Baillie Gifford Developed Asia Pacific Fund Factsheet
In plain words
This fund report covers Baillie Gifford's Developed Asia Pacific fund. It rose 17.6% over six months, beating its benchmark, but trailed badly over one and five years. The manager gives no explicit market view, only saying it invests with a five-year horizon and favors growth stocks. Top holdings include Tokyo Electron (semiconductor equipment) and United Overseas Bank (Singapore bank), each about 5% of assets, and SoftBank Group (tech investor) at about 3.4%. Note the fund is heavily Japanese and excludes emerging markets, so comparing it with peers that include them can mislead.
The Baillie Gifford Developed Asia Pacific Fund report shows that the fund aims to outperform the MSCI Pacific Index in GBP terms over rolling five-year periods, employing an active long-term growth strategy and investing in developed Asia-Pacific markets such as Japan and Australia, with no exposur
This Month's Scorecard
The fund returned 17.6% over the past six months, outperforming the MSCI Pacific benchmark (14.6%) by 3.0 percentage points; however, its one-year return of 19.7% lagged the benchmark (27.9%) by 8.2 percentage points, and the five-year annualised return of 0.4% versus the benchmark's 9.3% leaves a long-term gap of 8.9 percentage points.
| Metric | Past 6 Months | Past 1 Year | Past 3 Years (annualised) | Past 5 Years (annualised) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fund Class B-Acc | 17.6% | 19.7% | 8.0% | 0.4% |
| MSCI Pacific Index | 14.6% | 27.9% | 15.2% | 9.3% |
| IA sector average | 20.2% | 33.8% | 13.9% | 5.0% |
| Excess (vs Index) | +3.0pp | -8.2pp | -7.2pp | -8.9pp |
Annual discrete performance (for years ended 30 June):
| Period | Fund | Index | Sector Average |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021/06-2022/06 | -21.4% | -6.6% | -13.6% |
| 2022/06-2023/06 | 3.1% | 8.9% | -0.1% |
| 2023/06-2024/06 | 2.4% | 12.0% | 7.0% |
| 2024/06-2025/06 | 2.8% | 6.9% | 3.4% |
| 2025/06-2026/06 | 19.7% | 27.9% | 33.8% |
The sector rankings follow a "the longer the period, the further down the rank" pattern: 6/11 over the past six months, 8/11 over one year, 10/11 over three years and 9/9 over five years — the past six months is the only window within this report period in which the fund outperformed the benchmark, while the fund lagged the index in every annual interval and ranked last among the nine peer funds over five years.
Who Contributed, Who Detracted
The report only discloses the top ten holdings' weights and provides no contribution/detraction attribution for individual securities; the source of excess returns cannot be determined from this document.
| Holding | % of Assets |
|---|---|
| Baillie Gifford Japanese Smaller Cos Fund | 5.7% |
| Tokyo Electron | 5.0% |
| United Overseas Bank | 5.0% |
| BHP Group | 4.7% |
| Recruit Holdings | 3.9% |
| Sony | 3.5% |
| Fast Retailing | 3.4% |
| SoftBank Group | 3.4% |
| Keyence | 3.3% |
| Techtronic Industries | 3.1% |
The top ten total 41.0%. Six of the ten are Japan-related holdings (including one Japanese small-cap fund), with the remainder comprising Singapore's United Overseas Bank, Australia's BHP Group and Hong Kong-listed Techtronic Industries.
How the Manager Views the Market
[Not stated] This section offers no judgment on market direction; it merely sets out the strategy framework: investing on a five-year horizon, a strong preference for growth stocks and rigorous fundamental bottom-up stock selection, covering Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Singapore (including certain Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong but incorporated outside mainland China).
The author specifically stresses that the fund holds no emerging market positions, and that "comparability with peer funds is weaker when returns are volatile" — an explanation of why performance comparisons against the IA sector average, which may include emerging market exposure, can be distorted. Readers should note that this is an interpretive framework presented from the fund's perspective, and future relative performance cannot be inferred from it.
How Positions Shifted
This report discloses no buys or sells for the period (no data on new positions, additions, reductions or closures); only the direction of the portfolio's deviation from the benchmark as of 30 June 2026 can be presented.
Sector allocation (fund vs MSCI Pacific Index):
| Sector | Fund | Index | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Financials | 21.5% | 25.8% | -4.3pp |
| Industrials | 18.8% | 19.0% | -0.2pp |
| Information Technology | 15.4% | 15.5% | -0.1pp |
| Consumer Discretionary | 9.1% | 12.1% | -2.9pp |
| Materials | 8.3% | 7.6% | +0.7pp |
| Communication Services | 6.7% | 5.3% | +1.5pp |
| Consumer Staples | 6.1% | 3.4% | +2.6pp |
| Health Care | 5.6% | 4.8% | +0.8pp |
| Energy | 2.3% | 1.3% | +0.9pp |
| Cash | 0.6% | 0.0% | +0.6pp |
Geographic allocation:
| Region | Fund | Index | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 69.4% | 70.0% | -0.6pp |
| Australia | 15.1% | 19.4% | -4.2pp |
| Singapore | 7.1% | 5.0% | +2.1pp |
| Hong Kong | 6.8% | 5.1% | +1.7pp |
| New Zealand | 1.1% | 0.5% | +0.5pp |
| Total | 99.4% | 100.0% | - |
The main deviations from the benchmark: underweight Financials (-4.3pp) and Australia (-4.2pp), overweight Consumer Staples (+2.6pp) and Singapore (+2.1pp). The Japan weight is broadly in line with the benchmark (-0.6pp), but the top ten holdings show exposure concentrated in technology leaders (Tokyo Electron, Keyence, SoftBank Group) and consumer names (Sony, Fast Retailing, Recruit Holdings).
Fund Details
Fund size £55.41m; 47 holdings (guidance range 30-50); active share 76% relative to MSCI Pacific; annual turnover 32%; no changes in fund size or matters requiring investor notification are disclosed in this report.
- Fund managers: Iain Campbell / Mirbahram Azimbayli; inception date: 20 June 2001; structure: OEIC
- Share classes: Class B-Acc and Class B-Inc; annual management fee 0.55%; ongoing charges figure (OCF) 0.65%; historic yield 1.00%
- Fund objective: to outperform the MSCI Pacific Index (after costs) on a sterling basis over rolling five-year periods; the manager also regards the IA Asia Pacific Including Japan sector average as an appropriate reference benchmark
Legal Notices and Regulatory Compliance Analysis
The Risk Warning Transmission Chain: The Linkage Mechanism from Concentration to Currency Fluctuation
The three risk warnings in the document do not exist in isolation; together they form a complete risk transmission chain:
- Geographic/sector concentration → a single adverse event triggers larger NAV swings
- Currency risk → exchange rate movements between Asia-Pacific market currencies (yen, won, Australian dollar, etc.) and the fund's base currency directly erode returns denominated in the base currency
- Pricing mechanism → the fund may adopt fair value pricing or swing pricing, which means that when market liquidity dries up, redemption activity itself further depresses the NAV
It is particularly noteworthy that developed Asia-Pacific markets (Japan, Australia, Singapore) generally rely on export-oriented economies, and their currencies are highly sensitive to the US dollar and sterling. For example, the yen carry-trade unwinding wave of 2024 caused a marked spike in Asia-Pacific equity volatility within a single week, and over the same period Asia-Pacific funds denominated in sterling posted NAV drawdowns of more than 5% — a textbook case of currency risk and market volatility risk compounding each other. By listing the three in parallel, the document is in effect asking investors to understand that "volatility is not the exception, but the norm."
The Real Meaning of the Date 30 June 2026
The date in the footer is not a random editorial date; it carries clear financial significance:
- It is the fund's semi-annual reporting period end (the accounting cycle of the Baillie Gifford Asia-Pacific fund normally takes 30 June as the interim point)
- It means this factsheet is an interim performance report, not a full year-end annual report
- Interim reports are generally not required by law to be audited, but they must still comply with the FCA (Financial Conduct Authority) disclosure rules
Why does this matter? Because the period around 30 June typically corresponds to the UK "half-year end" regulatory review window, and the major Asia-Pacific indices (such as MSCI AC Asia Pacific) conduct their semi-annual constituent adjustments on that date. By publishing the factsheet at this time, the fund both satisfies its contractual periodic disclosure obligations and can present the new holding structure to investors at the first opportunity after the index rebalance.
Tiered Design of Contact Channels
The contact information at the end is divided into two separate routes; this is not a simple layout decision:
| Channel Type | Phone | Target Audience | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intermediary Enquiries | 0800 917 2113 (UK freephone) | enquiries@bailliegifford.com | Financial advisers, platforms, distributors |
| Institutional Enquiries | +44 (0)131 275 2000 (international) | Institutional.Enquiries@bailliegifford.com | Pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, endowments |
This distinction reflects the fund's distribution structure: the intermediary channel handles "indirect sales" to retail investors and requires call-centre-level responsiveness, while the institutional channel uses a direct-connect model handled by senior client relationship managers. The capital "I" in "Institutional" in the email address also hints at a dedicated inbox separate from the general queue.
In addition, "Your call may be recorded" is a standard compliance notice required by the UK FCA under its Conduct of Business rules, intended to provide evidence when resolving sales disputes. This is not mere formalism — when investors bring litigation over fund losses, the call recordings are core evidence that the "suitability" obligation has been fulfilled.
Version Number and Copyright: Invisible Traces of Compliance Auditing
The "Ref: 10064199" at the end is an internal document control number used to trace the factsheet's version history. In large asset management firms, such numbers are typically linked to global distribution compliance systems (such as FundApps) to ensure that the same product displays a consistent version across different countries. The presence of the Ref number means the document has been reviewed by legal counsel and recorded on file.
The "Baillie Gifford & Co 2026" in the copyright clause, together with the address "3 Haymarket Square, Edinburgh EH3 8RY", in effect hints at the fund manager's legal entity structure — the Edinburgh head office is the registered office and the seat of the regulatory entity. For non-UK investors, this determines that legal disputes must be brought before UK courts rather than local courts, which is itself a form of legal risk isolation.
Comparison with the US Disclosure Framework
Comparing this content with a US mutual fund's statutory prospectus reveals significant differences:
| Feature | Baillie Gifford Factsheet | US SEC Form N-1A |
|---|---|---|
| Legal nature | Marketing document + key risk summary | Statutory registration document |
| Investor classification | Relies on exemption concepts such as "sophisticated investors" and "institutional investors" | Aimed at the retail public; approved upon registration |
| Risk disclosure | Highly summarised, pointing to KID/Prospectus | Mandatory "Risk Factors" section with item-by-item enumeration |
| Audit requirements | Interim data may be unaudited | Annual report must include an independent audit opinion |
This difference is essentially a divergence in offering models: Baillie Gifford follows the European model of "private placement as the mainstay, exemptions as a supplement", rather than the US model of "registered public offering". The latter requires SEC review and is more costly, but can be sold to the public; the former, by establishing a "no public offering" baseline across multiple countries, targets clients at the top of the pyramid.
The above analysis indicates that the core function of this Introduction's final page is not information transmission, but rather the construction of risk isolation and legal firewalls. By precisely limiting investor types, clarifying prohibitions across different jurisdictions, and delineating communication channels, the fund positions itself in the safest possible place at both legal and operational levels—which is precisely the most important survival skill for the asset management industry in the era of globalization.