This is a monthly factsheet for Baillie Gifford's high-yield bond fund — a fund that buys riskier corporate bonds paying higher interest. The fund aims for income plus some price gain; it beat its peers over three years but lagged slightly over the past six months. Managers don't forecast rates or the economy; they say they pick bonds company by company and hold 90–120 names patiently. Top holdings include UK Treasury (largest, a safe anchor), Cirsa Finance (European gaming/leisure), and Asmodee (a board-game group), all major bond positions.
Baillie Gifford High Yield Bond Fund (as of June 30, 2026) is an actively managed high-yield bond fund that invests in sub-investment grade bonds in Europe and the US, seeking income and capital growth, with a portfolio typically holding 90–120 companies. The fund has assets of £227.79m and is manag
Monthly data not disclosed; as of June 30, 2026, the fund returned 1.9% over the past six months, underperforming the IA £ High Yield sector average of 2.3% by 0.4 percentage points. Over the past year, 6.0% vs 6.1%; over three years annualized, 9.6% vs 8.5%, an outperformance.
| Metric | 6 months | 1 year | 3-year annualized | 5-year annualized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fund Class B-Inc | 1.9% | 6.0% | 9.6% | 3.3% |
| IA £ High Yield sector average | 2.3% | 6.1% | 8.5% | 3.7% |
| Excess return | -0.4pp | -0.1pp | +1.1pp | -0.4pp |
Sector ranking: 23/31 over six months, 16/31 over one year, 6/29 over three years, 20/29 over five years — the fund entered the sector's top six on a three-year basis but slid to the bottom quartile over the past six months. Annual discrete performance (fiscal years ending June 30):
| Year period | Fund | IA £ High Yield sector average | Excess |
|---|---|---|---|
| 30/06/21-30/06/22 | -15.1% | -12.5% | -2.6pp |
| 30/06/22-30/06/23 | 5.4% | 7.1% | -1.7pp |
| 30/06/23-30/06/24 | 12.8% | 10.7% | +2.1pp |
| 30/06/24-30/06/25 | 10.2% | 8.8% | +1.4pp |
| 30/06/25-30/06/26 | 6.0% | 6.1% | -0.1pp |
The annual data shows that excess returns were concentrated in the two fiscal years spanning 2023-2025; across the other three fiscal years, the fund underperformed or matched.
[Neutral/Not stated] The report offers no explicit outlook on the direction of interest rates, credit spreads, or the economic cycle; it only states the investment methodology. The fund is positioned as global best ideas, sterling-hedged, investing in sub-investment-grade bonds in Europe and the US, with the objective of combining income and capital growth; the manager regards the IA Sterling High Yield Sector average as an appropriate comparator benchmark.
The manager's own account sets out three core claims:
1. Bond selection criteria: invest in attractively valued bonds issued by resilient companies — "We aim to invest in attractively valued bonds issued by resilient companies."
2. Research approach: emphasizes detailed bottom-up research, sizing positions according to the strength of conviction in each opportunity's prospects and risks.
3. Portfolio construction: patient and flexible, investing with concentration in 90-120 companies — "investing with conviction in 90-120 companies".
Derivatives will be used for hedging purposes, and the manager states there is no intention to significantly alter the portfolio's overall risk profile through the use of derivatives.
The report discloses no new positions, additions, reductions, or exits during the period; the following is the existing structure as of June 30. The top ten issuers account for approximately 19.9% of the portfolio in aggregate (calculated from the original data).
| Issuer | % of assets |
|---|---|
| UK Treasury | 2.7% |
| Cirsa Finance International S.à r.l. | 2.2% |
| Asmodee Group AB (publ) | 2.1% |
| B&M Retail | 1.9% |
| EDF | 1.8% |
| Lottomatica Group S.p.A. | 1.7% |
| CPI Property Group | 1.7% |
| Deluxe Corp | 1.6% |
| SoftBank Group | 1.6% |
| Shift4 Payments, Inc. | 1.6% |
Credit rating distribution ( denotes Baillie Gifford internal ratings): AA 2.7%, BBB 6.0%, BB* 45.4%, B 39.3%, CCC-D 1.1%, cash and derivatives 5.6%.
Sector distribution: Retail 10.6%, Financial Services 8.7%, Leisure 8.0%, Banking 7.9%, Media 7.5%, Basic Industry 7.0%, Health Care 6.8%, Telecommunications 6.2%, Services 5.4%, Automotive 5.2%, Consumer Goods 4.5%, Real Estate 3.6%, Asset Backed 3.1%, Utility 2.9%, Sovereign 2.7%, Capital Goods 2.3%, Energy 2.3%, Others -0.2%, Cash & Derivatives 5.6%.
Geographic distribution: Europe 41.7%, UK 26.7%, North America 22.8%, Emerging Markets 1.7%, Developed Asia 1.6%, cash and derivatives 5.6%.
Fund size £227.79m; fund managers Arthur Milson and Faisal Islam; launched November 30, 2001; currently 90 issuers (typical range 90-120); structured as an OEIC.
This seemingly unremarkable line reveals the special positioning of the fund factsheet within the regulatory framework: it is not a statutory Key Investor Information Document (KIID), but rather marketing supplementary material. The rounding statement is essentially a disclaimer-first measure — preventing investors from making investment decisions based on NAV or yield data precise to the decimal point. The regulatory logic is that the factsheet does not bear the "accurate, consistent, comparable" information obligations of the KIID, so it must proactively lower investors' expectations of data precision through such statements to avoid future disputes.
This copyright notice embeds three layers of legal design:
| Layer | Content | Function |
|---|---|---|
| Licensing identifier | Clear attribution of the ICE® and BOFA® trademarks | Indicates the third-party licensed nature of the index (presumably the ICE BofA high-yield bond index series) |
| Disclaimer scope | "as is" principle + no warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose | Excludes all liability for damages arising from defects in the index data |
| Non-endorsement statement | ICE Data does not "sponsor, endorse or recommend" Baillie Gifford | Severs the credit transmission between the index provider and the fund product |
There is a notable contradiction worth highlighting here: Baillie Gifford uses this index as its performance comparator benchmark, yet the index provider explicitly states that it does not endorse the fund. This means the choice of benchmark is merely a unilateral performance reference and does not constitute a third-party credit endorsement of the fund's quality. This is of practical significance when investors assess the "relationship between the fund and its benchmark" — benchmark drift or changes in index construction rules may affect the reasonableness of the performance comparison, but the fund company has no right to intervene.
This is the implementation in marketing documents of product governance obligations under the PROD (Product Intervention and Product Governance Sourcebook) rules of the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
The underlying logic is that high-yield bond funds have substantial NAV volatility and high credit risk exposure, and their allocation value can only materialize over holding periods of more than three years. The negative exclusion is not a regulatory mandate, but a self-regulatory measure by which the fund company fulfills its obligation to "act in the client's best interests". A fund that can explicitly state "who it is not suitable for" is more prudent in governance than a fund that only states "who it is suitable for" — because what regulators care most about is whether vulnerable investors are induced into purchasing unsuitable products.
These five notices (Israel, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Mexico) show the differences in the legal pathways for the fund to be lawfully sold in each country's market. The core differences can be presented in tabular form:
| Country | Legal basis | Registration obligation | Investor type restrictions | Core constraints |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Israel | First Schedule of the Securities Law + First Schedule of the Investment Advice Law | None (relies on dual qualification) | Dual status of "mature investor" + "qualified customer" | Investors must satisfy both sets of criteria simultaneously |
| Colombia | No specific provision cited | Explicitly not registered | Not specified, but directed at private placement | No public offering and no trading on an exchange |
| Chile | General Rule NCG No. 336 (CMF) | Explicitly not registered | Not restricted, but public offering prohibited | Issuer has no local public disclosure obligations |
| Peru | SMV regulation | Explicitly not registered | Institutional investors only | Non-institutional investors must proactively refrain; the strictest wording |
| Mexico | Article 8 of the Securities Market Law | Explicitly not registered | Qualified investors + institutional investors | Relies on private placement exemption; no public sale |
Two key insights stand out:
First, the Peruvian notice is the most forceful in its exclusionary wording on investor status — "Persons and/or entities that do not qualify as institutional investors should refrain from participating" — which shifts compliance responsibility onto investors themselves: if one does not qualify and still purchases, the responsibility is one's own.
Second, the Chilean notice has the most distinctive structure — it directly cites CMF General Rule No. 336 (Norma de Carácter General N° 336), the facilitation channel for "private placement of foreign funds" established in Chile after 2012, which allows eligible foreign funds to sell to investors within a specified scope without local registration. In its notice, Baillie Gifford lists items (i) through (v) one by one, effectively embedding the full text of the disclosure obligations required by Chilean law and further reducing the review burden on local regulators.
The rating comes from Fund Research Centre, which sits under the Embark Group. What needs to be clarified is:
From the perspective of information value, the persuasiveness of such commercial ratings depends on methodological transparency. As part of the factsheet, the appearance of this rating is a marketing signal rather than independent investment analysis — it leverages a third-party assessment to enhance the fund's credibility, but does not disclose the rating methodology, fee relationships, or potential conflicts of interest. This differs fundamentally from rating systems approved by regulators (such as the FCA).
This phrase on the contact page reflects the telephone recording obligation under the MiFID II framework. Its purpose is that if a telephone consultation involves investment advice or trading instructions, the recording can serve as compliance evidence. Its presence indicates that Baillie Gifford's client communication process has an embedded, complete compliance recording chain, and that the fund sales process is subject to systematic oversight — which also indirectly suggests that the fund faces fairly stringent regulatory requirements in the UK retail distribution channel.
The overall design of the factsheet exhibits the characteristics of "layered disclosure":
This design places the factsheet legally in the category of "marketing communication" rather than "regulatory disclosure", thereby affording it greater freedom of expression, while building a closed compliance loop through multi-layered links. If investors read only the factsheet without consulting the KIID and Prospectus, the fund company has legally fulfilled its duty of guidance, and the responsibility for incomplete information rests with the investors themselves.