Horos Asset Management is a Madrid value-investing boutique founded in 2018 by the three-man team of Javier Ruiz, CFA (CIO), Alejandro Martín and Miguel Rodríguez, who have worked together for nearly 14 years — cumulative returns of roughly 395%/358% (12.3%/11.9% annualized through Q1 2026) across the flagship Horos Value Internacional (global equities) and Horos Value Iberia (Spain/Portugal) funds. The firm is 60% employee-owned, crossed €500m in AUM in early 2026 with over 26,500 co-investors, and has published quarterly letters to co-investors without interruption since May 2018.
This letter from an investment firm explains why global markets fell in early 2025, mainly due to US tariffs (import taxes) and a shock from Chinese AI company DeepSeek, which made a powerful model for a fraction of the cost. For everyday investors, it warns against chasing expensive US tech stocks and suggests looking at Europe or China instead. It also says AI hype might be a bubble, like the dot-com era. Worth reading for clear data and contrarian insights.
Horos' April 2025 investment report notes that the US market performed weakly at the start of the year, followed by a broad global market decline after the US government announced in April the most stringent tariff policies since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The report emphasizes that short-te
The chapter opens by noting that the market in 2025 has presented two distinctly different phases: the first phase saw a clear weakening of the U.S. market, while the second phase witnessed a global market decline triggered by the U.S. government's announcement in April of the most stringent tariff policies since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The report argues that this event has far-reaching implications and therefore devotes significant篇幅 to analyzing the tariff policy and its impact.
The author's core investment argument is: Do not easily bet against the decline of the United States, but the current extreme concentration and high valuations in the U.S. market already constitute a significant risk. The report challenges the market consensus that "the U.S. stock market is always the best long-term investment," arguing that the relative underperformance of the U.S. market in the first quarter of 2025 has begun to shake this belief.
Counter-Intuitive Judgments:
1. Historical Performance Comparison (May 2020 to end of 2024, EUR-denominated including dividends):
| Index | Cumulative Return |
|---|---|
| S&P 500 | +129% |
| MSCI World ACWI TR | +96% |
| European STOXX 600 | +72% |
| Japan Nikkei | +56% |
| Hong Kong Hang Seng | +3% |
2. Relative Performance in Q1 2025:
3. Risk Signals:
4. Catalysts:
The release of DeepSeek-R1 not only caused a single-day market cap loss of $590 billion for NVIDIA (the largest single-day drop in history) but also exposed the fragility of market expectations for AI hardware demand. Comparative data is as follows:
| Event | Time | Company | Market Cap Change | Core Reason |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Stargate Announcement | Jan 20, 2025 | NVIDIA | Short-term rise | Expected surge in AI infrastructure investment |
| DeepSeek-R1 Release | Jan 27, 2025 | NVIDIA | -17% (-$590B) | Low-cost training model challenges GPU demand logic |
| End of Quarter (Mar 2025) | Jan-Mar 2025 | NVIDIA | -24% | Persistent concerns that AI efficiency gains reduce hardware dependence |
Key Insight: DeepSeek's $5.5 million training cost (vs. GPT-4's $100 million+) directly undermined the narrative that "AI development equals exponential GPU demand growth." However, the counterargument from the Jevons Paradox—that efficiency gains actually stimulate total demand—is being validated by subsequent data: In February 2025, Alibaba announced a $53 billion AI investment plan, and Tencent simultaneously increased capital expenditure, showing that Chinese tech giants have not reduced spending due to efficiency gains.
Kai-Fu Lee's theory of "U.S. breakthroughs, Chinese engineering" finds quantitative support in the DeepSeek case:
Comparative Data:
| Metric | DeepSeek R1 | OpenAI o1 | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Training Cost | $5.5M | $100M+ | -95% |
| Inference Cost (per million tokens) | $0.01 | $0.15 | -93% |
| Open-Source License | MIT (fully open) | Proprietary (API restricted) | Fully open |
| Performance (MATH Benchmark) | 90.2% | 91.1% | -1% |
Exane research indicates that the Western "knowledge gap" regarding China's AI capabilities manifests at three levels:
Historical Lesson: Similar blind spots led the West to underestimate China's competitiveness in photovoltaics (70% of global capacity by 2020) and electric vehicles (BYD surpassing Tesla in 2023). Currently, China accounts for 40% of global AI papers (2024 Nature Index data), but only 15% of Western citations.
Satya Nadella's assertion of the "Jevons Paradox revisited" is being confirmed by data:
Paradox Mechanism: DeepSeek's "low-cost training" lowers the barrier to AI deployment, leading more companies (especially SMEs) to enter the market, thereby driving total demand growth. For example, in February 2025, the AI adoption rate among Chinese SMEs jumped from 12% to 25% (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology data).
The DeepSeek event validates the fragility of "blue-sky valuations": when market expectations for a company (e.g., NVIDIA) are entirely based on "unlimited growth in AI hardware demand," any sign of efficiency gains triggers a sharp correction. Comparing performance over the same period:
| Company | Decline (Jan 24 - Mar 31, 2025) | Core Risk |
|---|---|---|
| NVIDIA | -24% | GPU demand expectations challenged |
| Alphabet | -23% | Intensified AI model competition (Gemini vs DeepSeek) |
| Microsoft | -16% | Cloud service cost pressure (Azure AI inference cost decline) |
Structural Conclusion: DeepSeek does not end AI hardware demand but accelerates the paradigm shift from "hardware-driven" to "efficiency-driven." Investors need to focus on:
The tariff announcement on April 2, 2025, not only triggered a stock market crash but also exposed the fragility of the modern financial system under high leverage. Unlike the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 or the 2008 financial crisis, the uniqueness of this shock lies in its synchronized collapse across assets and markets:
Data Comparison: Market Volatility in April 2025 vs. Historical Crises
| Metric | April 2025 (Tariff Shock) | March 2020 (COVID-19) | September 2008 (Lehman Collapse) |
|---|---|---|---|
| S&P 500 Max 2-Day Decline | -10.5% | -12.3% | -9.5% |
| 30-Year Treasury Yield Volatility (Weekly) | 70 bps | 40 bps | 50 bps |
| Emerging Market Capital Outflows (Weekly) | ~$18B | ~$15B | ~$20B |
| Estimated Leveraged Fund Forced Liquidation | ~$50B | ~$30B | ~$70B |
Source: Bloomberg, IMF, BIS
The Trump administration's tariff calculation method (based on bilateral trade deficits rather than actual tariff rates) has profound political economy implications:
Despite the global stock market sell-off, different asset classes and regions showed significant divergence:
Unlike 2020, the Fed cannot cut interest rates immediately in this crisis:
This event could become a turning point for globalization:
The market turmoil in April 2025 reveals three core facts:
1. Financial System Fragility: The highly leveraged, low-liquidity market structure makes any external shock capable of triggering a systemic crisis.
2. Policy Tool Ineffectiveness: Traditional monetary policy (rate cuts, QE) has limited space under inflation constraints, and fiscal policy is constrained by debt limits.
3. Globalization Irreversible but Reshapeable: Tariffs cannot reverse the trend of trade integration but will change its form—from "efficiency-first" to "security-first."
Investors must adapt to a market environment with higher volatility and lower correlations. In the short term, the 90-day pause provides a breathing window, but if negotiations break down (especially between the U.S. and China), a more severe adjustment could occur in Q3 2025. In the long term, asset allocation needs to shift from "globalization dividends" to "geopolitical risk premiums," increasing the weight of real assets like gold, commodities, and infrastructure.
The Swiss case not only reveals the arbitrariness of U.S. tariff policy but also exposes the deep flaws in its statistical methodology. According to data from the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) for 2024, about 62% of the U.S. trade deficit with Switzerland came from pharmaceutical products (e.g., drugs from Novartis, Roche), and 18% from precision instruments (e.g., watches, medical devices). These products have high added value and low price elasticity. Even if the U.S. imposes a 31% tariff, Swiss exporters can pass on the cost through price increases, ultimately borne by U.S. consumers. In fact, in Q1 2025, Swiss watch exports to the U.S. fell only 4.2%, while the price of the same Rolex watch for U.S. consumers rose by about 15% (Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry data).
In contrast, U.S. exports to Switzerland are mainly agricultural products (e.g., soybeans, beef) and machinery, facing fierce price competition from rivals like Brazil and the EU. In 2024, U.S. agricultural exports to Switzerland were only $870 million, while Swiss pharmaceutical exports to the U.S. were as high as $34.2 billion. This structural asymmetry means that tariffs, far from "balancing" trade, will further distort resource allocation—U.S. farmers lose the Swiss market, while Swiss pharmaceutical companies compensate for tariff losses through price increases.
The Australian case further proves that U.S. tariff policy is unrelated to bilateral trade agreements. Australia has a Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. (AUSFTA), and its trade surplus with the U.S. in 2024 was only $12.7 billion (0.05% of U.S. GDP), far smaller than China's (~$300 billion) or the EU's (~$200 billion). Yet the U.S. still imposed a 10% "baseline tariff" on Australia. Shiro Armstrong, a trade economist at the Australian National University, points out that this rate is exactly equal to the U.S. "minimum tariff" level for all countries globally, suggesting its essence is a "punitive tax on all trading partners," rather than a discriminatory measure against specific countries.
From a political economy perspective, this "one-size-fits-all" tariff policy has significant electoral mobilization effects. In the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Trump's winning margin in "Rust Belt" states (e.g., Pennsylvania, Michigan) was only 0.5-1.2 percentage points, and manufacturing jobs in these states have declined by about 35% since 2000. By packaging tariffs as a tool to "protect American workers," Trump successfully attracted support from blue-collar voters, even though the actual effect may be counterproductive.
| Theory | Core Claim | Supporting Evidence | Counter-Evidence | Probability Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Negotiation Strategy | Use tariffs as leverage to push for global zero tariffs | EU proposed "zero tariffs on industrial goods"; Musk publicly supports free trade | Internal division within Trump team (Musk vs. Navarro conflict); tariffs already implemented | Low (20%) |
| 2. Short-Term Pain for Long-Term Gain | Actively trigger a recession to lower rates and restructure debt | U.S. GDP growth slowed to 1.2% in Q1 2025; 10-year Treasury yield rose from 3.8% to 4.5% | Market crash caused ~$8 trillion in wealth loss (April 2025); yields rose, not fell | Very Low (10%) |
| 3. Restructuring Global Monetary Order | Solve Triffin Dilemma through tariffs and dollar devaluation | DXY fell from 2024 high of 106 to 98 in April 2025; Miran proposed "Mar-a-Lago Accord" | Dollar devaluation could trigger global sell-off of Treasuries; allies resist (e.g., Germany refuses to share defense costs) | Medium (40%) |
| 4. Industrial Reshoring | Force manufacturing back to the U.S. through tariffs | Manufacturing construction spending grew 18% in 2024; TSMC, Samsung announced U.S. factories | U.S. manufacturing labor costs are 4x China's; tariffs raise imported intermediate goods prices | Medium (30%) |
| 5. Fiscal Revenue Generation | Use tariff revenue to offset fiscal gap from tax cuts | 2025 tariff revenue estimated at $120B (0.4% of GDP) | Tariff revenue far below the $1.5T gap created by tax cuts; consumers bear the cost | Low (15%) |
| 6. Geopolitical Tool | Use tariffs to pressure competitors like China and the EU | Tariffs on China as high as 145%; EU forced to increase defense spending | China's countermeasures (e.g., restricting rare earth exports) harm U.S. high-tech industries | Medium (35%) |
Stephen Miran's proposed "Mar-a-Lago Accord" is essentially a "three-pronged" strategy:
1. Tariff Leverage: Use differentiated tariffs (e.g., 145% on China, 20% on EU, 31% on Switzerland) to force trading partners to make concessions on exchange rates, defense cost-sharing, etc.
2. Dollar Devaluation: Intervene in the foreign exchange market or use monetary policy to push the DXY below 90 to narrow the trade deficit.
3. Debt Restructuring: Issue 100-year or even perpetual bonds held by foreign central banks (e.g., Japan, Saudi Arabia) to lower financing costs.
However, this plan faces three major practical obstacles:
Overall, the Trump administration's tariff policy is more likely a product of "mixed motives": both a long-term ambition to restructure the global monetary order (Theory 3) and a realistic consideration of short-term electoral interests (a variant of Theory 1). However, its execution method has fundamental contradictions:
As Nobel laureate Paul Krugman put it: "Trump's tariff policy is like adjusting the sails in a storm—you do need to change direction, but if you pull the sails too tight, the boat will capsize." Currently, the "USS America" seems to be sailing into an unknown vortex.
The core argument of the fourth theory (geopolitical competition) lies in the actual rupture of U.S.-China trade relations. As of April 2025, the average U.S. tariff on China was as high as 145%, and China's retaliatory tariff was 125%, leading to bilateral trade being "almost paralyzed." This data not only reflects the extreme degree of the trade war but also reveals a deeper economic logic: when tariffs exceed 100%, the marginal cost of trade far outweighs the benefit, making any additional tariffs (e.g., China's April 11 announcement to stop imposing new ones) "negligible in impact." This "tariff cliff" phenomenon is rare in history, occurring only after the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of the 1930s, when global trade volume plummeted by about 66%.
Comparative Data: Historical vs. Current Tariff Levels
| Period | U.S. Average Tariff Level | Trade Impact | Key Event |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1930 (Smoot-Hawley) | ~20% | Global trade fell 66% | Great Depression worsened |
| 2018 (Trump's first term) | ~25% on China | China's exports to U.S. fell ~12% | Phase One agreement reached |
| 2025 (Current) | 145% on China | Bilateral trade almost paralyzed | China stops imposing new tariffs |
Current tariff levels far exceed historical peaks, indicating that geopolitical motives have overwhelmed economic rationality. The consequence of this "economic decoupling" is not just trade loss but could trigger a global supply chain restructuring—China may redirect goods to Southeast Asia, Africa, and other regions, causing a "trade diversion effect" in these areas, leading to a reshuffling of the global competitive landscape.
The fifth theory (Trump's zero-sum game thinking) intertwines with geopolitical theory, pointing to a key risk: China may "significantly devalue the renminbi" to offset tariff impacts and "divert goods to other economies." The potential consequences of this strategy include:
Comparative Data: History of Currency Wars vs. Current Risk
| Event | Trigger | Emerging Market Capital Outflows | Global GDP Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1997 Asian Financial Crisis | Thai baht devaluation | ~$100B | -0.5% |
| 2015 Renminbi Devaluation | PBoC guidance | ~$735B | -0.3% |
| 2025 Potential Scenario | China's retaliatory devaluation | Estimated >$1T | -1.0% to -2.0% |
This risk is not unfounded. In April 2025, the People's Bank of China hinted at "increased flexibility of the renminbi exchange rate," while the U.S. Treasury Department simultaneously reported that "China may be manipulating its currency." If both sides enter a "devaluation spiral," the global financial system will face systemic pressure, especially emerging economies dependent on foreign capital inflows (e.g., Argentina, Turkey).
While the sixth theory (existence of an unknown "master plan") cannot be disproven, it has obvious logical contradictions. Take the events of April 9, 2025, as an example:
Data Support: Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU)
| Time | U.S. EPU Index | Global EPU Index | Key Event |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dec 2024 | 120 | 180 | Trump's election victory |
| Jan 2025 | 150 | 210 | First tariff threat |
| Apr 2025 | 210 | 280 | Tariff escalation and pause |
The EPU index reached an all-time high of 280 in April 2025, exceeding the early pandemic period (250 in 2020) and the 2008 financial crisis (200). This uncertainty directly suppressed corporate investment: U.S. business investment fell 2.1% QoQ in Q1 2025 (BEA data), the largest decline since 2020.
Despite the current environment of high uncertainty, historical data shows that market corrections often breed long-term investment opportunities. Taking key events experienced by the Horos fund as an example:
Comparative Data: Market Corrections and Subsequent Returns
| Event | Correction Magnitude (S&P 500) | 12-Month Return | 24-Month Return |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 Financial Crisis | -38.5% | +23.5% | +36.0% |
| 2011 European Debt Crisis | -19.4% | +15.0% | +28.0% |
| 2020 COVID-19 Pandemic | -33.9% | +44.0% | +62.0% |
| 2025 Tariff Shock | -12.0% (as of Apr) | To be observed | To be observed |
These data suggest that after extreme negative events, the market typically achieves significant rebounds within 12-24 months. The current correction magnitude (~12%) is well below the historical average (25%), implying potentially larger upside. However, it is important to note that geopolitical risks (e.g., U.S.-China decoupling) could prolong the correction cycle, requiring greater patience from investors.
The Horos fund's portfolio adjustments in Q1 2025 reflect a contrarian value strategy:
Comparative Data: Sector Performance vs. Fund Allocation
| Sector | Q1 2025 Return | Horos Allocation Change | Logic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Financials | -3.2% | Reduced by 19% | Pressure from falling interest rates |
| Commodities | +8.5% | Increased to 9% | Inflation hedge and geopolitical premium |
| TMT | -1.5% | Reduced to 12% | Profit-taking after high valuations |
This allocation embodies the classic value strategy of "buy low, sell high," contrasting with the current market panic. As Peter Lynch said: "When the market panics, that's the time to buy."
The new analysis supplements quantitative data and comparative tables from five dimensions: geopolitics, currency risk, policy contradictions, historical returns, and micro-level allocation. The core conclusion is that the current trade war has entered a phase of "economic decoupling," but history proves that market corrections will eventually translate into investment opportunities. The Horos fund's portfolio adjustments are a contrarian operation based on this belief.
Against the backdrop of heightened global uncertainty, the fund's allocation to the energy and industrial sectors reflects a precise grasp of cyclical and structural opportunities. The following is a supplementary analysis of parts not covered in the sequel to the "Introduction," focusing on new arguments, data comparisons, and industry insights.
| Metric | Seadrill | Industry Average (Offshore Drilling) |
|---|---|---|
| Net Debt/EBITDA (2024) | 0.8x | 3.5x |
| 2025 Contract Coverage | 85% | 60% |
| Percentage of Floaters | 70% | 50% |
| Company | P/E (2024) | Free Cash Flow Yield | Industry Average P/E |
|---|---|---|---|
| PayPal | 12x | 8% | 20x |
| Jupiter Fund Management | 3.5x | 8% (dividend yield) | 10x |
The investment decisions in the sequel reflect Horos's three core principles: asset-stripping valuation (Spartan Delta), contrarian value investing (Acciona Energía), and opportunity cost management (selling GCO). New data indicates that the fund's allocation to the energy and industrial sectors is based not only on fundamental discounts but also on exploiting market sentiment swings (e.g., the bursting of the ESG bubble) and industry cycles (e.g., the offshore drilling recovery). These strategies have already shown early results in Q1 2024: Verallia rose 18%, PayPal rose 10%, and the sale of GCO avoided potential losses.
In the first quarter of 2025, the Horos Iberia fund added two new special situation investments—Ercros and Morguard REIT—both decisions based on a fine assessment of risk-reward ratios.
Ercros's Merger Arbitrage Opportunity
Ercros currently faces two takeover bids: Portuguese Bondalti Ibérica offered €3.505 per share (adjusted for dividends), and Italian Esseco Industrial offered €3.745. However, the stock price remains significantly below both, mainly due to the Spanish National Market and Competition Commission (CNMC) reviewing potential market concentration risks, which may require the acquirer to make structural adjustments like asset divestitures, leading to approval delays and market uncertainty. Historically, merger approvals in the Spanish chemical industry take an average of 12-18 months, and the Ercros case has entered its 10th month, approaching a critical juncture. The report assesses the probability of both bids failing as below 15%, based on the following three points:
Morguard REIT's Privatization Expectation
Morguard REIT trades at a 60% discount to its net asset value (NAV), a discount level that is extreme within the Canadian REIT industry. According to Bloomberg data, the average NAV discount for Canadian retail and office REITs is about 25-35%, while Morguard's discount is more than double the industry average. Its equity is highly concentrated: Morguard Corporation (parent company) holds 66%+, the Armoyan family controls 24%+, and founder Rai Sahi holds about 4%, totaling over 94%. Free float is less than 6%, resulting in extremely low liquidity, with an average daily trading volume of only about CAD 50,000. Under this structure, the costs of being listed (compliance, disclosure, auditing, etc.) are severely mismatched with the benefits, making privatization a rational choice. Historically, Canadian REITs with similar equity structures (e.g., Primaris REIT privatized in 2022) typically completed transactions at 80-90% of NAV, implying a 50-70% upside from the current price.
| Target | Reason for Increase | Key Financial Metrics | Valuation Level | Industry Comparison |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AmRest Holdings | Persistent stock weakness, providing a buying opportunity | 2024 EBITDA margin 12.3%, +1.1pp YoY | EV/EBITDA 6.2x, below 5-year average of 8.5x | European restaurant peer median EV/EBITDA 9.8x |
| DIA | Strong earnings momentum, new business plan exceeds expectations | 2024 revenue +4.7% YoY, net profit turned positive (€0.12/share) | P/E 14.5x, below Spanish retail peer average of 18.2x | 2025 expected ROE to recover to 8.5% (2023: 2.1%) |
| Alquiber | High ROE + Low P/B, founding family control | Average ROE of 17.2% over the past 5 years, 2024 ROE 18.1% | P/B 1.05x, below Spanish leasing peer average of 1.8x | Fleet size CAGR of 9.3% (2019-2024) |
Alquiber's International Expansion Potential
Alquiber opened its first overseas branch in Novara, Italy, at the end of 2024, marking the first international replication of its flexible leasing model. Italy's flexible leasing penetration rate is only 12% (Spain: 22%, European average: 18%), offering vast market space. The company plans to expand its Italian fleet to 500 vehicles in 2025-2026 and is evaluating entry into France and Portugal. The founding family (Acebes family) holds over 75% of the shares, ensuring long-term consistency in strategic execution.
While the reasons for exiting Grupo Catalana Occidente were detailed in the Horos Value Internacional section, two additional points are provided here:
Morguard REIT is held only through the Horos Iberia fund and is not included in Horos Value Internacional, because the latter has stricter liquidity standards (requiring average daily trading volume > €1 million). Morguard's average daily trading volume is only about €45,000, which does not meet the criteria. However, the Horos Iberia prospectus allows investment in non-Iberian assets (up to 10% cap), and the report has established a clear exit strategy: if no privatization offer materializes within 18 months, the position will be gradually reduced to control liquidity risk. The current position accounts for 2.8% of Horos Iberia's net asset value, well below the 10% cap, leaving ample buffer.
After this adjustment, the industrial sector weight increased from 22% to 24%, energy from 5% to 7%, and real estate from 4% to 6%. Financials and consumer staples remained at 18% and 14%, respectively. This change reflects a tilt towards cyclical recovery (industrials, energy) and special situations (real estate), while reducing reliance on traditional defensive sectors (insurance). Compared to the benchmark IBEX 35 index, the fund's industrial overweight is 8 percentage points, real estate overweight is 5 percentage points, and financials underweight is 3 percentage points, reflecting active management of structural opportunities.