Bonsai Partners is a one-person boutique partnership founded in 2018 by Andrew Rosenblum (ex-Matrix Capital) near San Diego, California. It runs a highly concentrated portfolio of 5–15 long-term holdings of high-quality, undervalued businesses, with a notable tilt toward overlooked Australian and New Zealand small caps.

This is Bonsai Partners Fund's Q1 2022 letter. The fund lost 17.8%, worse than the market, but the manager sees market panic as a chance to buy good companies cheap. He introduces 're-founders': non-founder CEOs who, after a decade or more, act like founders with long-term thinking. He also explains a new investment, Elastic NV, which uses free software to attract users and then sells premium services, creating strong customer loyalty. Worth reading for a calm take on investing during downturns.
Bonsai Partners Fund's net return for the first quarter of 2022 was -17.8%, while the S&P 500 total return index declined -4.6% over the same period. The report reviewed the fund's performance since its inception in October 2018, with an annualized net return of 39.3%. Founder Andrew noted that the
This chapter opens the Bonsai Partners Fund Q1 2022 investor letter. The fund posted a net return of -17.8% in Q1, significantly underperforming the S&P 500 Total Return Index's -4.6%. Author Andrew uses personal career setbacks as a lead-in, arguing that the current market decline creates opportunities for future excess returns, and introduces one of the fund's stock selection logics — the concept of "re-founders".
| Metric | YTD 2022 | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | Cumulative Since Inception | Annualized Since Inception |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bonsai Gross Return | -17.6% | -13.9% | 277.9% | 60.3% | -17.6% | 254.3% | 44.5% |
| Bonsai Net Return | -17.8% | -14.8% | 247.9% | 56.1% | -17.7% | 212.8% | 39.3% |
| S&P 500 Return | -4.6% | 28.7% | 18.4% | 31.5% | -8.6% | 74.6% | 17.6% |
> Note: The figures in the table are presented as in the original text. The 2021 column numbers (-13.9%/-14.8%) do not match the fund's actual full-year 2021 returns (Gross 277.9%/Net 247.9%), which may be a typesetting or labeling error in the original. They are listed here as per the original text.
This chapter discusses the phenomenon of "Re-founders"—moments when a CEO reshapes the company according to their own values and thus develops a deep personal identification with the firm. The author argues that such "re-founding moments" are critical turning points for a company's long-term success.
The author's key judgment is that when a company's CEO undergoes a "re-founding moment," the company is no longer just a job but becomes an extension of the CEO's personal identity. This state of deeply tying long-term success to personal identity is a significant driver for the company's ability to consistently generate excess returns.
This chapter is a qualitative discussion and does not provide specific financial data or historical case studies. The author merely describes the definition and characteristics of the "re-founding moment," without citing any numbers, comparisons, or empirical research. Therefore, the argument lacks quantitative supporting evidence.
This chapter does not mention any specific company or security name.
For investors, this concept suggests paying attention to companies whose CEOs have undergone major strategic or cultural overhauls and have deeply embedded their personal values into the company's operations. Such companies often demonstrate stronger long-term execution capabilities. However, investors need to assess whether a "re-founding moment" has genuinely occurred by reviewing financial reports, management interviews, shareholder letters, and other materials. Due to the lack of data validation, this viewpoint is more suitable as a supplementary reference in qualitative analysis rather than as a standalone basis for investment decisions.
This chapter discusses how to identify whether a non-founder CEO genuinely possesses a founder’s mindset—that is, whether they become a “re-founder.” The author argues that this assessment requires an extremely long time horizon, far exceeding the evaluation periods typically granted to management by the market.
The author’s core investment thesis is: Only after more than a decade of observation in office can it be confirmed whether a non-founder CEO truly thinks and acts like a founder. No short-term performance is sufficient to support the label of “re-founder.” This judgment runs counter to the market—which often quickly labels management as “outstanding” after performance improvements—while the author insists on a multi-decade validation.
| Category | Confirmed re-founder | Potential re-founder |
|---|---|---|
| Tenure requirement | Over ten years | Requires years more observation |
| Certainty of judgment | Confirmed | Uncertain |
Investors should not casually regard a non-founder CEO as a “re-founder-style leader,” especially when their tenure is less than ten years. Over-trusting short-term performance may obscure a CEO’s deviation from the founder’s culture. A long-term holding strategy must be matched by a time-based verification of management’s true mindset—if a company undergoes a leadership change, the non-founder identity of the new CEO inherently means more time is needed to determine whether they truly carry forward the founder’s motivation and resilience.
This chapter discusses how management’s genuine commitment affects investment returns. The report argues that investors are generally willing to pay a premium for “founder-led companies,” but what truly matters is managers’ actions rather than their titles. In difficult times, the real quality of leaders emerges, offering opportunities to identify “re-founders”—leaders with a founder’s mindset but without the founder title.
The report’s core investment thesis is: Investors should not pay a premium for a founder title; instead, they should identify managers who demonstrate long-term commitment through actions during adversity—whom the author calls “re-founders.” The contrarian insight is that markets typically overvalue the founder label while undervaluing the excess returns that non-founder managers with a founder mindset can generate.
This chapter provides no specific data or cases, relying purely on logical reasoning:
| Concept | Common Market Practice | Author’s Recommendation |
|---|---|---|
| Founder label | Pay a premium | Do not pay a premium; identify through actions |
| Management commitment | Believe verbal statements | Observe actual behavior during adversity |
This chapter does not mention any specific companies or assets.
Investors should abandon the strategy of simply chasing the founder title and instead focus on the following:
This chapter discusses two key actions taken by the Bonsai Partners Fund in the first quarter of 2022: first, investing in operational processes and personnel (e.g., bringing in an outsourced CFO to improve back-office functions), and second, adding a new position (Elastic NV) to the portfolio while reducing an existing position (Redbubble). Against this backdrop, the author describes how the fund aims to enhance long-term returns by optimizing internal workflows and selecting individual stocks in a challenging market environment.
The author’s core investment thesis is: Elastic NV (ESTC) is a long-term investment opportunity with multiple growth drivers, and its fundamentals are undervalued by the market. Although the company’s name emphasizes “search,” more than half of its revenue in fact comes from areas beyond traditional search, such as Security and Observability. This forms a counterintuitive judgment—the market may simply categorize Elastic as a “search company” while overlooking its platform-based, multi-scenario potential.
Bonsai Fund year-to-date net return of -17.8%, annualized net return since inception of 39.3%, compared to S&P 500 return of -4.6% over the same period
| Solution | Function Description |
|---|---|
| Security | Logging, detection, and alerting for anomalous network activity |
| Observability | Monitoring, data collection, and visualization of internal system activity |
| Enterprise Search | Centralized search and data analysis based on Elasticsearch |
This chapter delves into how Elasticsearch (ticker: ESTC) leverages a free, open-source software model to build and continuously expand its enterprise search business. The report focuses on the unique value of the open-source community, its "bottom-up" sales strategy, a node-based pricing model, and the growth logic behind high net revenue retention. This provides investors with a clear framework for understanding the competitive moats and profitability models of modern open-source software companies.
The author's core investment thesis is: Elastic's open-source community is not a financial burden, but rather its most critical competitive advantage. Through community-driven network effects, it builds moats in R&D efficiency, low-cost expansion, and engineering talent acquisition that are difficult for competitors to replicate.
The report also highlights a counterintuitive judgment: Unlike the high-cost "top-down" sales model of traditional software companies, Elastic's approach of letting users "come to them" (bottom-up) significantly reduces sales expenses and improves conversion efficiency, enabling stronger customer loyalty at a lower cost.
1. Network Effects of the Open-Source Community:
2. Unique Sales Model ("Bottom-Up" vs. "Top-Down"):
The report points out that Elastic's model acts like a "Trojan horse": Developers can download and use it for free without management approval due to its free and customizable nature. Once usage becomes a critical part of the company's technology stack, users actively seek paid plans. In contrast, traditional competitors (using the "top-down" model) need to conduct comprehensive bidding first, resulting in higher sales costs.
| Sales Model | Representative Company | Core Logic | Sales Efficiency |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bottom-up | Elastic | Individual developers use for free, demand-driven | Extremely high (customers come proactively) |
| Top-down | Traditional Competitors | Management decision, comprehensive bidding | Relatively low (requires "door-breaking" sales) |
3. Business Model and Net Revenue Retention:
This chapter discusses Elastic (ESTC)'s customer expansion strategy. The report argues that Elastic's "bottom-up" adoption model creates a natural diffusion effect within existing customers: after initial success in one department, the product gradually penetrates other teams, thereby driving an increase in customer lifetime value.
The author believes that existing customers deploying Elasticsearch across internal teams is one of the core drivers of Elastic's future growth. This model naturally expands the paying user base without additional sales costs, and the expansion cycle is typically long, offering sustainability.
The original text does not provide specific data, but the report supports the thesis based on the following logic:
| Argument | Description |
|---|---|
| Adoption Path | After successful implementation in a single department (e.g., the operations team), internal word-of-mouth and demonstrated results gradually attract other departments (e.g., security, log analysis, business insights) to deploy Elasticsearch on their own. |
| Expansion Driver | Horizontal expansion across departments does not rely on traditional sales-driven land-and-expand; instead, it grows organically from user demand, reducing customer acquisition costs. |
| Upsell Potential | Each newly deploying team becomes a new paid node or increases usage on existing licenses, creating a revenue compounding effect. |
The report does not provide specific expansion ratios or revenue contribution data but emphasizes that this model is a key differentiator for Elastic compared to traditional enterprise software vendors.
Investors should focus on Elastic's Net Dollar Retention and growth in enterprise customer count. If the pace of internal team expansion among existing customers accelerates, it will directly improve revenue quality and reduce sales expense ratios, making these key metrics for evaluating whether the valuation premium is justified.
This chapter discusses the cross-selling potential among existing customers of Elastic (NYSE: ESTC). The report notes that although Elastic already has three core use cases—enterprise search, observability, and security—more than half of high-value customers currently use only one of these products, leaving significant room for incremental penetration.
The report argues that Elastic’s unified platform architecture and single-pricing model (as opposed to charging per product) will significantly lower the barrier for customers to deploy new solutions, driving existing high-paying customers to expand from single-use cases to multi-use cases. This represents one of the most certain sources of future revenue growth for the company.
| Metric | Data |
|---|---|
| Share of single-use-case customers with annual spending ≥$100K | >50% |
| Elastic platform pricing model | Unified platform, single pricing |
Elastic's net expansion rate has consistently exceeded 130% since its IPO; customer spending grows 2.1x in two years and 3.2x in four years
Investors should monitor changes in the average number of products used by high-value customers over the coming quarters. If the share of single-use-case customers starts to decline (e.g., from >50% to below 40%), it would validate the cross-selling thesis and could serve as a catalyst for share price upside. At the current stage, this thesis has not yet been fully priced into the market.
This chapter focuses on Elastic's cost advantage relative to its competitors and analyzes how this advantage could influence market share shifts in the context of a potential economic slowdown. The market environment is facing macroeconomic uncertainty, and enterprise customers' sensitivity to IT spending costs is increasing.
The author argues that Elastic's core competitive moat lies in its significant cost advantage—competitor Splunk's pricing is approximately 5 times that of Elastic's comparable solution. This cost gap will drive incremental workloads to continue migrating from high-cost competitors to Elastic, and this dynamic will become even more pronounced during an economic slowdown.
| Metric | Elastic Logstash | Splunk (Competitor) |
|---|---|---|
| Relative cost benchmark | 1x | ~5x |
| Pricing model | Annual billing, based on data consumption | Annual billing, based on data consumption |
Investors should focus on the possibility that Elastic leverages its cost advantage to accelerate enterprise customer acquisition during an economic downturn, while higher-cost competitors like Splunk may face growth pressure and valuation downgrades. It is recommended to overweight Elastic and underweight Splunk.
This chapter focuses on the trend of customers migrating from self-managed Elasticsearch to Elastic Cloud. The author argues that as enterprises migrate more workloads to the cloud, their Elastic deployments will follow suit—a structural shift that will significantly improve Elastic’s business model.
Direct judgment: Elastic Cloud will replace self-managed solutions as the mainstream. The author explicitly states that customers prefer Elastic Cloud over self-managed options because contract values are significantly higher—Elastic profits not only from software licenses but also from compute and storage resources.
| Comparison Dimension | Self-Managed | Elastic Cloud |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue Source | Software license only | Software revenue + compute + storage revenue |
| Per-contract Unit Value | Low | Significantly higher |
| Customer Stickiness | Lower (can migrate away) | Higher (tied to cloud infrastructure) |
Investors should focus on Elastic’s cloud migration rate and average revenue per contract (ARPC) trends. If enterprise customers accelerate the shift from self-managed to Elastic Cloud, it means Elastic’s revenue quality will improve (from low-margin software licenses to high-margin SaaS + infrastructure fees), while customer lifetime value will also increase. This is a classic value-revaluation narrative of transitioning from a software company to a cloud infrastructure platform.
This chapter discusses the operational complexity of Elastic (Elastic N.V.) products. The fund previously noted that the current market downturn creates opportunities for long-term returns, and as Elastic is one of its potential holdings, its maintenance costs and technical barriers are key factors in evaluating its investment value.
The author argues that maintaining Elastic clusters is more complex than off-the-shelf commercial software. This means that enterprise customers using Elastic need to invest dedicated engineering resources to ensure resource adequacy, version updates, and data distribution, which increases customers' total cost of ownership (TCO) and may affect product competitiveness.
The original text does not provide specific data or cases, only qualitatively stating that maintenance requires continuous attention from engineers. This section lacks numerical support, but in the context of the overall report (the fund seeking opportunities after a sharp decline in growth stocks), this assessment may point to challenges Elastic faces in customer development efficiency.
Investors should pay attention to the relationship between Elastic's customer acquisition cost (CAC) and customer lifetime value (LTV). If maintenance complexity forces customers to hire additional engineers, it may reduce the willingness of small and medium-sized enterprises to adopt the product, increasing the risk of customer churn. Against the backdrop of significant valuation pullback (more than half of NASDAQ stocks have declined), it is necessary to verify whether the product has a sufficient moat to absorb this cost disadvantage.
This chapter analyzes the core challenges and opportunities currently facing Elastic (ticker: ESTC). The report argues that Elastic's sales personnel struggle to convince developers to pay for open-source software they already use for free, which slows new customer acquisition. At the same time, the company faces a competitive threat from Amazon Web Services (AWS). The report's core thesis is that Elastic is gradually mitigating these risks through its cloud service transition (Elastic Cloud) and legal measures, and is on track to achieve profitable growth.
The author's core investment thesis is bullish on Elastic, believing that the company is successfully transforming from an open-source software company into a SaaS cloud services company, which can effectively resolve the sales bottleneck and improve profit margins. The report presents a contrarian assessment: despite fierce competition from Amazon, the author believes Amazon is not an "Elastic killer." The author judges that Elastic is pulling away from Amazon through legal action and faster technological iteration.
1. Solution to the Sales Conversion Bottleneck: Developers are accustomed to using Elasticsearch for free, but the sales-led conversion to paid usage is low and sales costs are high. Elastic Cloud, as a pure paid managed service, significantly reduces friction for paid adoption by automating resource provisioning, lowering the entry cost (a few hundred USD per month vs. thousands per month for a single node), and providing trials of all paid features.
2. High Growth of Elastic Cloud: Data directly demonstrates the success of the cloud transition. Elastic Cloud's revenue share increased from 18.5% at the end of 2019 to 38% in the most recent quarter.
3. Margin Improvement: Elastic Cloud's sales process is more self-service oriented, reducing the need for sales support and customer onboarding resources, thereby improving sales team efficiency. The report argues that the combination of higher revenue per customer and lower operating expenditure is the decisive reason why Elastic achieved positive cash flow in its fiscal year ending April 31, 2022, and expects its profitability to continue improving over the coming years.
4. Open-Source Community and GitHub Activity Comparison: In response to competition from Amazon, the report demonstrates Elastic's advantage by comparing developer community activity. Specific data is presented in the table below:
| Comparison Dimension | Elasticsearch (Elastic) | Opensearch (Amazon) | Multiples Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Number of Active Contributors | Significantly higher | Significantly lower | 3x - 6x |
| Number of Pull Requests | Significantly higher | Significantly lower | 3x - 6x |
| Number of Code Commits | Significantly higher | Significantly lower | 3x - 6x |
1. Favor SaaS Cloud Transformation: Investors should prioritize companies that can successfully convert free/open-source users into paying SaaS customers. Elastic has lowered the barrier to adoption and increased ARPU and margins through Elastic Cloud. This model validates the sustainability of its business.
2. Avoid Excessive Fear in Direct Competition: When facing competition from giants like Amazon, one should not dismiss the target outright. Through legal measures (brand protection) and technology (continuous iteration), Elastic has proven its ability to maintain leadership and widen the gap in its niche. This provides an evaluation framework for investing in other companies facing similar threats.
3. Focus on the Profitability Inflection Point: Elastic is expected to turn cash flow positive in fiscal 2022, with profitability expanding as Elastic Cloud penetration increases. This points to an investment thesis centered on net profit improvement, and investors should monitor the release of operating leverage.
The appended fund legal documentation in the follow-up article is not irrelevant; rather, it reveals how formalized, heavily disclaimed sales materials exacerbate developer distrust. The core predicament for Elastic salespeople is not only a lack of product differentiation, but a deficiency of trust infrastructure — they cannot rely on performance commitments and legal protections as in traditional B2B sales, because developers' decision-making logic is based on "verifiable facts" rather than "disclaimers." Every risk disclosure in the Bonsai letter has a corresponding "open-source alternative" benchmark in the developer community, making any paid proposition appear costly with uncertain returns.