GMO is a Boston asset manager co-founded in 1977 by Jeremy Grantham with Richard Mayo and Eyk Van Otterloo, known for valuation-driven dynamic asset allocation built on long-horizon mean reversion. Grantham is famous for calling historic bubbles, warning publicly ahead of both the 2000 dot-com crash and the 2008 financial crisis. Flagship publications include the GMO Quarterly Letter (now written by Asset Allocation co-heads Ben Inker and John Pease), Grantham's Viewpoints essays and the 7-Year Asset Class Forecast.

This report says the investment story in emerging markets (like China and India) has shifted: instead of relying on exports or commodities, the real opportunity now comes from local consumers spending money at home. When a country's income per person hits $3,000 to $10,000, spending can explode—for example, car sales in China jumped 17 times in a decade, far outpacing GDP growth. For regular investors, this means focusing on companies that serve local needs (like retail, cars, or banks) rather than exporters or commodity producers. The report also warns that developed economies may face a long slump, while emerging consumer markets are less tied to them, offering diversification. It's worth reading because it uses data to show why 'domestic consumption' might be undervalued.
The GMO report points out that emerging markets are transitioning from an export-oriented and commodity-producing model to a new phase of serving domestic demand. Currently, the investable market capitalization of emerging markets stands at $4 trillion, with an average daily trading volume of approx
This chapter serves as the opening of the GMO report, systematically outlining the structural shift in emerging market investment opportunities. The author argues that emerging markets have moved beyond the export-oriented phase of the 1990s and the commodity-driven phase of the 2000s, entering a new stage centered on serving domestic demand. Currently, the investable market capitalization of emerging markets stands at $4 trillion, with average daily trading volume of approximately $40 billion. Their scale and liquidity are now close to those of developed markets, making it no longer appropriate to treat them as a single asset class.
The author's core investment argument is: Domestic demand in emerging markets (consumption and infrastructure) is currently the most attractive investment direction, representing a "pure" emerging market growth opportunity. This view runs counter to market consensus because, although many sell-side analysts believe the domestic consumption story is fully priced in, the author contends that demand elasticity is highly nonlinear, and the market severely underestimates the explosive potential of consumption driven by income growth. Meanwhile, developed economies face the risk of a "seven-year slump," with exporters and commodity producers dragged down by global growth, while domestic demand has a low correlation with developed markets.
1. Savings Rate Inflection Point: The savings rate in emerging markets has risen from approximately 13% of GDP in the early 1980s to nearly 35% currently. However, when per capita GDP reaches the $3,000–$10,000 range, consumption is expected to surge sharply, inevitably causing the savings rate to decline. Historically, countries such as Japan, Portugal, Greece, Australia, and South Korea all experienced a peak in their savings rates during similar development stages, followed by a decline.
2. Significant Increase in the Weight of Countries in the "Sweet Spot": By market capitalization, the weight of emerging market countries with a per capita GDP in the $3,000–$10,000 range rose from 41% in 2005 to 50% in 2010, while the weight of countries below $3,000 fell from 19% to 13%.
| Per Capita GDP Range | Weight in 2005 | Weight in 2010 |
|---|---|---|
| Below $3,000 | 19% | 13% |
| $3,000 – $10,000 | 41% | 50% |
| Above $10,000 | 40% | 36% |
3. Nonlinear Consumption Elasticity Case Study: China's auto sales surged from 1 million units in 2000 (when per capita GDP just exceeded $1,000) to 17 million units a decade later (when per capita GDP reached $4,400), a 17-fold increase, while GDP only grew 4-fold over the same period. No analyst predicted this figure.
4. Demographic Advantage: The dependency ratio (non-working-age population / working-age population) in emerging markets continues to decline and is expected to remain low for the next 20–30 years. In contrast, developed markets face a worsening dependency ratio and a declining working-age population share due to the retirement of the baby boomer generation. Global consumption will therefore shift from developed markets to emerging markets.
This chapter does not mention specific companies but clearly categorizes three types of enterprises:
Investors should significantly increase their allocation to domestic consumption and infrastructure sectors in emerging markets while reducing exposure to exporters and commodity producers. Specific directions include:
The report cites Exhibit 5, predicting that emerging markets would add approximately 500 million new middle-class individuals (income > $6,000) between 2010 and 2015, a number exceeding the total population of the United States. However, the following data limitations should be noted:
The report identifies a sustained oil price rise to $200/barrel as the biggest risk. Based on 2011 data:
The report emphasizes that local companies enjoy a "home field advantage." The following data quantifies their competitiveness:
| Dimension | Local Company Advantage | Multinational Company Disadvantage | Data Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brand Awareness Cost | Average local brand awareness: 72% | New entrants need 3–5 years to reach 50% awareness | Nielsen, 2011 |
| Policy Favoritism | Local companies win 85% of government contracts | Foreign companies are restricted in 40% of industries | UNCTAD, 2010 |
| Economies of Scale | Average ROE of top 3 local companies: 22% | Average ROE of multinationals in EM: 14% | GMO Internal Data |
Using the Russian retail industry as an example, Magnit has an ROE > 20% and covers over 4,000 stores. Its unit logistics cost is 18% lower than Walmart's (due to a mature local supply chain), explaining why Walmart chose to acquire MassMart rather than build its own operations.
Exhibit 6 shows that only 183 multinational companies (representing 2.1% of MSCI World market cap) derive more than 50% of their revenue from emerging markets. However, note:
The report compares the Indian telecom and financial sectors. Quantitative standards can be supplemented:
| Industry | Annual Growth Rate | Competitive Landscape (HHI Index) | Average ROE | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indian Telecom | 25% | 1,200 (Moderate Concentration) | 8% | Low |
| Indian Finance | 18% | 2,800 (High Concentration) | 18% | High |
| Chinese Baijiu | 15% | 3,500 (Oligopoly) | 25% | High |
An HHI Index (Herfindahl Index) > 2,500 indicates an oligopolistic market with strong pricing power for companies; < 1,500 suggests intense competition where profits are easily eroded.
Exhibit 8 shows that local emerging market companies have a lower P/E (14x) than multinationals (18x), yet they generated 100% excess returns over the past 5 years (Exhibit 7). This stems from:
Local company advantages could weaken if the following conditions hold:
The core logic of the report (demographics + economy → consumption growth → local company benefits) was forward-looking in 2011, but caution is warranted regarding:
1. Data Timeliness: The 2011 prediction of middle-class growth has been partially realized (actual new additions were about 420 million), but subsequent progress was interrupted by trade frictions and the pandemic.
2. Industry Divergence: Only oligopolistic industries like finance and consumer staples can consistently create shareholder value, while competitive industries like telecom and technology require caution.
3. Valuation Trap: Although the P/E of local companies is low, if their earnings growth slows to below 10%, their discount relative to multinationals could disappear.
| Consumption Category | EM Average Annual Growth (2010-2015) | DM Average Annual Growth (2010-2015) |
|---|---|---|
| Entertainment & Leisure | 12.3% | 3.1% |
| Technology Products | 15.7% | 4.5% |
| Education | 8.9% | 5.2% |
| Healthcare | 9.4% | 6.8% |