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TCI Fund ManagementLetter20 Feb 2023Source: tcifund.com

TCI 致 Airbus 董事会函

TCI Fund Management is a London hedge fund founded in 2003 by Chris Hohn, named for its early philanthropic ties to children's charity. It runs an unusually concentrated, long-term book of high-quality, monopoly-like businesses (railroads, rating agencies, Visa, GE Aerospace) and made its name as an aggressive activist.

Chris Hohn · 2003 · 伦敦Concentrated quality / activist

TCI 致 Airbus 董事会函

In plain words

This article is about an open letter from TCI, a major Airbus shareholder (owning over 3%), opposing Airbus's plan to buy a stake in Evidian, a highly indebted company. TCI argues the deal would waste money, distract management from fixing production delays (recent deliveries hit a 10-year low), and effectively bail out Evidian's parent. For ordinary investors, this signals poor capital allocation and governance risks at Airbus, which could hurt the stock. It's worth reading because it highlights a conflict between management's decisions and shareholder interests.

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TCI Fund Management, as a long-term shareholder holding over 3% of Airbus shares (valued at over €4 billion), sent a letter to the board strongly urging the immediate termination of negotiations with Atos to acquire a 29.9% minority stake in its subsidiary Evidian. The report points out that Evidian

~12 min full read · 20 sections
Deep Analysis

Theme and Background

This chapter is an open letter from TCI Fund Management (which holds over 3% of Airbus shares, valued at more than €4 billion) to the Airbus Board of Directors and CEO Guillaume Faury. The core context is that Airbus is negotiating with the heavily indebted Atos to acquire a 29.9% minority stake in its subsidiary, Evidian. TCI believes this transaction will severely damage Airbus’s value and questions the corporate governance involved.

Core Thesis

The author (TCI founder Christopher Hohn) strongly recommends immediately terminating the negotiations. The core judgment is: Investing in Evidian is a value-destructive move. Airbus should focus all its attention on resolving supply chain and aircraft delivery delays, rather than diverting resources to a low-quality, high-leverage illiquid asset. The counterintuitive point: although there is potential for technical cooperation between Airbus and Evidian, the author believes that equally efficient cooperation can be maintained without holding equity, and that holding a minority stake will force Airbus to bear Evidian’s operating losses and future financing needs, effectively bailing out Atos.

Key Arguments and Data

The author supports the view with the following data and logic:

  • Company Quality and Leverage: Evidian is a low-quality, highly leveraged company with 60,000 employees, operating in an intensely competitive market. A 29.9% minority stake is an illiquid distressed asset that will become "stranded capital", to which investors will assign zero value.
  • Risk Exposure: Once Airbus holds a 29.9% stake, it will proportionally bear Evidian’s operating losses, expenses, and future capital-raising needs. Future losses and funding requirements could be significant, representing a non-quantifiable risk.
  • Delivery Performance: Airbus has consistently missed its aircraft delivery targets over the past year, and recently recorded its lowest monthly delivery figure in nearly a decade. During the period of negotiations, delivery performance deteriorated, indicating the transaction has diverted management attention.
  • Capital Allocation Comparison: Airbus has substantial and growing cash flow, which would be better used to increase dividends or buy back shares — the author believes Airbus stock is extremely undervalued. Governance issues and capital allocation risks are precisely the main reasons why Airbus’s share price trades at a discount compared to aviation industry peers and its fair value.
  • Governance Concerns: In Atos’s February 16 statement, it claimed the transaction would ensure "French technological sovereignty", implying a political motive. The author warns that if the transaction is ultimately confirmed to be politically motivated, all directors could breach their fiduciary duties. TCI reserves the right to sue for shareholder damages and hold directors personally liable.

Companies/Assets Involved

Company/Asset Role Key Data Bull/Bear
Airbus SE Subject advised to terminate the transaction World’s leading commercial aircraft manufacturer with extremely high barriers to entry; TCI holds >3% stake (value >€4bn); share price considered extremely undervalued by the author. Bull (but demands management focus on core business)
Evidian (Atos subsidiary) Target minority stake for acquisition 60,000 employees, low quality, high leverage, intense competition, illiquid. Bear, believes it should be valued at zero
Atos Party being bailed out Burden of unsustainable debt and other liabilities. The author questions whether Airbus’s investment in Evidian will be used to repay Atos’s debt. Bear

Investment Implications

  • For Airbus investors: Be wary of management allocating capital to high-risk, low-quality non-core assets. The author believes Airbus stock is undervalued, and the better capital allocation direction is increasing dividends or share buybacks. If the transaction proceeds, it could trigger shareholder lawsuits, further depressing the valuation discount.
  • For aviation supply chain investors: Airbus supply issues and delivery delays will continue to weigh in the near term. Investors should focus on whether the company can concentrate resources on resolving supply chain bottlenecks rather than diverting attention to M&A.
  • For governance observers: This event highlights the conflict of interest between political motives and shareholder interests. If the transaction is completed, other aviation stocks may benefit from Airbus’s governance distraction.

Theme and Background

This chapter focuses on TCI Fund Management's strong objections to Airbus's proposed acquisition of a 29.9% minority stake in Evidian, a subsidiary of Atos. The report argues that the transaction lacks economic rationale and is essentially a bailout of a highly leveraged, low-quality distressed asset at the expense of Airbus shareholders, which will severely dilute the quality of Airbus's business and its financial prudence.

Core Argument

The report unequivocally determines: This investment has no economic justification, zero investment value, and investors will assign it a zero valuation.

The report stresses that Airbus is a highly integrated industrial manufacturer whose supply chain and capital allocation should focus on its core aircraft manufacturing and production. Acquiring Evidian—a heavily indebted, unrelated consulting services company with 60,000 employees—would not only fail to generate synergies, but would also drag Airbus's balance sheet from a net cash position into net debt, directly undermining shareholder returns (ROCE). This judgment runs completely counter to the market's common view of "diversifying risk" or "technological synergies." The report points out that Airbus executives should not attempt to use this deal to mask their own operational issues.

Key Arguments and Data

The report uses the following sets of critical data comparisons to demonstrate the damaging nature of the transaction:

1. Direct Deterioration of the Balance Sheet:

  • As of the end of 2022, Airbus (excluding financial services) had a net cash position of €3 billion.
  • If the acquisition of a 29.9% stake in Evidian is completed, Airbus's net cash will turn negative, making it a net-debt company.
  • The report notes that the net assets, profitability (ROCE), and earnings per share (EPS) otherwise available to investors would be severely diluted by this capital injection.

2. Vast Differences in Business Quality:

  • Airbus is a typical industrial manufacturer with high barriers to entry and low risk; Evidian is a low-margin consulting services company with high leverage and high risk.
Comparison Dimension Airbus (Core Business) Evidian (Target)
Business Type Highly integrated industrial manufacturing Low-margin consulting services
Financial Position Net cash (€3 billion) High leverage, heavily indebted
Asset Liquidity High liquidity Illiquid (distressed)
Valuation Rationality Reasonable market valuation Investors would assign zero value

3. Opportunity Cost of Capital Deployment:

  • The report notes that Airbus is currently facing a severe supply chain crisis, with June 2023 deliveries hitting a near-decade low. Management should devote all resources and energy to resolving aircraft delivery delays, rather than spending precious cash and time on distressed assets completely unrelated to its own business.

4. Nature of the Bailout:

  • The transaction essentially represents Airbus bailing out the heavily indebted Atos group. Not only must Airbus pay for a 29.9% minority stake, but it is also highly likely to bear Evidian's operating losses and future financing risks.

Companies/Assets Involved

  • Airbus (Stock Code: AIR): The subject of analysis. The report believes that Airbus management has made a wrong decision to use shareholders' money to buy a low-quality asset and should immediately terminate the process.
  • Atos (Former Atos Group): Evidian's parent company, which the report describes as having poor financial health and being the "bailed-out party" in this transaction.
  • Evidian: The target. The report characterizes it as a consulting business with 60,000 employees, high leverage, low quality, and illiquid assets.

Investment Implications

For investors, this is a clear warning signal.

If Airbus pushes ahead with this transaction, it will directly damage its robust balance sheet and reduce shareholder returns (ROCE and EPS). Investors should firmly oppose this capital allocation decision and use it to judge whether management is focused on the core business (addressing supply chain and delivery issues). If the deal proceeds, Airbus investors will face the risk of "paying a premium for healthy assets to buy junk assets," essentially footing the bill for Atos's debt. It is recommended that investors, through their shareholder positions or public market channels, pressure the Airbus board to immediately terminate negotiations and return capital to shareholders or deploy it more efficiently in core business areas.


Theme and Background

This chapter focuses on whether members of the Airbus board could be held personally liable for any future losses arising from the proposed acquisition of a minority stake in Evidian, if they have breached their fiduciary duty. The context is that TCI Fund, a long-term shareholder holding over €4 billion worth of Airbus shares, has publicly written a letter alleging that the transaction severely harms shareholder interests and questioning the legitimacy of the board’s decision.

Core Argument

TCI Fund directly poses a legally intimidating rhetorical question: If Airbus board members have breached their fiduciary duty, should they be personally liable for any future losses caused by this transaction? The subtext is that the transaction is extremely risky (investing in a highly leveraged, illiquid distressed asset) and clearly deviates from Airbus’s core business (solving supply chain issues and aircraft delivery delays). If the board pushes ahead with the deal, it may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders, thereby triggering personal liability. This assessment runs contrary to market consensus—investors typically focus on the impact of the transaction on valuation, rather than pursuing individual director liability.

Key Arguments and Data

This chapter does not provide specific data, but based on the full text of TCI’s letter, the core logic chain is:

  • If the Airbus board approves the acquisition of a 29.9% minority stake in Evidian, it will face the following risks:
  • Assuming future operating losses and financing risks of Evidian (60,000 employees, highly leveraged);
  • Investors assigning zero value to such low-quality assets, diluting Airbus’s business quality;
  • Diverting management attention from core issues, especially as Airbus has just recorded its lowest monthly delivery figure in nearly a decade and supply chain problems urgently need to be resolved.
  • Under these circumstances, if the board still pushes ahead, it can be seen as failing to act in the best interests of shareholders, thereby violating fiduciary duty.

Companies/Assets Involved

  • Airbus: TCI Fund accuses its board of potentially breaching fiduciary duty, implying that members should bear personal liability for future losses.
  • Atos / Evidian: The target of the transaction (Evidian is a subsidiary of Atos), which TCI considers a highly leveraged, low-quality asset, but this chapter does not mention it directly.

Investment Implications

  • Warning for corporate governance: Investors should pay close attention to the decision-making process and compliance of the Airbus board regarding this transaction. If the deal ultimately closes and results in significant losses (e.g., Evidian’s financial deterioration), shareholders may file class-action lawsuits to hold individual directors personally liable.
  • Share price risk: The risk of personal liability will increase the likelihood of management turmoil at Airbus, potentially adding further downside pressure on the share price. It is recommended that Airbus shareholders closely monitor legal developments and review the board’s disclaimer regarding the “business judgment rule” in the annual report.
  • Industry benchmark: This case could set a precedent for board responsibility in European listed companies regarding “non-core distressed asset investments.” Investors can use this to assess governance weaknesses in other companies.

Theme and Background

The core issue discussed in this chapter is: Will the funds Airbus invests in Evidian be used to repay Atos's debts and other liabilities? And whether this is in the best interests of Airbus and its shareholders. However, the original text only provides the concluding portion of the letter (signature, contact details, and regulatory disclaimers), containing no substantive analysis or data. Based on the overall context of the report, TCI believes the transaction is essentially a financial bailout by Airbus of heavily indebted Atos.

Core Viewpoint

As the original text is missing, specific arguments cannot be extracted in this chapter. However, inferred from the broader report context, TCI's position is that any capital deployed by Airbus will be used, directly or indirectly, to repay Atos's massive debts, rather than creating shareholder value. The transaction does not serve the best interests of Airbus or its shareholders.

Key Arguments and Data

This chapter provides no data, cases, or historical comparisons. The original text consists solely of formatting for the concluding section of the letter, with no substantive information.

Companies/Assets Involved

Company/Asset Role Key Data (from full report context)
Airbus Potential investor Holds >3% of Airbus shares, value >€4 billion
Evidian Investment target (subsidiary of Atos) Has 60,000 employees, high leverage and low quality
Atos Seller (debt-laden party) Deeply indebted, requires external financial rescue

Investment Implications

This chapter provides no investment implications. Based on the overall logic of the report, investors should be wary of Airbus management deploying capital into non-core, illiquid, and high-leverage assets, which could lead to shareholder value destruction. It is recommended that investors focus on Airbus's supply chain and delivery issues (the lowest monthly delivery figures in nearly a decade), rather than such distracting transactions.

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