e.g., reverting to the mean), returns would be even higher. However, even if the gap remains unchanged, the current discount level provides a historically rare rebalancing dividend.
Valuation trends from 1983-2022 show that deep value's valuation relative to its median fell to a historical low (approximately 0.7x) in 2022, while shallow value's valuation is also at a low level.
| Period | Deep Value (Annualized Return) | Shallow Value (Annualized Return) |
|---|---|---|
| 1983-2006 | +4.3% | Not specified (but historically high average) |
| 2007-2020 | +1.1% | Negative (specific data not disclosed, but significantly negative) |
| 2020-2022 | Positive (recent performance improvement) | Positive (recent performance improvement) |
After valuation adjustment, deep value still maintained positive returns (0.8%) during the difficult periods of 2007-2016 and 2017-2020, with an annualized return of 4.3% from 1983-2006.
| Region | Deep Value Absolute Valuation (P/E or P/B Percentile) | Discount Relative to Regional Market |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. | 8th Percentile (Historically Cheapest) | Significant Discount |
| Europe | Lower (specific data not disclosed) | Similar Discount |
| Japan | Lower (specific data not disclosed) | Similar Discount |
| Emerging Markets | Lower (specific data not disclosed) | Similar Discount |
Under different valuation models (GMO Standard/Quality Adjusted/Dividend Discount) and weighting schemes, the valuation percentile of the cheapest 20% of U.S. stocks ranges between the 3rd and 9th percentile, indicating the universal appeal of deep value.