GMO is a Boston asset manager co-founded in 1977 by Jeremy Grantham with Richard Mayo and Eyk Van Otterloo, known for valuation-driven dynamic asset allocation built on long-horizon mean reversion. Grantham is famous for calling historic bubbles, warning publicly ahead of both the 2000 dot-com crash and the 2008 financial crisis. Flagship publications include the GMO Quarterly Letter (now written by Asset Allocation co-heads Ben Inker and John Pease), Grantham's Viewpoints essays and the 7-Year Asset Class Forecast.
This piece explains why investment firm GMO bought more emerging market stocks in mid-2017 after they had already surged over 18%. Their logic: even though prices rose, these stocks became more attractive compared to other assets like developed market stocks or bonds. For regular investors, the key takeaway is to focus on relative value—how one investment stacks up against others—not just price moves. Also, when specific risks (like political or currency issues) are low, it may be smart to increase exposure. It's worth reading because it shows how pros think against the crowd.
A GMO research report notes that despite emerging market equities rising over 18% in the first half of 2017, the firm increased its holdings of emerging market assets in early July, going against the prevailing trend. The core argument is that while the absolute expected return of emerging market va
This chapter discusses GMO's rationale for increasing its holdings in emerging market equities in the first half of 2017, after they had risen by over 18%, going against the prevailing market trend. The market backdrop was a strong rebound in emerging markets, but GMO believed their relative value advantage had actually widened.
GMO's core judgment was that, although the absolute expected return of emerging market value stocks had declined, their margin of superiority relative to other asset classes had increased. Therefore, under conditions of relatively benign risk, the institution chose to increase its allocation. This move differed from its typical contrarian strategy of "buying low and selling high," but based on relative value assessment, it remained a correct decision.
| Indicator | Early 2017 | Early July 2017 (at time of increase) |
|---|---|---|
| Cumulative gain in emerging market equities | — | Over 18% |
| Absolute expected return of emerging market value stocks | Higher | Declined |
| Relative superiority of emerging market value stocks | Baseline | Increased |
| Emerging-specific risk | — | Relatively benign |