Hosking Partners is a London boutique founded in 2013 by Jeremy Hosking, a portfolio manager at Marathon Asset Management for over 25 years. It runs a single global equity strategy built on the capital-cycle, supply-side approach — contrarian, long-term, and unusually diversified (350+ holdings) under a multi-counsellor model, managing around $5.5bn.

This report explains how to find stocks that could rise 10x. The author's simple method: look for stocks with a future P/E (price vs. expected profit) near 1x—meaning the market is practically giving them away. The example is Saga Plc, a UK company serving over-50s with travel and insurance. After private equity firms (investors that buy and flip companies) loaded it with debt and neglected customers, its stock crashed 95%. But the founding family returned, cut debt, and won back customers. The stock is up 8x from its 2022 low, and the author sees potential for another 5x. For ordinary investors, the lesson isn't just spotting these bargains—it's having the patience to hold on through ups and downs. Worth reading for a real-world case of finding value in beaten-down stocks.
Hosking Partners' research report The saga of Saga Plc proposes a simple framework for screening "10x baggers" using a forward P/E ratio close to 1x, arguing that such opportunities possess structural advantages in low-competition environments. The report uses Saga Plc as an example, noting that the
This chapter proposes a simple yet counterintuitive investment framework: identifying stocks whose future price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio is near 1x as the screening criterion for "10x baggers." The report uses UK-based Saga Plc as an example to illustrate that such opportunities exist in companies overlooked by the market, facing short-term distress but possessing a "deep reality"—a long-term business model that meets core customer needs. In the post-financial-crisis era, these low-valuation stocks face a lack of competition, creating a structural tailwind for diversified contrarian investors.
| Metric | 2004 (Pre-MBO) | Around 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Operating Profit | £95m | Medium-term target £100m (but expected higher) |
| Target Population (55+) | Base | Increased by one-third |
| Debt Leverage | Unknown | Net debt below 4x EBITDA (peak over 10x), declining for 5 consecutive years |
| Controlling Shareholder | Founding family (de Haan) | Sir Roger de Haan returns, holds 28% |
| Number of Employees | Unknown | 40% lower than before |
| Number of Customers | Approx. 2 million regular customers (10% of target market) | Declined due to private equity management, now recovering growth |
1. Screening Method: Investors should use "future P/E ratio near 1x" as a systematic screening framework, focusing on companies driven to extremely low valuations by short-term events or industry cycles, rather than statically low P/E stocks.
2. Holding Structure: Such investments require an institutional structure capable of withstanding significant drawdowns and long waiting periods (5+ years), as well as a contrarian mindset. Diversified portfolios with the ability to build positions gradually are more likely to capture 10x baggers.
3. Brand and Customer Relationships: Companies with strong brands and high customer loyalty may have their "corporate DNA" survive even severe management missteps. Saga's example shows that the return of the founding family and a long-term shareholder structure are key to unlocking hidden value.
4. Debt and Assets: In leveraged companies, a sustained decline in debt is the primary signal of a successful turnaround. At the same time, the underlying assets (e.g., replacement value) need to be assessed to judge the true risk of net debt.
The follow-up further quantifies Saga's earnings target under the "full steam ahead" scenario in the 2030s (approximately £220m operating profit) and compares it with historical peaks (FY2018-19), emphasizing that the current business has shed capital-intensive insurance underwriting and shifted to an asset-light model. This comparison requires more detailed financial data.
Saga's share price fell from ~£2.5 in 2021 to a low of £0.8 in 2022 before rebounding to ~£5.5 in March 2026. During this period, Hosking Partners' stake increased from under 1% to over 8%.
| Metric | FY2018-19 (Historical Peak) | 2030s Target (Full Steam Scenario) |
|---|---|---|
| Operating Profit | ~£220m (incl. insurance underwriting) | ~£220m (excl. insurance underwriting) |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | Approx. 12-15% | 20%+ |
| Revenue Growth | Approx. +4% (held back by insurance) | GDP+ (approx. 4-5% annualized) |
| Business Model | Capital intensive (insurance reserves) | Asset light (brokerage/service fees) |
Key Difference: Under the same profit scale, the asset-light model requires less capital, thus significantly improving ROIC. In FY2018-19, Saga's net operating assets were ~£1.5bn (including insurance liabilities). Under the asset-light model, net operating assets could fall below £1bn, raising ROIC from ~15% to 20%+. If £220m profit is achieved, a 20% ROIC would imply assets of ~£1.1bn, far below historical levels.
The follow-up proposes that if £220m profit is achieved, an EV/EBIT multiple of 15-18x would support an EV of £4bn (~£25/share). However, the current share price (assuming ~£5.67 in March 2026, based on an 8x rise from 71p) implies an EV/EBIT of less than 8x. A peer comparison is needed:
| Company | Business Type | EV/EBIT (2026E) | Avg ROIC | Revenue Growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Saga (implied by mkt cap) | Senior travel + insurance brokerage | <8x | 15-20% | 5%+ |
| Viking Holdings (US-listed) | Premium cruise | ~24x | 20%+ | 12% |
| CCL (Carnival) | Mass market cruise | ~12x | 8-10% | 6% |
| Travel + Leisure Co. (TNL) | Vacation ownership/travel | ~11x | 15% | 4% |
Core Contradiction: Saga's valuation multiple is not only below direct cruise peers (Viking 24x) but also below mass market cruise lines (CCL 12x), despite its ROIC (20%+) far exceeding CCL. This reflects the market's misunderstanding of its hybrid "travel insurance + travel" model and excessive pessimism over its historical insurance losses. If Saga can consistently demonstrate its asset-light model and high repeat purchase rates (the follow-up mentions "three generations of customers"), its valuation should converge towards Viking rather than remain at a discount.
The follow-up mentions the "grey pound" demographic tailwind (GDP+ growth). UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) 2024 data: The 65+ population share is projected to rise from 18.4% in 2020 to 22.3% in 2030, an absolute increase of approximately 2 million people. Specific impacts:
Quantification: Even if macroeconomic GDP growth is only 2%, Saga could gain an additional 2-3% excess growth from aging, totaling approximately 4-5% annualized revenue growth. This aligns with its "GDP+" claim.
The follow-up mentions "multi-bagger" returns (after an 8x rise from the 71p trough, there is still an opportunity to double again). Downside protection must be considered:
A footnote in the follow-up mentions that if valued at Viking's 24x operating profit, Saga's ocean cruise division alone could be worth far more than a portion of the EV. Characteristics of Saga's cruise assets:
If valued independently, this division could be worth £1.6bn (at 24x operating profit of £67m). With a total EV of ~£4bn, this implies the other businesses (insurance brokerage, legal/care) are valued at only £2.4bn, an extremely low 8x multiple.
Conclusion: The "simple logic" of the follow-up is essentially a superposition of multiple undervaluations: recovery of historical profits without insurance risk, demographic tailwinds, misjudged assets, and heavy management stakes. This makes Saga a high-odds, low-correlation opportunity.