Kopernik Global All-Cap Fund — Quarterly Commentary

First-Quarter Outperformance of Over 10 Percentage Points vs. Benchmark

In Q1 2026, the fund significantly outperformed the global benchmark, with gains concentrated in January–February and a notable drawdown in March.

Performance comparison: Class I shares +7.35% for the quarter (YTD also 7.35%), versus the MSCI ACWI (Net) at -3.20% over the same period, producing quarterly excess return of 10.55 percentage points; trailing one year +54.50%, benchmark +20.01%. Class A (NAV) +7.29% for the quarter (+1.15% after the maximum 5.75% sales charge), trailing one year +54.16%; both share classes were established on November 1, 2013, and Class I has a since-inception annualized return of 10.10%. Expense ratios: Class A 1.26%, Class I 1.01%.

Share Class	2026 Q1	1 Year	3-Year Annualized	5-Year Annualized	10-Year Annualized	Since-Inception Annualized
Class I	7.35%	54.50%	24.46%	14.53%	15.31%	10.10%
Class A (NAV)	7.29%	54.16%	24.14%	14.26%	15.03%	9.84%
Class A (After Maximum Sales Charge)	1.15%	45.31%	21.71%	12.92%	14.35%	9.32%
MSCI ACWI (Net)	-3.20%	20.01%	16.58%	9.49%	11.33%	9.51%

Author attribution: The fund rose significantly in January and February, then fell sharply in March; market volatility intensified in the final third of the quarter, mainly as the market digested an energy price shock from the Middle East war. The author's stance toward the market is [cautious]: he believes this is a time to focus on fundamentals, avoid overpriced securities, and diversify across industries, countries, and companies. Looking ahead, the author offers no directional forecast; geopolitical conflict and oil prices are explicitly cited external risks, and the defensive posture arises from responding to the external environment rather than predicting it.

Contrarian Investing: Volatility Is Opportunity, Not Risk

Kopernik treats "conclusions that contradict the crowd" as the core of its strategy and believes that career risk for fund managers is not the same as portfolio risk.

The author compares himself to his namesake Copernicus (Kopernik, Latin: Copernicus), saying he trusts the results of his own analysis even if they contradict the crowd or academia. The author's exact words: "We trust the results of our own analysis even when (especially when) it generates vastly different conclusions from those of the crowd," meaning "we trust the results of our own analysis even when—especially when—it produces conclusions vastly different from the crowd's"; he also states that he questions data published by governments, central banks, and the companies themselves. The author believes bargains often appear because people focus on fears, panics, and other risks irrelevant to the portfolio; high tracking error, bad news, or unpopular stocks/countries/regions/industries are risks to a manager's career, but they often reduce the likelihood of permanent capital loss because of lower entry prices and greater potential upside. The author's exact words: "Volatility and other measures of past price movements are not relevant to long-term investors' assessment of risk," meaning "volatility and other measures of past price movements are not relevant to long-term investors' assessment of risk"; he adds that such metrics may signal potential risk for short-term speculators or highly leveraged players, but for true long-term investors they are often an opportunity.

Note from the relayer: This paragraph is an obvious self-defense from the position holder—using "low permanent capital loss" to justify a high-tracking-error strategy, and providing an ex-ante explanation for the fund's high volatility and deviation from its benchmark.

Energy Sector Contributed 3.6%, Ranked First

Oil and gas producers and uranium companies were the largest positive contributors in Q1, and the author trimmed several sharply risen positions.

• Cenovus Energy (two-way adjustment): leading Canadian integrated oil and gas producer, total return 59.9%, contributing 0.7 percentage points, one of the fund's largest contributors.
• Range Resources (two-way adjustment): U.S. natural gas producer with a large reserve base, total return 29.0%.
• Petrobras (reduced): Brazilian integrated oil and gas producer, downstream business includes most of Brazil's refining capacity, total return 71.7%; Range Resources and Petrobras together contributed 0.5 percentage points.
• Japex (reduced): Japanese oil and gas exploration and production company, total return 66.0%, contributing 0.3%.
• Inpex (reduced): Japanese oil and gas producer, total return 47.4%, contributing 0.2%.
• Paladin Energy (two-way adjustment): Australian uranium company with operations in Namibia and development projects in Canada and Australia, total return 22.6%, contributing 0.6%.
• Kazatomprom (reduced): Kazakhstan-based, world's largest uranium producer, total return 41.1%, contributing 0.5%.

The author explained that he reduced Kazatomprom, Petrobras, Japex, and Inpex as prices rose; price fluctuations in Cenovus, Paladin, and Range Resources provided two-way opportunities to trim on strength and add back on weakness.

Materials Contributed 2.1%; Cut Gold, Added Elsewhere

Materials continued their 2025 strength; the author reduced gold exposure and shifted toward resource assets he believes have greater upside.

• K+S (reduced): European potash producer, total return 30.2%, contributing 0.7 percentage points.
• Glencore (reduced): one of the world's largest diversified natural resource companies, total return 36.6%, contributing 0.5%.
• Vale SA (reduced): Brazil-based, world's largest iron ore producer, total return 21.3%, contributing 0.4%.
• Nutrien (reduced): Canadian potash producer, total return 23.6%, contributing 0.3%.
• Valterra Platinum (two-way adjustment): South African platinum group metals (PGM) producer, one of the fund's largest positions, total return 3.1%, contributing 0.3%; the author believes it still has significant upside relative to its risk-adjusted intrinsic value estimate.
• Royal Gold (reduced): precious metals streaming company with leverage to metal price increases and no mining operational risk, total return 16.3%, contributing 0.2%.

Actions: The author reduced K+S, Glencore, Vale, Nutrien, and Royal Gold on strength, and used Valterra's volatility for two-way adjustments; within materials, he continued to rotate—cutting gold positions and reallocating capital to areas the author judges to have greater upside.

Industrial, Financial, and Other Sectors Contributed Across the Board

Individual stocks in industrials, financials, telecom, healthcare, and electric utilities delivered diversified positive returns; the author did not disclose buy/sell actions for most holdings.

• DL E&C (action not disclosed): Korean engineering and construction company, total return 57.9%, contributing 0.7 percentage points.
• CK Hutchison Holdings (action not disclosed): Hong Kong-based conglomerate with diversified businesses, total return 11.7%, contributing 0.2%.
• Schroders (action not disclosed): British asset management company, total return 43.6%, contributing 0.3%; shares rose after Nuveen LLC announced an all-cash acquisition in February, with the transaction expected to close later this year.
• KT Corp (action not disclosed): one of South Korea's three major telecom companies, total return 12.2%, contributing 0.2%.
• Draegerwerk (action not disclosed): German medical device manufacturer, total return 28.8%, contributing 0.2%.
• AXIA Energia (action not disclosed): leading Brazilian electric utility and large hydropower producer, total return 22.3%, contributing 0.2%.

Active Trading Logic: Dual Confirmation of Event-Driven and Volatility Harvesting

This quarter's rebalancing shows a distinct event-driven character, especially in the handling of `DL E&C`—high-frequency "trim and add opportunistically" trading reflects the fund manager applying both valuation anchoring and volatility harvesting strategies to a single position. Combined with the previously trimmed positions in `Draegerwerk`, `KT`, and `Schroders`, the portfolio appears to be dynamically rebalancing between "trimming names whose valuation repair is nearly complete" and "adding names that were mispriced due to events."

Operation Type	Example Holdings	Strategic Implication
Two-way trading amid volatility	DL E&C	Use market overreaction to lower average cost
Adding on weakness	Empresa Nacional, Centene, Ivanhoe Mines	Contrarian additions when fundamentals are unchanged but prices are mispriced
Liquidating after price gains	Newmont, SLB, Hong Leong Financial	Disciplined exit after valuation repair is complete

Three Consecutive Quarters of Option Drag: Structural Misunderstanding of Hedging Costs

The report disclosed for the third consecutive quarter that S&P 500 put options were the largest detractor (this quarter -1.0%), with options expiring in January and February both expiring out of the money. This phenomenon should be understood as an "insurance premium" rather than a "loss"—the strategy is essentially exchanging a fixed cost for downside protection on the portfolio, not a directional bet. Notably, as of May 12, options expiring at the end of May were still outstanding, indicating that when the benchmark index is expensive or volatility is low, the fund manager remains willing to pay premiums for tail-risk hedging. This complements the portfolio's generally high position and deep-value allocation.

Sector-Level Building in Timber: Reexamining Scarcity Pricing

The most notable sector move this quarter was simultaneously establishing positions in four global timber producers (U.S. `Rayonier`, `Weyerhaeuser`, Finland's `Stora Enso`, and Chile's `Empresas CMPC`), with a clear intent to build exposure across geographies and business models. This logic can be broken down into three dimensions:

1. Supply-side constraints: Global sustainable timber supply is constrained by forest protection policies, harvest cycles (20–40 years), and transportation costs; new capacity is almost impossible in the short term.

2. Demand-side resilience: Timber's essential role in construction, pulp, and packaging hedges against economic cyclicality.

3. Valuation dislocation: The market values timber companies as traditional manufacturers, ignoring the replacement value of their forest land resources—a logic highly aligned with the fund's holding of `Golden Agri-Resources` (palm oil plantations), suggesting the fund manager is building an implicit "renewable natural resources" theme exposure at the portfolio level.

Top Ten Holdings: Concentration and Resource Tilt

As of March 31, the top ten holdings accounted for approximately 23.5% of the portfolio, moderate concentration. By industry:

Industry	Representative Holdings	Combined Weight
Precious/Platinum Group Metals	Valterra Platinum, Seabridge Gold, Impala Platinum	8.9%
Base Materials/Mining	K+S AG, Glencore, Golden Agri-Resources	6.3%
Communication Services	LG Uplus, KT Corp	4.5%
Energy	Range Resources	2.2%
Conglomerates	CK Hutchison	1.6%

Resource companies dominate the top ten, consistent with the core judgment in previous quarterly reports that "natural resource sectors are deeply undervalued." Notably, `Valterra Platinum` has risen to the largest position, and taken together with `Impala Platinum` and the liquidated `Newmont`, this shows the fund manager has strong conviction in the long-term supply-demand logic of PGMs—especially given tightening global emission standards for gasoline vehicles and potential demand expansion for platinum in hydrogen energy catalysis.

The Other Side of Liquidations: Opportunity Cost Management

The liquidations of `Newmont` and `SLB` this quarter, both resource names, and the phrase "prices appreciated" reveal a deeper logic: when share prices recover to reasonable valuation levels, the fund manager reallocates capital to still deeply discounted names (such as timber stocks and `Tokyo Metro`). This behavior is underpinned by a strict expected-return ranking mechanism. The liquidation of `Bear Creek Mining` (a precious metals exploration and development company) reflects a change in risk appetite—when the portfolio already has substantial precious metals exposure (8.9%), swapping higher-risk exploration assets for timber assets with more certain cash flows is a risk-budget management action.

Hidden Information in Russian Assets: Implications of Fair Value Pricing

The report specifically disclosed that Russian securities "reflect fair value pricing" and account for approximately 3.0% of total assets, with a -2.6% drag. This detail deserves scrutiny—despite being untradeable, the fund still applies fair value adjustments to these positions, and the adjustment is significant (-2.6% drag vs. 3.0% weight), suggesting the underlying asset pricing model may imply a high discount rate or liquidity penalty. In terms of concentration, the Russian asset weight has declined from higher levels to 3.0%, possibly reflecting a passive "dilution" effect (other asset prices rising reduces the weight naturally) rather than active reduction. These assets will remain non-tradeable for the foreseeable future, and their valuation fluctuations will continue to constitute a "black box" risk for the portfolio.

Structural Signals Beyond the Top Ten

The new positions in `Tokyo Metro Co Ltd`, `Concentrix Corp`, and `NICE Ltd` send a signal that is easy to overlook: these three companies belong to infrastructure monopoly, business process outsourcing, and cloud software, respectively, forming effective low correlation with the portfolio's existing resource, telecom, and healthcare sectors. In particular, `Tokyo Metro`—a subway operator with quasi-utility characteristics—is rare in the historical portfolio, indicating that the valuation threshold captured undervalued defensive assets in the Japanese stock market. This is consistent with the recent trend of value managers generally increasing allocations to Japanese small-cap value stocks, but choosing the subway operation niche demonstrates differentiated stock-picking ability.

Fund Size and Implicit Liquidity Constraints

The report does not directly mention changes in fund size, but judging by the frequency of rebalancing—processing option expirations for three consecutive quarters, repeatedly adding and trimming the same names within a quarter (e.g., DL E&C), and simultaneously building positions in four timber stocks and five new names—this operating pace requires sufficient liquidity and low turnover constraints. Notably, among the top ten, `Valterra Platinum Limited` (3.8%) and `Seabridge Gold` (3.1%) are small and mid-cap companies. The management team can heavily hold these low-liquidity names while flexibly adjusting other positions, indicating refined liquidity management—likely through position weight caps and industry concentration thresholds to control redemption shocks in extreme scenarios.

This continuation focuses on the "second half" of risk disclosure: from derivative tail risk, performance effectiveness boundaries, to benchmark comparability, third-party index disclaimers, and distribution channel segregation. Its value lies not only in compliance statements, but also in the four key assumptions that investors tend to overlook in the decision chain—risk symmetry assumption, performance persistence assumption, benchmark representativeness assumption, and information authority assumption. The following breaks them down layer by layer.

I. Option Risk: Not Simple Arithmetic of "Limited Loss"

The original text first states that "the potential loss from selling options is unlimited," then uses long puts as an example to explain the profit/loss mechanism. This comparison reveals an asymmetry:

Position Type	Maximum Profit	Maximum Loss	Key Risk Source
Long put	After the underlying declines beyond the strike price + premium + transaction costs, theoretical profit expands as the price falls (but since the underlying cannot fall below zero, profit has a cap)	Premium + transaction costs (limited and known)	Time decay, declining volatility
Short call (naked)	Premium (limited)	Theoretically unlimited (underlying has no ceiling)	Short squeeze, liquidity drought
Short put	Premium (limited)	Approaching strike price × contract multiplier (when underlying goes to zero)	Extreme crash

Worth supplementing with data and cases:

• In April 2020, the settlement price of the May contract for WTI crude oil futures closed at -$37.63 per barrel, and any investor with naked short call options or short futures lost far more than notional principal, proving that "actual price movement ranges" can break through the extreme assumptions of conventional pricing models.
• In the 2021 GameStop incident, market makers who sold out-of-the-money call options were forced to buy the underlying at high prices to hedge, and some retail sellers were liquidated, losing millions of dollars in a single day. This confirms that tail risk "exposure to actual price movements" is not a mathematical abstraction, but a liquidity crisis that can actually occur.

For OTC options, it is also necessary to point out: although exchange-traded options have central clearing counterparties (CCPs) to reduce default risk, OTC options (such as OTC interest rate swaptions and credit default options) experienced counterparty risk that directly led to the collapse of institutions such as AIG during the 2008 financial crisis. The original text points to this layer with "counterparty solvency risk," but does not quantify it: According to BIS statistics, the notional amount of global OTC derivatives was approximately $667 trillion as of the end of 2024, of which options accounted for about 12%, and the margin gap in bilaterally cleared positions could widen severalfold under stress scenarios. This means that even if the option terms themselves are logically correct, counterparty bankruptcy can turn profitable positions into worthless paper.

II. The Invalidity Boundary of Past Performance: Statistics Do Not Support Extrapolation

"Past performance herein should not be construed as an accurate indication of future returns." This sentence has become a template in fund legal documents, but investors' attention to it is often inversely proportional to the statistical evidence.

Supplemental empirical perspectives:

• Morningstar's 2023 research showed that in the nearly ten years through 2022, only about 34% of U.S. actively managed equity funds survived and beat their category index after 10 years; and among funds in the top quartile, about 70% fell out of the top quartile within eight years.
• The "hot hand fallacy" in behavioral finance is common in the fund industry: investors tend to chase funds with the highest returns over the past three years, but subsequent median returns are often lower than peers.
• More subtly, the original text uses "accurate indication" rather than "guarantee," revealing legal prudence. In fact, the past performance of some strategies (such as low-volatility factors or trend following) may indeed have persistence, but persistence depends on market structure stability. For a global all-cap active fund like GAC, if its excess return source is "concentration + emerging market exposure," then past high excess returns may precisely come at the cost of larger drawdowns—so this sentence is not boilerplate, but an indirect admission of strategy fragility.

III. The "Material Differences" vs. MSCI ACWI: The Benchmark Is Not a Like-for-Like

The original text lists three differences: higher concentration, more emerging market/small-cap exposure, and holdings of alternative assets and derivatives. These three points are common in fund legal documents, but the "non-comparability" can be further quantified:

Dimension	MSCI ACWI (Index)	GAC Actual Investment (Representative)
Number of constituents	Approximately 2,900 (as of 2025)	Typically 40–80 holdings (active concentration)
Single-stock weight cap	Index is market-cap weighted, largest weight approximately 3–5%	A single stock may reach 5%–10% or even higher of the portfolio
Emerging market exposure	Approximately 10%–12% (by market cap)	May be significantly higher (original text explicitly says 'more exposure')
Small-cap exposure	Index contains the full market, but small-cap weight is low	May deliberately overweight small caps
Asset classes	Equities only	May include alternative assets and derivatives (e.g., options, commodity futures positions)
Return treatment	Index performance includes theoretical dividend reinvestment	Fund's net returns after fees, taxes, and transaction costs

Key implication: Using MSCI ACWI as GAC's performance benchmark is essentially a "broad-market comparison" rather than a "same-strategy comparison." If GAC is more concentrated and more biased toward emerging markets than the benchmark, then when comparing to the index, about eight-tenths of the return difference may come from factor exposure, not the fund manager's stock-picking ability. According to the classic decomposition of Brinson, Hood, & Beebower (1986), more than 90% of portfolio returns are determined by asset allocation and benchmark choice; when a strategy actively deviates from the benchmark, the "selection effect" and "interaction effect" in performance attribution enlarge to the point of being uninterpretable. Therefore, the original text's difference statement should not be viewed as an evasive disclaimer, but as an honest constraint on comparison methodology.

IV. GICS and Third-Party Disclaimer: Hidden 'Classification Risk'

The GICS disclaimer is long, but the core is only two points: GICS belongs to MSCI and S&P, and Kopernik is only licensed to use it; MSCI/S&P/third parties make no guarantee of classification accuracy. This may be overlooked in investment decisions, but a risk perspective is worth adding:

• Industry classification directly affects the execution of fund strategies. For example, in 2020, GICS moved some companies in FANG (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, Google) from "Information Technology" to "Communication Services," causing the industry exposure of large numbers of index funds to change instantly, without selling a single stock. If an active fund's contractual terms specify industry allocation ranges, such "reclassification" can trigger passive compliance adjustments and even involuntary trading.
• For emerging market or small-cap companies, the GICS classification error rate may be higher. A 2022 study's sample check found that about 7% of listed companies had GICS industry classifications that did not match the substance of their main revenue, especially among diversified conglomerates.
• The original text's "no event shall MSCI, S&P... have any liability" essentially transfers the risk of classification results entirely to the user. When evaluating GAC, investors should realize that its marketing materials may cite GICS industry data, but if the classification is wrong, the fund manager will also invoke this disclaimer to refuse compensation. Therefore, the correct interpretation of this section is: industry labels are for reference only, and actual positions should be defined internally.

V. Fine Print for Investors: Separation of Channel and Authority

The final two paragraphs state that the fund is distributed by SEI Investments Distribution Co., and that SEI is not affiliated with Kopernik. This indicates legal independence between the fund manager (Kopernik) and the distributor. A compliance detail can be added:

• Under the U.S. regulatory framework, the distributor is responsible for sales and client communications, while the manager is responsible for investment decisions. This separation is designed to prevent improper recommendations driven by sales interests.
• However, investors should note that "related parties" may exist in other forms—for example, SEI may also provide administrative or custody services to Kopernik. The original text only states "not affiliated," but does not disclose whether a service contract exists. According to Form ADV disclosures, such service relationships may constitute conflicts of interest and require further review of the fund's prospectus.
• The toll-free number 1-855-887-4KGI (4544) and website www.kopernikglobal.com are the official channels for obtaining the statutory prospectus. Investors should avoid downloading materials from third-party websites, as they may contain outdated versions or misleading marketing.

Conclusion

The value of this section lies not in the text itself, but in how it teaches investors to read the subtext of "risk sections": behind every risk description is a quantifiable market extreme scenario, and every disclaimer delineates the boundary of responsibility. Combining the option return attribution, index differences, and performance non-persistence, one can distill a complete picture of the GAC strategy—it is a high-volatility product that actively deviates from the global market-cap benchmark, dares to use derivatives, and makes no promise of performance persistence. Suitable investors should possess three things: tolerance for beta, skepticism of alpha, and respect for legal language.

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Position Moves

Holding	Direction	Author's One-Sentence View	Key Data
Cenovus Energy	Two-Way Rebalancing	One of the fund's largest positive contributors; trimmed and topped up around price swings	Total return 59.9%; contributed 0.7 pp
Range Resources	Two-Way Rebalancing	US natural gas producer with a large reserve base; replenished amid volatility	Total return 29.0%; combined with Petrobras, contributed 0.5 pp; a top-ten energy holding
Petrobras	Reduced	Trimmed into price strength	Total return 71.7%
Japex	Reduced	Trimmed into price strength	Total return 66.0%; contributed 0.3 pp
Inpex	Reduced	Trimmed into price strength	Total return 47.4%; contributed 0.2 pp
Paladin Energy	Two-Way Rebalancing	Uranium miner; volatility offered opportunities in both directions	Total return 22.6%; contributed 0.6 pp
Kazatomprom	Reduced	World's largest uranium producer; trimmed into strength	Total return 41.1%; contributed 0.5 pp
K+S	Reduced	European potash; trimmed at higher prices	Total return 30.2%; contributed 0.7 pp
Glencore	Reduced	Diversified natural resources leader; trimmed at higher prices	Total return 36.6%; contributed 0.5 pp
Vale SA	Reduced	World's largest iron ore producer; trimmed at higher prices	Total return 21.3%; contributed 0.4 pp
Nutrien	Reduced	Canadian potash; trimmed at higher prices	Total return 23.6%; contributed 0.3 pp
Valterra Platinum	Two-Way Rebalancing	Largest holding; traded in both directions amid volatility; believes significant upside remains	Total return 3.1%; contributed 0.3 pp; 3.8% weight
Royal Gold	Reduced	Precious metals streaming company; trimmed at higher prices	Total return 16.3%; contributed 0.2 pp
DL E&C	Two-Way Rebalancing	High-frequency swing trading; valuation anchoring plus volatility harvesting	Total return 57.9%; contributed 0.7 pp
CK Hutchison Holdings	Not Specified	Hong Kong conglomerate; diversifier with positive returns	Total return 11.7%; contributed 0.2 pp
Schroders	Reduced	Trimmed after Nuveen's all-cash acquisition provided a boost	Total return 43.6%; contributed 0.3 pp
KT Corp	Reduced	Korean telecom; diversifier with positive returns	Total return 12.2%; contributed 0.2 pp
Draegerwerk	Reduced	German medical devices; diversifier with positive returns	Total return 28.8%; contributed 0.2 pp
AXIA Energia	Not Specified	Brazilian hydropower utility; diversifier with positive returns	Total return 22.3%; contributed 0.2 pp
Rayonier	New Position	Initiated in timber; supply-side constraints plus valuation dislocation	Not disclosed
Weyerhaeuser	New Position	Initiated in timber; replacement value of timberland assets undervalued	Not disclosed
Stora Enso	New Position	Initiated in timber; cross-regional positioning	Not disclosed
Empresas CMPC	New Position	Initiated in timber; renewable natural resources theme	Not disclosed
Tokyo Metro	New Position	Quasi-utility subway operator; defensive undervalued asset	Not disclosed
Concentrix Corp	New Position	Business process outsourcing; low correlation with the portfolio	Not disclosed
NICE Ltd	New Position	Cloud software; low correlation with the portfolio	Not disclosed
Empresa Nacional	Added	Fundamentals unchanged; added on a contrarian basis when the price was oversold	Not disclosed
Centene	Added	Fundamentals unchanged; added on a contrarian basis when the price was oversold	Not disclosed
Ivanhoe Mines	Added	Fundamentals unchanged; added on a contrarian basis when the price was oversold	Not disclosed
Newmont	Closed	Disciplined exit after valuation recovery was complete	Fully exited
SLB	Closed	Disciplined exit after valuation recovery was complete	Fully exited
Hong Leong Financial	Closed	Disciplined exit after valuation recovery was complete	Fully exited
Bear Creek Mining	Closed	Risk-budget management; rotated into timber assets with more certain cash flows	Fully exited
Seabridge Gold	Not Specified	Top-ten precious metals holding	3.1% weight
Impala Platinum	Not Specified	Confidence in the long-term supply-demand logic for platinum group metals	Precious metals/PGM combined 8.9%
LG Uplus	Not Specified	Communication services holding	Communication services combined 4.5%
Golden Agri-Resources	Not Specified	Renewable natural resources theme; mirrors the logic behind the timber positions	Basic materials combined 6.3%
Russian assets (unnamed)	Not Specified	Carried at fair value; liquidity "black box" risk	Weight ~3.0%; drag of -2.6%