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Oakmark FundsQuarterly31 Mar 2016Source: oakmark.com

Bill Nygren Market Commentary | 1Q16

Oakmark is the mutual fund family launched in 1991 by Harris Associates, the Chicago deep-value firm founded in 1976 (about $105bn AUM). Bill Nygren runs the flagship Oakmark Fund and David Herro the Oakmark International Fund, buying businesses at large discounts to intrinsic value and holding them like owners — publishing quarterly fund commentaries, market commentaries and insight articles.

Bill Nygren、David Herro · 1991 · 美国芝加哥Deep value / contrarian long-term

In plain words

This is a Q&A with investing legend Bill Nygren on how to find great companies and value them. His key point: a great company isn't always a great stock—price matters. He uses non-traditional metrics like price-to-sales for Amazon and stresses evaluating management like an owner, not a growth-chaser. For regular investors, the big takeaway is to sell even good stocks when they reach fair value, because holding overpriced ones means missing better opportunities. Worth reading for real-world examples (Amazon, Google) that show how pros think.

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In an interview, Oakmark investment research analyst Bill Nygren elaborated on his long-term value investing philosophy: the core is to identify high-quality businesses and only buy them when their stock prices are significantly below intrinsic value, then patiently wait for the gap to narrow. High-

~8 min full read · 10 sections
Deep Analysis

Theme and Background

This chapter is an excerpt from a Q&A session between Oakmark investment research analyst Bill Nygren and John Rotonti of The Motley Fool. Nygren systematically elaborates on Oakmark's long-term value investing framework, focusing on the definition of high-quality businesses, criteria for evaluating management teams, sources of competitive advantages, and valuation methods, providing investors with a complete logic for value investing decisions.

Core Thesis

Nygren's core investment argument is: There is a significant difference between a high-quality business and a good stock, and the key lies in price. Investors should only buy when the stock price is significantly below intrinsic value and sell when it approaches fair value, even for high-quality companies, without holding them long-term to overvalued levels. This judgment runs counter to market consensus—many investors tend to hold high-quality companies long-term, but Nygren believes that opportunity cost dictates that holding overvalued stocks means missing out on more undervalued investment opportunities.

Key Arguments and Data

1. Six Characteristics of High-Quality Businesses: High incremental return on capital, high free cash flow, above-average growth opportunities, non-replicable competitive advantages, low cyclicality, and low obsolescence risk.

2. Key Focus in Evaluating Management Teams: Capital allocation ability is more important than day-to-day operations. Nygren points out that professional managers tend to expand company size (focusing on the numerator), while owner-oriented thinking focuses on maximizing per-share value (focusing on the denominator).

3. Sources of Competitive Advantage: Corporate culture is the most underappreciated and free moat. For example, Liberty Media (LMCA) focuses on per-share value, 3G focuses on cost cutting, and Goldman Sachs (GS) focuses on hiring top talent—these may seem replicable but are actually difficult to imitate.

4. Valuation Methods:

  • Preferred method: Reference recent acquisition multiples of comparable companies
  • For companies lacking comparable acquisition data (e.g., Apple, Alphabet, Amazon), alternative metrics are used:
  • Amazon: Enterprise value to sales (EV/Sales). At the time, its P/E was in the hundreds, but EV/Sales was lower than that of brick-and-mortar retailers.
  • Alphabet: Sum-of-the-parts valuation, including cash, cumulative venture investments, and YouTube valued per viewing hour.
  • Other cases: Price per subscriber (cable TV), price to EBITDA plus R&D expenses (pharmaceutical companies).

5. Sell Discipline: Sell when the stock price approaches fair value, unless delaying to benefit from long-term capital gains tax rates. Nygren cites Charlie Munger's contrarian thinking: Holding overvalued stocks means forgoing the opportunity to buy more undervalued stocks.

Companies/Assets Involved

Company Role Key Data/Judgment Bullish/Bearish
Liberty Media (LMCA) Case study of corporate culture advantage Focus on per-share value, moat is free Bullish (as a case study)
Goldman Sachs (GS) Case study of corporate culture advantage Focus on hiring top talent Bullish (as a case study)
Amazon (AMZN) Case study of non-GAAP valuation P/E in the hundreds at the time, but EV/Sales lower than brick-and-mortar retailers; sales growth of 20%+, 2000 basis points faster than competitors Bullish (previously held)
Alphabet (GOOG/GOOGL) Case study of sum-of-the-parts valuation Search business with low incremental capital needs, high market share, industry tailwinds Bullish (as a case study)
Apple (AAPL) Company lacking comparable acquisition multiples No specific valuation method provided Neutral (only mentioned)

Investment Implications

1. Focus on Capital Allocation Ability: When evaluating management, prioritize analyzing whether they maximize per-share long-term risk-adjusted returns like an owner, rather than simply pursuing company size growth.

2. Look for Non-Earnings Metrics: For high-growth, high-investment companies, using alternative metrics such as price to sales, price per subscriber, or price to EBITDA plus R&D expenses may uncover value obscured by GAAP earnings.

3. Strictly Adhere to Sell Discipline: Even for high-quality companies, sell when the stock price reaches fair value to avoid transitioning from a value investor to a momentum investor. Opportunity cost is the core consideration—holding overvalued stocks prevents allocation to more undervalued targets.

4. Corporate Culture as a Moat: Identify companies with unique corporate cultures (e.g., focus on per-share value, cost cutting, talent hiring), as such advantages are often undervalued and free in the market.


Theme and Background

This chapter focuses on two key non-quantitative dimensions of the Oakmark fund's investment process: management assessment and investment behavior during periods of market volatility. Nygren emphasizes that qualitative judgments about management require the same rigor as valuation models, and during significant market fluctuations, the fund's operational strategy is not about market timing but about using price discrepancies for portfolio rebalancing.

Core Views

  • Management assessment is central to the investment process: Nygren believes that evaluating management requires the same discipline as building valuation models. He opposes drawing conclusions from a single meeting, instead relying on long-term, in-depth conversations to understand management's thought patterns, long-term goals, incentive structures, and self-evaluation criteria.
  • Questioning from a "business partner" perspective: Unlike focusing on short-term earnings forecasts, Nygren's questioning style resembles evaluating a potential business partner, aiming to determine whether they are worthy of long-term trust and collaboration.
  • The fund does not actively "buy the dip" during market declines: Oakmark funds typically maintain high positions and do not predict market direction. When markets fall, the fund often lacks new cash inflows, so its operational logic remains unchanged: continuously seek the portfolio with the best risk-adjusted expected returns, using market volatility to exploit price differentials between individual stocks for rebalancing.

Key Arguments and Data

  • Core metric for management incentives: Nygren points out that excellent management should pursue maximizing long-term per-share value, rather than simply expanding company size. He criticizes the practice of "expanding company size by diluting shareholders" and emphasizes that "elite management maximizes per-share value."
  • Operational logic during market declines: In a sharp decline of 20% or 30%, the Oakmark fund does not prioritize buying specific types of stocks (such as core holdings or stocks on the watchlist). Instead, it continuously executes a rebalancing operation of "selling stocks near their valuation ceiling and buying stocks far below their valuation." The greater the market volatility, the more pronounced the pricing differences between individual stocks, and the more active the fund's rebalancing.

Companies/Assets Involved

This chapter does not conduct investment analysis on specific companies but provides partial holdings data for three Oakmark funds (Oakmark Fund, Oakmark Select Fund, and Oakmark Global Select Fund) as of March 31, 2016. Below are the key holdings and their weightings:

Company/Asset Oakmark Fund Oakmark Select Fund Oakmark Global Select Fund
Alphabet Inc., Class C 2.5% 8.4% 8.0%
Apple Inc. 2.3% 0% 0%
MasterCard Inc., Class A 2.6% 5.4% 4.9%
Liberty Interactive Corp. QVC Group, Class A 1.9% 4.4% 0%
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. 0% 0% 5.2%
General Motors Co. 1.5% 0% 0%
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 1.7% 0% 0%

Investment Insights

  • Investors should prioritize qualitative analysis of management: Relying solely on financial models is insufficient. Like evaluating a business partner, investors need to conduct long-term, in-depth conversations to assess management's thought patterns, capital allocation capabilities, and focus on per-share value.
  • Avoid blindly "buying the dip" during market panic: For long-term value investors, a sharp market decline should not be a reason to change investment strategy. A more effective approach is to use the pricing discrepancies created by volatility to continuously optimize the portfolio, shifting capital from fairly valued stocks to those that are severely undervalued.
  • Focus on the link between management incentives and per-share value: Investors should be wary of management that expands company size through mergers, acquisitions, or equity financing but dilutes earnings per share. Prioritize companies where compensation is tied to long-term per-share returns.