GMO is a Boston asset manager co-founded in 1977 by Jeremy Grantham with Richard Mayo and Eyk Van Otterloo, known for valuation-driven dynamic asset allocation built on long-horizon mean reversion. Grantham is famous for calling historic bubbles, warning publicly ahead of both the 2000 dot-com crash and the 2008 financial crisis. Flagship publications include the GMO Quarterly Letter (now written by Asset Allocation co-heads Ben Inker and John Pease), Grantham's Viewpoints essays and the 7-Year Asset Class Forecast.

This report says modern civilization is in a close race between self-destruction and salvation. On the bad side: we're overusing resources, damaging the environment, and ignoring warnings—just like past collapsed empires. On the good side: birth rates are falling (China and Iran now have fewer kids than needed to keep population stable) and renewable energy costs are dropping fast (solar power is getting cheaper like computer chips). For regular investors, this means don't blindly bet on business as usual. Watch out for overly optimistic news from big companies, and pay attention to long-term trends like population decline and clean energy.
GMO Q1 2013 Letter: The Race of Our Lives Authored by Jeremy Grantham, this letter focuses on the risk of collapse facing current global civilization. The core argument is that the same factors responsible for the decline of historical civilizations—excessive resource consumption, poor management, o
This chapter is the introduction to GMO's April 2013 quarterly letter, The Race of Our Lives, authored by Jeremy Grantham. The report opens with a stark proposition: the current global economy is recklessly consuming resources and straining natural systems, exhibiting multiple indicators that preceded the collapse of numerous civilizations throughout history. The author's core question is whether modern civilization is also heading toward self-destruction and whether any possible path to redemption exists.
Grantham's core investment argument does not directly target markets but instead makes a judgment on the macro survival environment: Modern civilization faces systemic risks—driven by overconfidence, resource abuse, and mismanagement—similar to those that doomed past civilizations. However, the author presents a counterintuitive, contrarian view: while historian William Ophuls argues that civilizations are "hardwired" for self-destruction, Grantham believes modern civilization possesses two "lucky gifts" that no stressed civilization in history has ever had—declining fertility rates and technological progress in alternative energy—which may be the key to avoiding collapse. The ultimate outcome will be "a close race."
1. Declining Fertility: This is a long-term factor that Malthus completely failed to foresee. Key data points include:
2. Technological Progress in Alternative Energy: The author believes this could be a crucial rescue force, akin to the "U.S. Cavalry," but does not provide specific data in this chapter.
This chapter does not mention specific companies or assets. Grantham primarily discusses macro civilizational risk, not individual stocks. His reference to "vested interests" broadly refers to large corporations, such as energy companies, which he believes obstruct change by controlling governments.
Total fertility rates in major Asian economies (China, Japan, South Korea, etc.) plummeted from 5-6 in 1961 to 1-1.5 in 2011, all significantly below the replacement level of 2.1
In the continuation, GMO further deepens the global picture of fertility decline, revealing two key trends: first, low fertility rates in Asia and the Western world have formed a "new normal"; second, some African countries remain "stubborn exceptions," constituting the main source of future global population pressure. The following supplements arguments and viewpoints based on new data and charts.
| Country/Region | 2012 Fertility Rate (Children/Woman) | Gap from Replacement Level | Main Challenges |
|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 1.3 | -0.8 | Labor shortage, pension pressure |
| South Korea | 1.2 | -0.9 | High education costs, youth employment difficulties |
| Germany | 1.4 | -0.7 | Regional development disparities, immigrant integration |
| United States | 1.9 | -0.2 | Immigration dependence, income inequality |
Fertility rates in Western countries (France, USA, UK, Germany, etc.) declined from 3-3.5 in 1961 to 1.5-2.0 in 2011, fluctuating around the replacement rate of 2.1
| Scenario | Global Population 2050 | Global Population 2100 | Africa Population (2100) | Main Risks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low Fertility | 8.2 billion | 6 billion | 2.3 billion | Aging, labor shortage |
| High Fertility | 9.6 billion | 11+ billion | 4+ billion | Resource depletion, intensified conflict |
Fertility rates in emerging countries (Iran from 7.0 to 1.6, Bangladesh from 7.0 to 2.2, etc.) plummeted from 6-7 in 1960 to around 2.0 in 2011
The continuation reveals the binary divergence of global demographic transition through a comparison of Asia, the West, and Africa: developed regions face a "low-fertility trap," while Africa's "high-fertility stubborn zone" constitutes a long-term risk. GMO views declining fertility as a "last hope" and calls on the economics profession and policymakers to abandon short-sighted thinking, while also acknowledging the technological breakthroughs in renewable energy. However, the real challenge lies in bringing Africa's fertility rates below replacement levels, which requires global cooperation and resource allocation.
Okay, this is the analysis of Part 3/5 of the "Introduction," continuing the style of the previous two parts, supplementing new arguments, data, and viewpoints without repeating already analyzed content.
The core argument of this section is that the cost decline of solar and wind energy has entered an exponential decline channel similar to the "Moore's Law" of semiconductors, fundamentally altering the energy competition landscape. However, this revolutionary breakthrough faces a key paradox: high capital costs (determined by corporate high discount rates) severely distort the true socio-economic benefits of renewable energy, delaying its large-scale deployment.
1. "Moore's Law"-Style Decline in Solar PV Costs: The author compares the decline in solar PV costs to the "Moore's Law" decline in semiconductor prices, a highly compelling analogy. The semiconductor industry has achieved continuous cost reductions by repeatedly pushing physical limits, suggesting that the physical limits of solar efficiency may also be repeatedly broken. Exhibit 6 shows that solar PV costs fell from approximately $1,600/MWh in 1980 to approximately $200/MWh in 2010, a decline of 87.5%. If this trend continues, solar power will provide "permanently cheap and abundant energy."
2. The "Material Cost Trap" for Wind Power: Unlike solar, the cost decline for wind power encountered a "material cost trap" between 2002 and 2008. During this period, the prices of steel, cement, and aluminum (all energy-intensive materials) used to build wind towers rose by 2-3 times. Despite technological progress and flat labor costs, wind power costs still rose by about 40%. This reveals the sensitivity of wind power costs to commodity prices, suggesting limited future cost reduction potential. Exhibit 6 predicts that even by 2025, wind power costs may still be higher than in 2000 (before the commodity price surge).
3. The "Externality" Black Hole of Coal Power Costs: The author emphasizes that the coal cost comparison in Exhibit 6 does not account for "externalities"—the costs the coal industry imposes on the public, including:
The author asserts that if externalities were fully accounted for, coal power would already be an "uneconomical choice" today. The prediction is that by 2025-2030, solar and wind costs will be lower than coal costs, even without considering externalities. This provides a quantitative basis for the risk of "stranded assets": investing in new coal-fired power plants may fail to recoup investment within the next 20 years due to cost disadvantages or regulatory constraints.
4. The Double Standard of Capital Costs: This is the most profound insight in this section. The author points out that companies typically use high discount rates of 10%-14% to evaluate renewable energy projects, reflecting the opportunity cost of capital and high risk premiums (policy uncertainty, rapid technological iteration, unfamiliarity of capital providers). However, from a societal perspective, solving the long-term energy problem is about civilizational survival, far more important than short-term corporate returns. The author proposes that using a 5% social discount rate (far lower than corporate standards) would reduce the "Levelized Cost of Energy" (LCOE) for wind and solar projects by up to 40%. This means that under a more reasonable social discount rate, wind power is already competitive with coal, and solar power will catch up within 10 years.
Fertility rates in some African and failed states (Somalia, Zambia, Uganda, etc.) have declined from 6-8 in 1961 but remain high at 4.0-8.0
| Energy Type | Cost Competitiveness at Corporate Discount Rate (10-14%) | Cost Competitiveness at Social Discount Rate (5%) | Key Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wind Power | Current cost still higher than coal (before accounting for externalities) | Already lower than coal, with future advantages expanding | 40% reduction in capital cost makes wind immediately economical |
| Solar Power | Still needs 10 years of cost decline to compete with wind | Can catch up with wind in 10 years, competing with coal | Lower capital cost brings solar into the economically viable range earlier |
| Coal Power | Currently lowest cost (excluding externalities) | Highest cost (after accounting for externalities) | Social discount rate amplifies coal's long-term cost disadvantage |
This section constructs a multi-dimensional argumentative framework through the "Moore's Law" analogy, material cost trap analysis, externality quantification, and a critique of the double standard in capital costs. The core conclusion is that the cost decline of renewable energy is no longer incremental but exponential and disruptive. The main obstacle today is not technology or resources but institutional capital cost distortions and cognitive lags. Once society evaluates its long-term value at a more reasonable discount rate, renewable energy will immediately become the most economical choice, ushering in a new energy era with extremely low marginal costs.
Energy storage is seen as the "holy grail" of environmental progress, but progress has historically been slow. Currently, hundreds of research teams worldwide are working in this area, which brings optimistic expectations. Before wind and solar power account for a large proportion of total electricity generation, storage costs are expected to see substantial declines (roughly halving), especially at the retail level. Unlike car batteries, home storage devices can be heavier, bulkier, and relatively less efficient, as long as they are cheap. Cheap storage would offer households the potential for grid independence.
However, it must be acknowledged that a lack of progress in storage could significantly slow the adoption of alternative energy. Therefore, this area particularly needs encouragement and good fortune.
World population is projected to peak at 8.3 billion in 2050 and then decline to 6 billion by 2100; excluding Africa, the population peaks in 2040 and falls below 4 billion by 2100
Modernizing the smart grid could significantly reduce the need for storage over several decades. Through broader and more efficient electricity transmission, and by leveraging the temporary regulation of household electric vehicle batteries and refrigerators (with user consent and discounts), the problem can be further alleviated. As a backup, natural gas power is an ideal technology, supplemented by biomass and municipal waste power. In the U.S., coal power is no longer necessary, and the last coal-fired power plants globally may be built within the next 20 years.
China has unique advantages in the alternative energy sector. Its capital investment accounts for 50% of GDP, which, although criticized as wasteful (e.g., subway stations in farmland, ghost cities, redundant regional airports), this capital surplus can be turned into an opportunity. In contrast, U.S. capital investment has fallen to 16% of GDP, and federal debt exceeds 70% of GDP, growing at 6% per year.
China could smoothly transition its capital investment from 50% to 35% over the next 20 years by managing large-scale alternative energy projects, including the smartest national grid, energy storage research, and all renewable sources (including nuclear fusion). This plan would yield multiple benefits:
Combined with China's lower labor costs, improving education levels, rapidly improving infrastructure, and capital deepening, this will put immense pressure on American capitalists.
Recently, several major Chinese cities experienced catastrophic pollution levels. On a pollution index where the safety limit is 30, some cities exceeded 300 multiple times. The Chinese government responded quickly by raising its current solar installation target (already very aggressive by U.S. standards) by another 65% within three years! This target is equivalent to adding solar power capacity roughly equal to seven large coal-fired power plants (worth more than ten in value, as solar power coincides with peak demand hours). Although still far smaller than coal power in China, this is a significant down payment.
Solar costs fell from over $1,000/MWh in 1980 to about $200 in 2010, wind to about $100, projected to be below coal costs by 2025-2030
| Indicator | China | United States |
|---|---|---|
| Capital Investment as % of GDP | 50% | 16% |
| Federal Debt as % of GDP | - | >70% |
| Annual Debt Growth | - | 6% of GDP |
| Solar Target Increase (3 years) | 65% | Politically infeasible currently |
The two favorable factors (progress in storage and smart grids), combined with luck and improved leadership, may buy us enough time to readjust our agricultural systems. This will require decades to change attitudes, build infrastructure, train personnel, and conduct research to achieve full agricultural sustainability. A stable environment will allow us to tackle the most time-consuming problem: shortages of metal supplies. While aluminum and iron ore are abundant, cheap supplies of other useful metals will diminish this century and must be replaced with organic alternatives.
Hanging over this race between destructive and regenerative forces are rising temperatures, slowly rising sea levels, ocean acidification, and, most importantly, instability in agricultural weather. Even if the cavalry arrives in time to prevent a major disaster (a partial collapse of civilization), environmental damage and biodiversity loss will continue. But through improved behavior, we may buy enough time to save humanity itself and most of what we value.
The terrible thing about the climate problem is its inherent unpredictability in terms of timing and magnitude. To avoid accusations of exaggeration, scientists systematically underestimate the situation. As reported by the New York Times, the scientific consensus is that sea levels will rise about 3 feet this century, possibly 6 feet, requiring the evacuation of millions. But many scientists fear their calculations are too conservative and that social stability will ultimately be threatened. Project leader Dr. Raymo noted: "As knowledge grows, we always find that the climate system is more sensitive than we thought, not less."
The bottom line is: if we focus our efforts, we can overcome normal inertia and exceptionally powerful vested interests. The global population may begin to slowly decline in a few decades; a fertility rate of 1.8% or lower would allow the population to gracefully fall back to a sustainable 4 billion by 2200. Progress in alternative energy is certain, and other scientific advances (especially in computing power) will also help. Whether we can act fast enough in these areas while reducing greenhouse gas emissions to avoid falling off a cliff is uncertain, but every minute saved and every improvement increases our odds. Let the race begin.
The following is a supplementary analysis of the continuation content, focusing on the unique role of disclaimers and copyright notices in academic and investment literature, and their potential connection to the main theme.
Looking back at this 2013 disclaimer from 2025, its value extends beyond its legal function:
In summary, the disclaimer and copyright notice are not merely legal appendages but an organic part of Grantham's narrative strategy: by isolating risk and constructing authority, they provide legitimacy and credibility for the radical arguments in the main text.