Voss Capital is a Houston hedge fund founded by Travis Cocke in 2011, running value-oriented, bottom-up strategies focused on underfollowed small- and mid-cap special situations through long/short and long-only funds, increasingly turning activist.

This report explains why software stocks have crashed recently. It's not because these companies are doing worse—their revenue growth is actually at a 20-year high. Instead, investors have shifted from favoring fast-growing companies to preferring profitable ones. For example, RingCentral's sales are still growing 26%, but its stock dropped 80%. Even the cheapest software stocks fell 37%, and the report warns valuations could fall another 24-40%. For regular investors, this means don't rush to buy the dip. Focus on companies that balance growth with profitability, not just those growing the fastest.
Voss Capital research points out that valuation multiples of software companies have plummeted from a median of nearly 9.0x revenue in August 2021 to less than 5.0x currently, with the average revenue multiple nearly halving. Although the market generally believes that high-valuation stocks (such as
This chapter focuses on the phenomenon of software industry valuation multiples plunging from historical highs over the past 5-6 months, examining whether this sell-off is driven solely by interest rate expectations or if fundamental changes have occurred. By analyzing cases such as RingCentral (RNG), the report questions the market's prevailing belief that "high-valuation stocks are the main driver of the decline" and examines whether investor preferences have shifted from growth to profitability.
The author's core judgment is that the collapse in software industry valuations is not driven by fundamental deterioration but by a shift in investor preferences from "growth first" to "profitability first." The counterintuitive findings include:
1. Valuation-Growth Decoupling: The median EV/Revenue multiple for the software industry has fallen from 8.8x to 4.7x, yet expected revenue growth rates have risen to 21% (a 20-year high), and gross margins remain stable in the 69%-75% range. While EBITDA margins have continued to decline, the Rule of 40 metric is within normal range.
2. RingCentral Case: RNG's expected revenue growth is approximately 26% (near historical highs), but its valuation multiple has dropped 80% from its peak, indicating that the sell-off is not entirely driven by fundamentals.
3. High-Valuation Stocks Lead Declines but Are Not the Sole Cause: Historical data shows that "high-flying" stocks (30x+ revenue) saw valuation multiples surge from 4.5-7.0x before 2017 to over 30x by mid-2021, then fell 58%; the cheapest stocks (<2.0x) also declined 37%. All quintiles still have 24-40% downside from historical averages.
| Quintile | Peak Multiple | Current Multiple | Decline from Peak | Downside to Historical Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Most Expensive (High-Flyers) | 30x+ | ~12.6x | 58% | 24% |
| Cheapest | 2.0x+ | ~1.26x | 37% | 40% |
4. Profitability Dominates Performance: From 2020-2021, high-growth/low-profitability stocks outperformed low-growth/high-profitability stocks by 91%. However, the trend reversed over the past 12 months; from November 2021 to January 2022, high-profitability/low-growth stocks cumulatively outperformed by 33%.
This section focuses on structural divergences within the software sector, examining whether the massive excess returns of high-margin/low-growth software stocks relative to other types of software stocks are nearing an end. The author believes that the current market's excessive preference for profitability may be creating a new imbalance, and future returns are likely to become more balanced.
The author's key judgment is that the relative strength of high-margin/low-growth software stocks may soon end, and future returns in the software sector will be more evenly distributed, favoring companies that strike a balance between profitability and growth. This is a contrarian view—the market currently shows a clear preference for high-margin, low-growth firms, but the author argues this extreme divergence is unsustainable.
Contrarian judgments include:
The author supports the thesis through their own historical positioning adjustments and current market structure:
| Metric | Data |
|---|---|
| Peak software position (early 2021) | ~40% |
| Current software position | High single digit % |
| Author's estimated further downside | 20%+ (cannot be ruled out) |
|---|---|
| Condition for substantially adding positions | High-quality software stocks decline another 20% |
The author's core logic chain:
1. Position concentration risk: Large hedge funds are concentrated in a few software stocks; de-leveraging could trigger a cascade of selling.
2. Valuations have already corrected significantly: The author has avoided most of the losses through position reduction, and current valuations are "more fairly valued."
3. Overcorrection opportunity: If high-quality software stocks fall another 20%, the author would view it as an "overcorrection" because the industry's fundamentals remain sound.
This section does not mention specific company names but analyzes the industry as a whole and "high-margin/low-growth software stocks." The author implicitly bears a bearish view on the currently market-favored high-margin/low-growth software stocks and a bullish view on software companies that balance profitability and growth.